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CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT AS AN ADAPTIVE MECHANISM IN EVOLVING 
TECHNOLOGY ECOSYSTEMS: THREE ESSAYS 
 
Tuhin Chaturvedi, Ph.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2018 
 
 
As contemporary business environments across the globe are increasingly affected by the advent 
of disruptive technologies, several technology ecosystems are in a consistent state of flux driven 
by the fast paced and discontinuous nature of technological change. This dissertation addresses the 
adaptive role of firms’ corporate development decisions in these dynamic and fast changing 
environments. I theorize on and empirically evaluate the role of four corporate development 
decisions – internal development, alliances, acquisitions and divestitures as adaptive mechanisms 
towards improving the likelihood of survival in evolving technology ecosystems. 
This dissertation examines how corporate development decisions exert an adaptive influence on 
strategic decisions taken at the product portfolio level (essay one), firm level (essay two) and 
transaction level (essay three). Each essay focuses on a unique challenge that accosts managers in 
evolving technology ecosystems – product configuration (essay one), corporate growth (essay two) 
and technology driven inertia (essay three). Also, each essay proposes that corporate development 
decisions contribute to the adaptive behavior of firms in different ways and hence, they represent 
strategic alternatives through which managers can overcome these challenges to enhance the 
likelihood of survival of their firms in evolving technology ecosystems.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
“If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” - Sir Isaac Newton 
 
 
No major initiative in a person’s life can be considered complete without acknowledging the 
collaborative and supportive efforts of mentors, colleagues and loved ones. My dissertation bears 
no exception to this rule and there have been several individuals who have made it a reality. My 
heartfelt gratitude goes to my advisor and mentor, Prof. John E. Prescott who was a guiding light 
to my scholarly efforts well before I arrived in Pittsburgh, PA to begin the doctoral program in 
strategic management at the Katz school. His scholarly and insightful views on multiple research 
questions and projects have been seminal to my research program of which this dissertation forms 
a central part. His emphasis on scholarly research having a high level of managerial relevance is 
one of the cornerstones of this dissertation. Prof. Prescott’s flexibility with time, patience with my 
struggles and failures and constant encouragement have been critical to forging and sustaining my 
scholarly spirit. I hope our collaboration can continue beyond this dissertation to alternative 
conundrums in corporate strategy.  
I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to Prof. Ravi Madhavan who has always been 
there as the voice of ‘reason’ while showing me alternative pathways to conceptualizing my 
research. He has also been instrumental in shaping me as a strategy scholar through his views on 
what strategy research has been, is and should be in the future. My thanks also go to Prof. Susan 
K. Cohen for her contribution to my research program through her participation on my dissertation 
committee. There was rarely an overview/defense session where she did not give me innovative 
ideas for future research questions. Both Ravi and Sue’s patience and encouragement have been 
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critical to this dissertation. I also extend my gratefulness to Prof. Tsuhsiang (Sean) Hsu who has 
been a regular mentor during my dissertation. Sean was always forthcoming in his views on the 
way I structured my empirical context and research question and his insights have refined this 
work to a significant extent. Prof. Yu Cheng has been instrumental in her contribution towards the 
empirical part of this dissertation. Her guidance as a teacher and mentor has been immense right 
from the start of our collaboration in the survival analysis course towards the culmination of this 
dissertation. I would also like to acknowledge the contributions of Professors. Feifei Ye and Kevin 
Kim (late) towards my empirical and methodology related training en route to this dissertation. 
The journey from an inchoate and rudimentary idea to a full-fledged dissertation would not have 
been without the presence of these individuals. 
I would also like to thank my colleagues from the Katz doctoral program – Jing Sun, 
Midhubalan Balasubramanian and Emily Bulger who provided me with some thought provoking 
ideas during the Katz doctoral program. The persistent support of Prof. Dennis Galletta and Carrie 
Woods was yet another asset that facilitated the fruition of this dissertation. 
Gratitude can in no way be an adequate word to address the immense and persistent 
contributions, sacrifices and efforts of my wife, Neha during the program. For all the moments of 
support and encouragement, I cannot be thankful enough. For all the foregone instances of 
enjoying some time together, I cannot be penitent enough. My parents’ support, blessings and good 
wishes have always been there with me towards the fruition of this critical initiative of my life and 
to even attempt to acknowledge gratitude would be futile – so immense has been their contribution. 
My immediate and extended family – my brother (Tushar), sister-in-law (Ankita) and my cousin 
sister (Jaya) were also invaluable sources of motivation during my dissertation. Finally, I have to 
acknowledge the tacit but irrepressible contribution of my daughter, Vara who gently arrived in 
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my life in June 2016 and immediately set about spreading immeasurable cheer, the positive vibes 
of which were particularly appreciated during some of the more sobering moments during the Katz 
doctoral program. Hopefully, I will have an adequate response on the day when she asks – ‘Papa, 
what is strategy?’. 
A token of gratitude goes to all the teachers in my life (in presence and in spirit) in addition 
to my mentors and guides from the Katz doctoral program. These individuals have always taught 
me the value of proactively maintaining a scholarly spirit and an intellectually inquisitive mind –
Mr. C. Natarajan, Mr. C.D. Sinha (late), Mr. Prem Prakash, Ms. Sabitha Raghunath, Mr. Terry 
Goodwin and Prof. Ilias Tsiakas. Finally, this dissertation has been influenced to a significant 
extent by the late Prof. Sumantra Ghoshal (thanks to his books and to YouTube!). His infectious 
enthusiasm and boundless energy for management scholarship has been a consistent source of 
motivation. Given his cherished goal of scholarly work being relevant to the immediate needs of 
practicing managers, I hope my dissertation presents a meaningful message for a corporate strategy 
practitioner who happens to read it.  
The above-mentioned individuals indeed have been the metaphorical giants who were kind 
enough to lend me their shoulders to stand and see ‘further’. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Since the inception of strategic management research, firm adaptation to rapidly changing external 
environments has been theorized to be a central driver of firm heterogeneity – a significant concern 
for strategic management scholars (Aldrich, 1979; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Levinthal, 1991; 
Miller and Friesen, 1983; Porter, 1980; Prescott, 1986; Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1994; Scott 
and Davis, 2006). Within this narrative of scholarly research, corporate strategy scholars have 
upheld the role of a firm’s corporate development function as a central pillar of its corporate 
strategy (Ansoff, 1965; Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2004; Puranam and 
Vanneste, 2016). The decisions aligned to the corporate development function (e.g. internal 
development, alliances, acquisitions and divestitures) underpin critical firm level outcomes such 
as product market survival, growth, profitability and shareholder returns. As a result, these 
decisions are popular in the realm of corporate strategy practice as they enable managers to 
leverage several drivers of competitive advantage.   
As contemporary business environments across the globe are increasingly affected by the 
advent of disruptive technologies, several technology ecosystems are in a consistent state of flux 
driven by the fast paced and discontinuous nature of technological change (Adner and Kapoor, 
2010; 2016; Dattee, Alexy and Autio, in press; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017; Parker, Van 
Alstyne and Choudary, 2016). Firms serving as the vanguards of technological disruption – Apple, 
Amazon, Alphabet and Microsoft have been responsible for disrupting established technology and 
product market ecosystems thus threatening the corporate vitality and longevity of firms left 
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trailing in their path (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Galloway, 2017; Simon, 2011). For firms that 
are less endowed and more reactive in strategizing in evolving technology ecosystems, adaptation 
becomes critical to ensuring survival. Scholarly and practitioner findings show that about 50 
percent of firms in the Standard and Poor 500 Index are embedded in global technology ecosystems 
experiencing diverse variants of technological change (Hsu and Prescott, 2017; Kim et.al., 2015; 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2016). These are - technological convergence (Hsu and Prescott, 2017), 
legacy vs new technology dialectics (Eggers and Park, 2018), eras of ferment (Benner and Tripsas, 
2012), technology speciation and exaptation (Cattani, 2006; Garud, Gehman and Giuliani, 2016) 
and non-linear variants of technological substitution or obsolescence (Adner and Kapoor, 2016).  
In view of this, corporate strategy practitioners have heralded the role of corporate 
development decisions as adaptive mechanisms that improve the likelihood of product market and 
firm survival in these environments. About 61 percent (on average) of corporate strategy 
practitioners surveyed by prominent global management consulting organizations think that the 
corporate development function is likely to assume survival enhancing significance as technology 
ecosystems evolve under the influence of technologies such as the Internet of Things, blockchain, 
artificial intelligence, artificial and virtual reality and machine learning (The Boston Consulting 
Group, 2016, 2017; Deloitte, 2016, 2018; Ernst and Young, 2015). Corporate strategy scholars 
seem to concur with this prediction with research on corporate development decisions being a 
subject of growing interest in recent years (Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; 
Kapoor and Klueter, 2015; Lungeanu, Stern and Zajac, 2016; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). Given the 
rapidly transforming landscape of global technology ecosystems and the concurrent 
acknowledgement of the need for adaptive action by corporate strategy managers and scholars, a 
pertinent question that arises is – ‘How do corporate development decisions enable firms to adapt 
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to technological change and increase the likelihood of survival (product market/firm level) in 
rapidly evolving technology ecosystems?’  
This dissertation addresses this question by theorizing on and empirically evaluating the 
role of four corporate development decisions – internal development, alliances, acquisitions and 
divestitures as adaptive mechanisms towards improving the likelihood of survival as technological 
ecosystems undergo structural and strategic change. Each of the three essays comprising this 
dissertation employs a distinctive context of change affecting technology ecosystems and 
examines how corporate development decisions exert an adaptive influence on strategic decisions 
taken at the product portfolio level (essay one), firm level (essay two) and transaction level (essay 
three). The dissertation addresses three different types of strategic challenges that managers face 
during these contexts – what is an appropriate product configuration? (essay one), how can the 
firm achieve corporate growth? (essay two) and how can the firm overcome the inertia of a legacy 
technology? (essay three). It proposes that corporate development decisions represent a strategic 
alternative through which managers can overcome these challenges and enhance the likelihood of 
survival of their firms in evolving technology ecosystems. 
Essay one employs the empirical context of an era of ferment in the mass market 
photography ecosystem between 1991-2006. It studies how three corporate development decisions 
- alliances, internal development – patenting and acquisitions assumed the role of knowledge 
accessing adaptive mechanisms and enabled firms to overcome the survival-threatening 
disadvantages of a feature implementation gap arising in digital camera product models. The 
challenge of maintaining an optimal product configuration increased in significance as the mass 
market photography ecosystem evolved to support digital camera firms and led to the obsolescence 
of analog photography (‘adaptation at the product level’).  
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Essay two uses the empirical context of technological convergence in the 
telecommunication equipment (equipment) and computer networking (networking) ecosystems 
between 1989-2003. It focuses on how four corporate development decisions: internal 
development, alliances, acquisitions and divestitures served as exploratory and exploitative growth 
modes that affected the relationship between a firm’s growth orientation and its likelihood of 
surviving in the converging product market ecosystem (‘adaptation at the firm level’). The advent 
of packet switching (networking) technologies substituted for the legacy circuit switching 
(equipment) technologies led to product market convergence, posing the challenge of seeking new 
sources of revenue and market share for corporate growth to managers.  
Essay three returns to the empirical context of the mass market photography ecosystem by 
focusing on the substitutive effect that the emergence of digital photography exerted on analog 
photography between 1991-2006. It studies how the choice and implementation of two corporate 
development decisions: new technology (digital photography) acquisitions and legacy technology 
(analog photography) divestitures contributed to resource reconfiguration (‘adaptation at the 
transaction level’). This enabled managers to overcome the challenge of technological substitution 
from digital photography that had adverse implications for the legacy technology of analog 
photography in terms of survival in the evolving technology ecosystem. 
In the following sections, I provide descriptive commentary on each essay in terms of the 
research question, theoretical framework, empirical context and results and intended contribution. 
I then conclude with a bird’s eye view of where this dissertation fits in the broader landscape of 
corporate strategy research and managerial practice given the reality of fast changing and 
continuously evolving technology ecosystems. 
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1.1 ESSAY ONE - SURVIVING THE “LIABILITY OF FERMENT” IN AN ERA OF 
FERMENT – THE MODERATING ROLE OF CORPORATE SCOPE 
 
Eras of ferment are periods of change for technology ecosystems affecting both their demand and 
supply sides (Adner, 2017; Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2016; Kapoor and Lee, 2013). On the demand 
side, changes in customer preferences influence the desirability of a firm’s products (Benner and 
Tripsas, 2012; Benner and Waldfogel, 2016). On the supply side, corporate scope decisions affect 
the types of product features that a firm offers (Davis, 2016; Kapoor and Lee, 2013). Firms that do 
not adopt the features of the evolving product dominant design are disadvantaged and theorized to 
exit the ecosystem (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Tegarden, Hatfield 
and Echols, 1999). Given that product market survival determines the winners and losers after the 
proverbial dust has settled on an era of ferment, understanding how corporate scope decisions 
facilitate firms in adopting features of the evolving product dominant design to enhance the 
likelihood of product market survival has strategic relevance.  
I theorize that one driver that threatens product market survival is a firm’s feature 
implementation gap defined as ‘the number of features of the evolving product dominant design 
that are absent from a given firm’s product design’. I also theorize that the focal mechanism that 
explains the relationship between a firm’s feature implementation gap and product market exit is 
the ‘liability of ferment’.  When a firm has a feature implantation gap, it is subject to a liability of 
ferment due to competitive disadvantages in the product market ecosystem (Christensen, Suarez 
and Utterback, 1998; Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et.al., 1999) and delegitimization by 
institutional stakeholders leading to a threat to product market survival (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
Baum and Oliver, 1991; Ruef and Scott, 1998).  
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The joint effect of demand-side changes in customer preferences for product features and 
the strategic relevance of supply-side corporate scope decisions as adaptive mechanisms in 
technology ecosystems experiencing an era of ferment motivated my research question. In an era 
of ferment, how do corporate scope decisions (alliancing, internal development and acquisitions) 
moderate the relationship between a firm’s feature implementation gap and its likelihood of 
product market survival?  
Second, adopting a knowledge-based view (KBV) lens, I theorize that in an era of ferment, 
corporate scope decisions represent knowledge accessing adaptive mechanisms on the supply side 
of the technology ecosystem (Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Mowery, Oxley 
and Silverman, 1996; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). These decisions facilitate access to 
extramural knowledge (e.g. technological, product, market and customer related knowledge) 
through alliancing and acquisition activity (Mowery et.al., 1996; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001) 
or leveraging knowledge within firm boundaries (i.e., patenting) (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). 
Using a longitudinal dataset of 843 firm-years involving 62 firms that participated in an 
era of ferment (1991-2006) in the mass market photography product market ecosystem, I used 
event history modeling and found that a firm’s feature implementation gap had a negative effect 
on its product market survival (i.e. increased the hazard rate of product market exit). Firms’ 
alliancing and acquisitions activity negatively moderated this relationship (decreased the hazard 
rate of exit). I found that the moderating effect of feature specific knowledge breadth patenting 
increased the hazard rate of product market exit but that feature specific knowledge depth patenting 
decreased the hazard rate of product market exit.  
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This essay makes two contributions to era of ferment and corporate scope streams of 
research. First, I contribute to research on eras of ferment by adopting a demand side perspective 
and theoretically linking it to product market survival. I develop theory as to how the lack of 
alignment at the feature level between a firm’s product design and the evolving dominant design 
creates a feature implementation gap that imperils product market survival in technology 
ecosystems experiencing an era of ferment. By taking a demand side perspective (product feature 
level), I complement research on eras of ferment that takes a product configuration and entry 
timing perspective (e.g., Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Eggers, 2016; Tegarden et.al., 1999) 
Second, drawing on the KBV, I add a novel perspective to the era of ferment literature by 
theorizing on the importance of supply side corporate scope decisions as knowledge accessing 
adaptive mechanisms that weaken or strengthen the negative effect of a feature implementation 
gap. Together, both contributions provide a novel perspective to research on eras of ferment by 
linking the supply and demand sides of technology ecosystems during an era of ferment and 
theorizing how they jointly affect product market survival in heterogeneous ways. 
 
 
1.2 ESSAY TWO - “PROLIFERATE AND MOBILIZE” – HOW FIRMS EXPLORE AND 
EXPLOIT THROUGH GROWTH MODES TO SURVIVE IN EVOLVING 
TECHNOLOGY ECOSYSTEMS 
 
Change in technology ecosystems require firms to adapt their growth strategies or face the threat 
of failure due to technological substitution/obsolescence (Adner and Kapoor, 2016; Christensen 
et.al., 1998; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Rapidly evolving technology ecosystems are characterized 
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by the emergence of new product markets (growth markets) underpinning opportunities for 
increasing revenue and market share (Luksha, 2008; Navis and Glynn, 2010; Woolley, 2010). 
Firms that realign their revenue and market share enhancement strategies around growth markets 
are more likely to survive as they can overcome the threats of technological substitution and 
obsolescence (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1993).  
In this context, I theorize that a firm’s growth orientation increases its likelihood of 
survival in evolving technology ecosystems as it is an adaptive response to technological change 
(Favaro, Meer and Sharma, 2012; Gulati, 2004; Penrose, 1959). Growth orientation is defined as 
‘the relative emphasis placed on the investment of firm resources towards increasing revenue and 
market share’. It is based on identifying and accessing new growth opportunities for increasing 
revenue and market share (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 
1993). It also entails committing resources to develop and leverage a limited subset of growth 
opportunities while diverting resources away from less attractive growth opportunities (Helfat and 
Eisenhardt, 2004; Chakrabarti, Vidal and Mitchell, 2011; Kaul, 2012). 
A firm’s corporate development decisions - internal development, alliances, acquisition 
and divestitures represent growth modes that drive the revenue and market share growth 
imperatives of firms (Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Dyer et.al., 2004). I theorize that firm growth 
modes are adaptive mechanisms that influence the relationship between growth orientation and the 
likelihood of firm failure through their ability to support the survival enhancing benefits of a 
growth orientation thus motivating my research question – In evolving technology ecosystems, how 
do growth modes (i.e. internal development, alliances, acquisitions and divestitures) moderate the 
relationship between growth orientation and the likelihood of firm failure? 
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To address this research question, I theorize that growth modes represent domains through 
which firms selectively determine the degree of exploration and exploitation defined as the relative 
emphasis on exploratory or exploitative corporate development decisions aligned to a given 
growth mode (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavie, Kang and Rosenkopf, 2011; Stettner and Lavie, 
2014). A high degree of exploration within a growth mode implies a focus on distant search and 
technological variation - entering new product markets to identify and access opportunities for 
revenue and market share growth (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and 
Singh, 1993). A high degree of exploitation within a growth mode implies local search or selection 
- committing resources to develop and leverage a limited subset of opportunities and diverting 
resources away from less attractive opportunities for achieving growth related outcomes (Helfat 
and Eisenhardt, 2004; Chakrabarti et.al., 2011; Kaul, 2012). As growth modes allow firms to 
selectively modify the relative emphasis on exploration or exploitation, they represent adaptive 
mechanisms that decrease the likelihood of firm failure.  
My empirical context is a salient case of technological change involving the convergence 
between the telecommunication equipment and computer networking product market ecosystems 
during 1989-2003 (Hsu and Prescott, 2017; Lee, 2007). Using a sample of 3,327 growth mode 
decisions made by firms in both sets of product markets, I examined my hypotheses using event 
history modeling. First, I found that maintaining a growth orientation had a negative effect on the 
likelihood of firm failure. Subsequently, I found that a high degree of exploration in the internal 
development and alliance activity growth modes exerted a ‘growth proliferation effect’ that 
strengthened the negative effect of growth orientation on firm failure. Finally, I found that a high 
degree of exploitation in the acquisition and divestiture activity growth modes exerted a ‘growth 
mobilization effect’ that strengthened the negative effect of growth orientation on firm failure.  My 
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findings indicate that firms that selectively emphasized exploration in certain growth modes i.e. 
internal development and alliance activity while emphasizing exploitation in alternative growth 
modes i.e. acquisition and divestiture activity were less likely to fail as they managed the twin 
imperatives of search and selection with their growth modes for superior adaptability. 
This paper makes two contributions to strategy research. First, I contribute to scholarly 
research at the intersection of corporate strategy and firm growth by demonstrating how firm 
growth modes serve as adaptive mechanisms in evolving technology ecosystems. By theorizing 
on the growth proliferation and growth mobilization effects, I demonstrate that a plausible driver 
of firm heterogeneity refers to the differences in firm growth mode choices and their influence on 
the relationship between growth orientation and survival. Second, I contribute to scholarly work 
on exploration/exploitation by showing the role of exploration and exploitation towards firm 
growth – a theoretical link that has received scant attention (cf. Raisch, 2008). By theorizing and 
finding support for the two effects, I extend research at the intersection of corporate strategy and 
exploration/exploitation by showing how selectively modifying the relative emphasis on 
exploration and exploitation in a firm’s growth modes improved the adaptive capability of the firm 
thus increasing its likelihood of survival during technological change.  
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1.3 ESSAY THREE - “REINFORCE, ATTENUATE, RECONCILE” – HOW RESOURCE 
RECONFIGURATION THROUGH CORPORATE SCOPE DECISIONS OVERCOMES 
THE INERTIA OF A LEGACY TECHNOLOGY ORIENTATION 
 
Resource reconfiguration (Folta, Helfat and Karim, 2016; Karim and Capron, 2016) assumes 
importance as an adaptive mechanism when the emergence of a new technology poses a threat of 
obsolescence or substitution to firms with legacy technology units – business units operating in 
technology ecosystems based on an established or pre-existing technology (Agarwal and Helfat, 
2009; Lavie, 2006; Sosa, 2011). Legacy technology units are vulnerable to a ‘legacy technology 
orientation’ defined as– ‘the relative emphasis on technological knowledge and products aligned 
to an incumbent technology’. To enhance the likelihood of product market survival, resource 
reconfiguration involves reconciling the tension between inertia associated with legacy technology 
units and adaptation to the new technology ecosystem (Adner and Snow, 2010; Huy, 2002). 
While resource reconfiguration assumes many forms, focusing on corporate scope 
decisions represents one way to examine what firms do to reconfigure their resources (i.e., 
acquisitions and divestitures) and how they reconfigure their resources (i.e., structural arrangement 
choices for integrating acquired resources and divesting resources) (Capron, Dussauge and 
Mitchell, 1998; Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan, 2001; Puranam, Singh and Zollo, 2006). 
Corporate scope decisions and their associated structural arrangement choices are central to the 
reconciliation of the tension between the two technologies as they affect the joint deployment of 
legacy and new technology resources that have a high potential for redeployment, recombination 
and complementarity (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Galunic and Rodan, 1998).  
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As product market survival is an outcome of successful adaptation in evolving technology 
ecosystems (Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Christensen et.al., 1998; Josefy et.al., 2017), how resource 
reconfiguration through corporate scope decisions and their structural arrangement choices enable 
firms to overcome and reconcile the inertia of a legacy technology orientation to improve the 
likelihood of product market survival is a strategic issue. The lack of theoretical insight into this 
issue and its relevance in managerial domains motivated my research question – In evolving 
technology ecosystems, how does resource reconfiguration through corporate scope decisions and 
their structural arrangement choices affect the likelihood of product market survival?  
I approach this research question in three stages. First, I theorize that a legacy technology 
orientation exerts a ‘legacy reinforcement effect’ that decreases the likelihood of resource 
reconfiguration through scope expanding new technology acquisitions and scope reducing legacy 
technology divestitures. A legacy reinforcement effect is driven by inertia associated with 
relatedness and coherence logic that contextualizes a legacy technology orientation (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001; Burgelman, 2002; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Second, I theorize that new 
technology alliance experience induces a ‘legacy attenuation effect’ that weakens the negative 
effect of legacy technology orientation and increases the likelihood of acquisitions and legacy 
divestitures. Alliance experience, a knowledge accessing mechanism, enhances absorptive 
capacity in the new technology thereby leading to greater familiarity and awareness of the threat 
posed by the new technology (Eggers and Kaplan, 2009; Lane, Salk and Lyles, 2001; Maula, Keil 
and Zahra, 2013; Schildt, Keil and Maula, 2012). 
Third, I theorize that in the event of new technology acquisitions or legacy technology 
divestitures, firms that survived were more likely to adopt hybrid structural arrangements (e.g. 
partial integration or partial selloffs) instead of pure structural arrangements (e.g. full integration 
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or unit selloffs) leading to a ‘legacy reconciliation effect’. Hybrid structural arrangements involve 
the joint deployment of legacy and new technology resources that have a high reconfiguration 
potential (i.e. capability for redeployment, recombination or complementarity) while isolating 
resources with low reconfiguration potential (Capron et.al., 1998, 2001; Moschieri and Mair, 2017; 
Zaheer, Castaner and Souder, 2013).  Hybrid structural arrangements harmonize the pre-existing 
legacy context with the emerging new technology context thereby enhancing product market 
survival (Kale, Singh and Raman, 2009; Puranam, Singh and Chaudhuri, 2009).  
Using a longitudinal dataset of 843 firm years based on 62 firms in the mass market 
photography product market ecosystem over the period 1991-2006, I found support for the 
hypothesized effects. As the technology ecosystem evolved due to the shifting emphasis on digital 
photography, I found that a legacy technology orientation aligned to analog photography exerted 
inertia decreasing the likelihood of new technology acquisitions and legacy technology divestitures 
unless they gained new technology alliance experience. Further, firms with legacy technologies 
were more likely to survive when they made new technology acquisitions and legacy technology 
divestitures while adopting hybrid structural arrangements for resource reconfiguration.  
Recent work on resource reconfiguration has studied the role of resource redeployment and 
resource/unit recombination as antecedents to reconfiguration (Folta et.al., 2016; Galunic and 
Rodan, 1998; Karim and Kaul, 2015), reconfiguration as an environment alignment mechanism 
(Chakrabarti et.al., 2011); the role of reconfiguration in technological innovation contexts (Kaul, 
2012); heterogeneity in reconfiguration approaches (Lavie, 2006) and reconfiguration in multi-
business firms (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010). My study contributes to the literature on resource 
reconfiguration in two ways. First, in contexts of changing technology ecosystems, when 
organizational inertia poses a challenge to firm adaptation, I theorize on how the nuances of 
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resource reconfiguration associated with the legacy reinforcement, attenuation and reconciliation 
effects improve the likelihood of product market survival. Second, my work emphasizes the 
importance of both ‘what’ firms do as part of resource reconfiguration (corporate scope decisions) 
and ‘how’ they undertake resource reconfiguration (structural arrangement choices). My work 
demonstrates that corporate scope decisions and structural arrangement choices are sources of firm 
heterogeneity that influence product market survival in evolving technology ecosystems.  
 
 
1.4 CONTRIBUTION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Two common threads link the three essays of my dissertation. First, each essay contributes to 
scholarly research at the intersection of corporate strategy and technology ecosystems by 
employing multiple theoretical lenses situated in strategy and organizational theory (Scott and 
Davis, 2006).  
Essay 1 links the demand side (product level features) of an evolving technology ecosystem 
characterized by an era of ferment with the supply side (corporate development decisions as 
knowledge accessing adaptive mechanisms) to develop a theory of product market survival. It 
provides a knowledge based view (KBV) perspective to the adaptive role of corporate development 
decisions and their contribution to product market survival in this context.  
Essay 2 connects the role of corporate development decisions as agents of exploration and 
exploitation with the survival enhancing benefits associated with a firm’s growth orientation to 
develop a theory of firm survival in evolving technology ecosystems. It demonstrates the role of 
15 
 
exploration and exploitation and how firms selectively emphasize the two through their corporate 
development decisions to supplement the growth imperative in these contexts. 
Essay 3 links the resource reconfiguring capability of corporate development decisions 
with the imperative of overcoming the inertia of a legacy technology orientation to develop a 
theory of product market survival in evolving technology ecosystems. Hence, it introduces a 
resource reconfiguration perspective to how corporate development decisions mitigate the threat 
to product market survival during the interplay between legacy and new technologies.  
Second, each essay demonstrates the significance of the firm’s corporate development 
function towards addressing and overcoming different types of challenges that managers face in 
evolving technology ecosystems. An associated message of the dissertation to managers is that 
corporate longevity and competitive fitness and agility can be inculcated by developing a broad 
and multifaceted corporate development function. Hence, firms that have the resources, knowledge 
and capabilities to leverage multiple types of corporate development decisions are more likely to 
survive in these dynamic and fast-changing environments.  
Essay one emphasizes the significance of corporate development decisions as knowledge 
accessing vehicles that contribute to product reconfiguration and hence enhance the firm’s 
competitive edge in product markets where the dominant product configuration is yet to be 
determined. Thus, the underlying message to practicing managers is that acknowledging the 
importance of these knowledge accessing vehicles may well be the difference between survival or 
exit from relevant product markets. 
From essay two, practitioners may note the role of corporate development decisions as 
growth modes that search for new growth opportunities while consolidating growth related 
outcomes from existing opportunities to increase the probability of survival in evolving technology 
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ecosystems. Hence, this essay demonstrates the survival enhancing importance of growth modes 
as tools wherein managers can selectively choose to either identify and access new growth 
opportunities or develop and leverage a limited subset of growth opportunities.  
Finally, essay three demonstrates the importance of corporate development decisions as 
survival enhancing agents that mitigate the inertia associated with legacy technologies in evolving 
technology ecosystems by enabling access to new technology resources and capabilities while 
diverting resources away from legacy technology resources. However, the caveat to managers is 
that the associated survival enhancing benefits may only materialize when they choose the optimal 
mode of implementation for these decisions.  
In conjunction, the three essays emphasize how corporate development decisions facilitate 
adaptation at different levels of analysis i.e. product level (essay 1), firm level (essay 2) and 
transaction level (essay 3) and correspondingly affects survival at different levels i.e. product 
market level (essays 1 and 3) and firm level (essay 2). In this, my dissertation joins the conversation 
around corporate development decisions and their increasing relevance in contemporary global 
technology ecosystems riddled with dynamic and fast-paced change. From a broader and more 
existential perspective, it demonstrates how the employment of corporate development decisions 
towards ensuring firm survival in fast-changing and turbulent environments represents a 
prospective source of firm heterogeneity – a hallmark of scholarly research on strategic 
management (Rumelt et.al., 1994). 
Given the fast-paced and persistently changing landscape of technology ecosystems across 
the globe, strategic management scholars and practitioners have long acknowledged the survival 
threatening implications for firms particularly if their adaptive capacity is found to be inadequate 
for overcoming the challenges of strategizing in these environments (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Hamel 
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and Prahalad, 1996; Hitt, Keats and DeMarie, 1998). This dissertation complements this 
conversation with the added insight that firms’ corporate development decisions represent a potent 
tool through which they can improve their adaptability and the possibility of surviving in such 
environments. For corporate strategy scholars, it emphasizes the importance of research that 
uncovers theoretical and empirical approaches through which managers can increase the 
sophistication, robustness and relevance of the corporate development function. For managers, it 
urges the importance of proactively developing corporate development capabilities aligned to a 
broad variety of decisions, each of which can contribute positively to firm level outcomes based 
on the firm’s environmental context and resource/capability requirements. 
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2. ESSAY ONE - SURVIVING THE “LIABILITY OF FERMENT” IN AN ERA OF 
FERMENT – THE MODERATING ROLE OF CORPORATE SCOPE 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Eras of ferment are periods of technological change affecting the demand and supply sides 
of product market ecosystems (Adner, 2017; Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2016; Kapoor and Lee, 
2013). On the demand side, changes in customer preferences influence the desirability of a firm’s 
products (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Benner and Waldfogel, 2016). On the supply side, corporate 
scope decisions affect the types of product features that a firm offers (Davis, 2016; Kapoor and 
Lee, 2013). During an era of ferment, firms that do not adopt the features of an evolving product 
dominant design are disadvantaged and theorized to exit the product market ecosystem (Anderson 
and Tushman, 1990; Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et.al., 1999). I theorize that at any 
point in an era of ferment, the inability to adopt the features of an evolving product dominant 
design can be captured as a ‘feature implementation gap’ defined as the number of features of the 
evolving product dominant design that are absent from a given firm’s product design poses a threat 
to its product market survival. 
Scholars studying eras of ferment have typically adopted a supply or demand side 
perspective in explaining firm-related outcomes. On the supply side, scholars have addressed 
disruptive innovation (Adner and Kapoor, 2016; Anderson and Tushman, 1990); technology 
selection and readjustment decisions (Eggers, 2016); entry timing effects on firm survival 
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(Tegarden et.al., 1999) and design competition dynamics (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). 
Alternatively, demand side perspectives have focused on prior industry affiliation on product 
design decisions (Benner and Tripsas, 2012); product design introduction/evolution (Martin and 
Mitchell, 1998) and the emergence of dominant categories and products (Argyres, Bigelow and 
Nickerson, 2015; Suarez, Grodal and Gotsopoulos, 2015).  
However, how demand and supply side decisions jointly affect product market survival in 
an era of ferment has received limited attention. More specifically, I theorize how firms adapt their 
corporate scope (supply side) to adopt features of the evolving dominant design (demand side) to 
improve their likelihood of product market survival. The limited attention to the joint effects of 
supply and demand side decisions is an important omission in the literature because the number of 
industries that have witnessed an EOF or are currently experiencing one, indicate that changes in 
customer preferences for product features require adaptive action on the part of firms.  
A few prominent cases of technology ecosystems experiencing an era of ferment include 
the computerized distribution of music (Burgelman & Grove, 2007), film and video game 
integration (Brookley, 2010), digital cameras (Benner & Tripsas, 2012), functional foods 
(Bornkessel, Broring & Omta, 2016) and internet telephony (Hsu & Prescott, 2017; Lee, 2007). 
The history of these ecosystems is littered with examples of firms that exited their product markets 
as they were not able to adapt to changes in customer preferences. In the digital camera context of 
my study, firms implemented an average of two corporate scope decisions (alliances and/or 
acquisitions) and invested in patenting activity (internal development) to facilitate the adoption of 
features of the evolving product dominant design. Yet, 48 percent of the firms did not survive the 
era of ferment and exited their respective digital camera product markets.  
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The joint effect of demand-side changes in customer preferences for product features and 
the strategic relevance of supply-side corporate scope decisions as adaptive mechanisms are two 
strategic issues that have implications for product market survival in eras of ferment. As product 
market survival determines the winners and losers after the proverbial dust has settled on an era of 
ferment, understanding how corporate scope decisions enhance the likelihood of product market 
survival has strategic relevance. The limited scholarly attention accorded to the joint effect of both 
these factors motivated my research question – In an era of ferment, how do corporate scope 
decisions (alliancing, internal development and acquisitions) moderate the relationship between 
a firm’s feature implementation gap and its likelihood of product market survival?  
I approached my research question in two ways. First, adopting a demand side perspective 
to firm adaptation in an era of ferment, I focused my theoretical and empirical attention at the 
product level – product features that comprised the evolving dominant design of the digital camera 
in the product market ecosystem (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Martin and Mitchell, 1998; Tushman 
and Murmann, 1998). I theorize that at any point in an era of ferment, a feature implementation 
gap defined as the number of features of the evolving product dominant design that are absent 
from a given firm’s product design poses a threat to its product market survival. 
The theoretical grounding for the feature implementation gap hypothesis is consistent with 
the demand-side logic of a product market ecosystem during an era of ferment wherein product 
dominant designs evolve in an incremental manner with product features being included in a 
sequential fashion (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Martin and Mitchell, 1998; Tushman and Murmann, 
1998). The inclusion of features in the evolving product dominant design is a selection process 
associated with collective strategizing of the product market ecosystem and the social system of 
institutional stakeholders (Garud and Rappa, 1994; Oliver, 1988; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). 
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A ‘liability of ferment’ mechanism explains the relationship between a firm’s feature 
implementation gap and product market exit. When a firm experiences a feature implementation 
gap, it faces liabilities - competitive disadvantages in the product market ecosystem (Christensen 
et.al., 1998; Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et.al., 1999) and delegitimization by 
institutional stakeholders leading to a threat to product market survival (i.e. a liability of ferment) 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Ruef and Scott, 1998). Thus, employing a 
demand side perspective of the evolving dominant design in an era of ferment facilitates insight 
into how a feature implementation gap poses a threat to product market survival.  
Second, adopting a knowledge-based view (KBV) lens, I theorize that in an era of ferment, 
corporate scope decisions represent knowledge accessing adaptive mechanisms on the supply side 
of the product market ecosystem (Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Mowery 
et.al., 1996; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). These decisions facilitate access to extramural 
knowledge (e.g. technological, product, market and customer related knowledge) through 
alliancing and acquisition activity (Mowery et.al., 1996; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001) or 
leveraging knowledge within firm boundaries (i.e., patenting) (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar, 2001). I theorize that accessing extramural knowledge and leveraging internal 
knowledge through corporate scope decisions are supply side factors that enable a firm to develop 
features of the evolving product dominant design that are absent from the firm’s evolving product 
design hence mitigating the negative effect of a feature implementation gap. Thus, my theory 
development links the supply and demand sides of the product market ecosystem to explain 
product market survival during an era of ferment.  
Using a longitudinal dataset of 843 firm-years involving 62 firms that participated in an 
era of ferment (1991-2006) in the digital camera product market, I used event history modeling 
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and found that a firm’s feature implementation gap had a negative effect on its product market 
survival (i.e. increased the hazard rate of product market exit). Firms’ alliancing and acquisitions 
activity weakened this negative effect (decreased the hazard rate of product market exit). The 
moderating effect of feature specific knowledge breadth patenting increased the hazard rate of 
product market exit but that feature specific knowledge depth patenting had the opposite effect of 
decreasing the hazard rate of product market exit. Figure 1 below illustrates the theoretical model. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model 
 
 
 
I make two contributions to era of ferment and corporate scope streams of research. First, 
I contribute to research on eras of ferment by adopting a demand side perspective (product feature 
level) and theoretically linking it to product market survival. I demonstrate how the lack of 
alignment at the feature level between a firm’s product design and the evolving dominant design 
creates a feature implementation gap that imperils product market survival. Through this, I 
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complement research on eras of ferment that takes a product configuration and entry timing 
perspective (e.g., Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Eggers, 2016; Tegarden et.al., 1999). Second, drawing 
on the KBV, I add a novel perspective to the era of ferment literature by theorizing on the 
importance of supply side corporate scope decisions as knowledge accessing adaptive mechanisms 
that weaken or strengthen the negative affect of a feature implementation gap.  
Together, both contributions provide a novel perspective to research on eras of ferment by 
linking the supply and demand sides of a product market ecosystem during an era of ferment and 
theorizing how they jointly affect product market survival in heterogeneous ways. 
 
 
2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.2.1 Feature implementation gap and product market survival 
 
In an era of ferment, a strategic decision for firms concerns the selection of features to introduce 
as part of their product design (e.g., optical zoom, removable storage as in digital cameras – table 
1) (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Christiansen et.al., 1998; Martin and Mitchell, 1998). Feature related 
selection decisions are path dependent with respect to a firm’s prior industry affiliation (Benner 
and Tripsas, 2012), technological and market related profile (Christiansen et.al., 1998; Suarez and 
Utterback, 1995), identity (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) and resource dependence on ecosystem 
stakeholders (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Furr, 2015). The choice of product features in 
an era of ferment is heterogeneous across firms (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Martin and Mitchell, 
1998). Therefore, the evolution of a product’s dominant design is a process of ‘selection’ wherein 
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specific features are added to the evolving dominant design in an incremental and sequential 
manner (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Garud and Rappa, 1994; Tushman and Murmann, 1998).  
 
Table 1. Dominant design in digital cameras (adopted from Benner & Tripsas, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
The stochastic nature of the evolution of features to the dominant design implies that firms 
do not have perfect ex ante knowledge of the features that will eventually form the product’s 
dominant design. Hence, the likelihood that a firm’s evolving product design will be isomorphic 
with the evolving product dominant design becomes a key strategic challenge. As both product 
designs evolve, a firm’s product design may not possess the all of features of the evolving product 
dominant design.  I theorize that at any point in an era of ferment, a feature implementation gap 
defined as ‘the number of features of the evolving product dominant design that are absent from a 
given firm’s product design’ poses a threat to its product market survival. A mechanism that 
explains the relationship between a firm’s feature implementation gap and product market exit is 
the ‘liability of ferment’.  When a firm has a feature implantation gap, it is subject to a liability of 
ferment due to competitive disadvantages in the product market ecosystem (Christensen et.al., 
1998; Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Tegarden et.al., 1999) and delegitimization by institutional 
Feature 
Year of 
introduction in 
digital camera 
models 
Model name /Firm
Year of institutionalization 
(50% or more digital 
camera models included 
the feature)
Optical zoom 1992 Fujix PR-2J (Fuji) 2003
Removable storage 1993 FUJI DS-200F (Fuji) 1997
Higher than (>) VGA resolution 1994 Kodak/AP NC2000 (Kodak) 1998
LCD 1995 CASIO QV-10 (Casio) 1997
Video recording 1995 Ricoh RDC-1 (Ricoh) 2000
Digital zoom 1997 EPSON PHOTO PC 600 (Epson) 1999
Full design 1999 Toshiba PDR-M4 – (Toshiba) 2004
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stakeholders leading to a threat to product market survival (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Baum and 
Oliver, 1991; Ruef and Scott, 1998).  
Scholars theorize that the evolution of a product dominant design is the result of collective 
strategizing by actors aligned to the product market ecosystem and within the broader social 
system (Garud and Rappa, 1994; Oliver, 1988; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Tushman and 
Murmann, 1998). Thus, features selected into an evolving product dominant design will be those 
that fulfil relevant competitive and legitimization imperatives.  
A competitive imperative involves establishing relationships with ecosystem players 
including user and their preferences (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011), upstream and downstream 
stakeholders (Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2016; Cohen, Hsu and Dahlin, 2016) and complementary 
technology providers (Kapoor and Furr, 2015; Roy and Cohen, 2017). A feature implementation 
gap negatively affects the competitive edge of a firm’s product design because diminished 
attention on the part of lead users and early adopters leads to lower positive network externalities 
and subsequent technological ‘lock out’ (Schilling, 1998). When demand-side expectations 
associated with desired features are not met customers switch to alternative designs that have a 
greater overlap with the evolving dominant design (Cusumano, Mylonadis and Rosenbloom, 
1992). This negatively effects the demand side of a firm’s business model limiting the scalability 
of an installed base (customers) and adversely affecting product market survival (Cusumano et.al., 
1992; Schilling, 1998).  
A feature implementation gap also hampers the operational compatibility of the product 
design with supply side ecosystem actors – suppliers, distributors and complementary asset 
providers. These stakeholders begin collaborating with firms whose designs represent dominant 
categories or have a greater overlap with the evolving product dominant design (Suarez et.al., 
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2015). A decrease in operational ties with ecosystem actors leads to resource dependence issues 
and ecosystem ‘lock out’ with adverse implications for a firm’s business model (Adner and 
Kapoor, 2010, 2016; Kapoor and Furr, 2015). Hence, a feature implementation gap negatively 
affects the commercialization potential of a firm’s design as early or ‘fast’ second movers with 
features of the evolving product dominant design compete for ecosystem partner ties (Argyres 
et.al, 2015; Eggers, 2016; Tegarden et.al., 1999).  
A legitimation imperative involves developing legitimacy with institutional stakeholders 
including technology standard setting committees/sponsors, socio-political institutional coalitions 
and governments (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Garud and Rappa, 1994; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 
1992). In an era of ferment, collective strategizing by institutional stakeholders leads to the 
development of a new ‘negotiated order’ (Dokko, Nigam and Rosenkopf, 2012; Garud and Rappa, 
1994). These entities proactively support product designs that align with the evolving dominant 
design and symbolically endow legitimation through memberships in institutional bodies while 
‘ostracizing’ designs with feature implementation gaps (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Cusumano et.al., 
1992; Garud and Rappa, 1994). Thus, firms with feature implementation gaps have the risk of 
being isolated from access to important technology and market trends, important product markets 
and inter-institutional endorsements across the ecosystem. These deficiencies in turn have 
pernicious effects on product commercialization and ecosystem viability broadly (Cusumano 
et.al., 1992; Tushman and Murmann, 1998). In sum, for firms with product designs that have a 
feature implementation gap, competitive disadvantages in the product market ecosystem and the 
delegitimization by institutional stakeholders has a negative effect on product market survival. 
H1: In an era of ferment, a firm’s feature implementation gap has a negative effect on 
product market survival. 
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2.2.2 The moderating role of corporate scope decisions and the feature implementation gap 
 
When a firm’s product design has a feature implementation gap, an approach for increasing the 
likelihood of product market survival is to ‘reverse course’ and include the absent evolving product 
dominant design features into its design (Argyres et.al., 2015; Eggers, 2016; Tegarden et.al., 1999). 
As per the KBV, I theorize that modifying a firm’s knowledge boundaries through accessing or 
leveraging knowledge assets (e.g. technological, product, market and customer related knowledge) 
is critical to decisions related to the introduction of features absent from a firm’s product design 
(Grant, 1996a; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Winter, 1987).  
I conceptualize the role of corporate scope decisions (alliancing, internal development 
through patenting and acquisitions) as supply side knowledge accessing adaptive mechanisms that 
facilitate access to extramural knowledge assets while leveraging knowledge assets within firms 
(Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Mowery et.al., 1996; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001). In their role as knowledge accessing adaptive mechanisms, these decisions are 
heterogeneous in terms of their potential to address the demand side issues associated with a 
feature implementation gap. In the sections below, I theorize on how alliancing, internal 
development and acquisitions moderate the relationship between feature implementation gap and 
product market survival in an era of ferment. 
 
2.2.3 Scope expanding decision – Firm alliancing activity 
 
The technological change and KBV literatures conceptualize alliancing activity as an adaptive 
mechanism that provides access to a broad variety of knowledge assets (Mowery et.al., 1996).  
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Alliancing facilitates joint development efforts for entering new product markets (Mitchell and 
Singh, 1992), knowledge transfer through the creation of relational capital (Kale, Singh and 
Perlmutter, 2000) and provides structural embeddedness and brokerage related benefits of inter-
firm networks (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995). These mechanisms facilitate the mitigation of a feature 
implementation gap.  
Alliancing provides access to extramural knowledge that facilitates joint exploration 
through recombinant experimentation or new knowledge creation (Davis, 2016; Davis and 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Grigoriou and Rothaermel, 2017; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). These 
processes aid the development of absent feature variants that can effectively replicate an absent 
feature or proxy it through substituting functionalities (Deeds and Hill, 1996). As firms explore 
and develop multiple sets of feature variants, collaborative teams increase their commitment to 
high potential variants to address performance and cost related issues surrounding the absent 
feature’s functionality (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Noboeka and Cusumano, 1997).  
The process of increasing commitment to specific absent feature variants is the result of an 
interaction between knowledge orchestration and product development alliances that transform 
absent feature variants to product-compatible features (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). Multiple 
iterations between collaborative teams benefit from ‘spill-forward’ or ‘spill-back’ mechanisms 
thus continually refining the functionality-related performance outcomes of variants of an absent 
feature (Furr and Snow, 2015; Garud and Nayyar, 1994). These processes lead to the creation of 
multiple feature-related ‘generations’ or ‘beta versions’ to be assimilated within product designs 
through iterative testing and refinement (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Uzumeri and Sanderson, 
1995). Hence, local variants represent ‘parallel paths’ to implementing absent feature functionality 
within product designs (Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002). As interactions between knowledge 
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orchestration and product development alliances increase, sequential and rapid transfer 
mechanisms fast track the performance and cost related characteristics of specific local variants 
hence improving their fit with the overall product design (Garud and Nayyar, 1994; Noboeka and 
Cusumano, 1997). Apart from their interaction with knowledge orchestration alliances, product 
development alliances with partners that already possess an absent feature fast track the process of 
introducing absent feature functionality (Deeds and Hill, 1996). Knowledge orchestration and 
product development alliances thus decrease the turnaround time associated with incorporating 
absent features within product designs.  
Through collaboration with downstream partners, firms can optimize the degree of co-
specialization with downstream assets to ensure that local variants of absent features address 
product market ecosystem requirements (Kapoor and Furr, 2015; Roy and Cohen, 2017). Ensuring 
a high level of compatibility with complementary assets also enhances customer experiences and 
product performance hence speeding up commercialization possibilities (Gans and Stern, 2003). 
Further, involvement in multi-partner alliances and technological standard consortiums enables 
collective maneuvering with institutional and social stakeholders through insights into new 
technology standards, ecosystem and institutional trends, and legitimacy spillovers (Axelrod et.al., 
1995; Leiponen, 2008). These benefits increase the probability of developing absent feature 
functionality. In these ways, alliancing across a product market ecosystem mitigates the feature 
implementation gap and improve the likelihood of product market survival. 
H2: In an era of ferment, alliancing weakens the negative effect of the feature 
implementation gap on firms’ product market survival. 
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2.2.4 Internal development — Feature specific knowledge breadth 
 
The breadth of a firm’s internal knowledge is the result of processes involving exploration, distant 
search and recombining knowledge assets that have heterogeneous and unrelated scientific and 
technological origins (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Hence, a firm’s feature related knowledge breadth refers to the diversity in knowledge 
assets that underlie the different features in it product design. During eras of ferment, high levels 
of feature specific knowledge breadth lead to a lack of focus in knowledge orchestration and 
hinders the development of feature level variants (Fleming, 2001; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006). 
That is, efforts to develop absent feature functionality through knowledge orchestration face 
significant roadblocks due to incoherent problem-solving approaches, suboptimal problemistic 
search trajectories and maladaptive search outcomes based on premature satisficing (Haas, 
Criscuolo and George, 2015; Knudsen and Srikanth, 2014; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). These 
processes lead to suboptimal decisions regarding the development of absent feature functionality 
that ‘lock in’ inferior feature variants (Schilling, 1998). Thus, commitment to inferior variant 
development trajectories precludes the benefits of ‘real time’ approaches to product development 
and exacerbates the feature implementation gap (Bhattacharya, Krishnan and Mahajan, 1998; 
Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002).  
The shortcomings of feature specific knowledge breadth and their orchestration potential 
are intensified by the heterogeneity of broad knowledge asset portfolios due to stickiness, 
transferability, context specificity and limits to decomposability thus placing limitations on 
combinatorial possibilities (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Szulanski, 1996; Winter et.al., 2012). 
This issue overwhelms the bounded rationality of knowledge workers whereby unfamiliarity 
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results in applying inferior approaches to knowledge orchestration leading to inferior recombinant 
outcomes (Fleming, 2001; Galunic and Rodan, 1998). When knowledge orchestration teams 
transfer feature related variants to product development teams, negative spillovers and transfer 
effects compromise the development of absent feature functionality due to the creation of 
suboptimal local variants of the absent features (Winter et.al., 2012). The probability of developing 
variants decreases significantly thereby increasing the turnaround time in addressing a feature 
implementation gap (Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002). Both these issues intensify the feature 
implementation gap and compromise a firm’s competitive position within the ecosystem exerting 
a negative effect on product market survival. 
A third issue of feature specific knowledge breadth that adversely affects the development 
of absent feature functionality is individual and team based heterogeneity in knowledge 
orchestration environments and learning patterns leading to structural and cognitive embeddedness 
(Bingham and Davis, 2012; Cardinal et.al., 2011; Reagans, Miron-Spector and Argote, 2016). This 
compromises the knowledge integration capability of knowledge orchestration and product 
development teams due to operational shortcomings (Gardener, Gino and Staats, 2012; Grant, 
1996b). High decision-making turnaround times, cognitive/behavioral biases in knowledge 
orchestration and blind spots regarding the potential of ‘breakthrough’ solutions obstruct progress 
towards the development of feature related variants undermining the development of absent feature 
functionality (Bhattacharya et.al., 1998; Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002; Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000). These issues emerging from excessive levels of feature related knowledge breadth 
aggravate the feature implementation gap through slow or maladaptive product design decisions 
hence increasing the threat to product market survival. 
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H3a: In an era of ferment, feature specific knowledge breadth strengthens the negative 
effect of the feature implementation gap on firms’ product market survival. 
 
2.2.5 Internal development — Feature specific knowledge depth 
 
Knowledge depth refers to the accumulation of knowledge assets that have related scientific or 
technological origins and underpin competence enhancing innovation through local search and 
exploitation (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Hence, feature specific 
knowledge depth refers to the level of knowledge accumulation regarding a specific product design 
feature. A firm’s knowledge depth evolves through deliberate learning, exploitation and 
codification through transactive memory systems (Ren and Argote, 2011; Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
Experience with knowledge assets, absorptive capacity and mindful learning improves knowledge 
depth through greater clarity on the characteristics of these assets – stickiness, context specificity, 
decomposability and transferability (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Levinthal and Rerup, 2006; 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Hence, this leads to insights into how the firm’s knowledge assets 
can be redeployed for developing absent feature functionality.  
Knowledge orchestration, codification and development of knowledge repositories 
learning processes ensure that teams and individuals speed up the process developing absent 
feature functionality in several ways. First, knowledge depth facilitates the processes of searching 
and selection of knowledge assets for creating feature related variants (Brusoni, Prencipe and 
Pavitt, 2001; Hansen, 1999). Second, as the turnaround time of variant development decreases, it 
expedites the selection of high potential variants and transitioning to product development teams 
(Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Noboeka and Cusumano, 1997). Hence, knowledge 
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orchestration teams can quickly transition to product development efforts aimed at developing 
absent feature functionality. In turn, product development teams increase commitment to high 
potential variants avoiding temporal delays (Helfat and Raubitscheck, 2000; Krishnan and 
Bhattacharya, 2002). Knowledge depth increases the effectiveness and speed of knowledge 
orchestration and product development processes thereby increasing the likelihood of developing 
high potential variants that can mirror or substitute for absent feature functionality to address the 
feature implementation gap.  
When product development teams are informed of the possibilities of loose coupling and 
near-decomposability of knowledge assets, they can leverage the advantages of product design 
modularity (Brusoni et.al., 2001; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). In this case, as teams develop local 
feature variants drawing on their knowledge depth, they enhance performance and cost related 
issues through iterative prototyping, testing and ‘plug and play’ approaches (Staudenmeyer, 
Tripsas and Tucci, 2005). The creation of increasingly superior and robust variants that improve 
product design related performance leads to faster turnarounds as performance gaps in absent 
feature functionality are addressed. Thus, product reconfiguration processes driven by knowledge 
depth have a higher probability of mitigating the feature implementation gap and improving the 
likelihood of product market survival (Eggers, 2016).  
H3b: In an era of ferment, feature specific knowledge depth weakens the negative effect 
of the feature implementation gap on firms’ product market survival. 
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2.2.6 Scope expanding decision – Firm acquisition activity 
 
Scholarly work on technological change and the KBV conceptualizes acquisitions as expanding 
corporate scope by facilitating access to portfolios of related and unrelated knowledge assets that 
enhance the firms’ technological and product development capabilities (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Puranam, Singh and Zollo, 2003; Puranam et.al. 2006). 
Acquisitions augment a firm’s knowledge orchestration and product development capability by 
altering the development trajectory of product design wherein firms can improve the alignment 
between their product designs and the evolving dominant designs (Grimpe, 2007).  
Acquired knowledge assets that have a high degree of relatedness supplement the firm’s 
knowledge orchestration potential through complementarity or super-additivity in recombinant 
experimentation or through ‘grafting’ related outcomes (Kim and Finkelstein, 2009; Puranam 
et.al., 2003; Sears and Hoetkar, 2014). Since grafting benefits from structural absorption of the 
target, improved coordination between the acquirer and target knowledge orchestration teams 
accelerates the development of feature related variants (Puranam et.al., 2003). Hence, the process 
of variant development is faster as the benefits of time compression and scale and scope in 
knowledge orchestration are realized. In turn, product development processes are scaled up 
through a steady input of feature related variants transitioned into local variants that can be 
included within product designs (Grimpe, 2007). Thus, scale and scope in knowledge orchestration 
and product development increase the possibility of firms developing absent feature functionality 
improving the likelihood of addressing the feature implementation gap.  
Alternatively, acquisitions with lower degrees of relatedness provide access to knowledge 
orchestration alternatives that were previously unavailable to the firm (Cassiman et.al.,2005; Lodh 
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and Battaggion, 2015). Employing the twin mechanisms of structural absorption and subsequent 
collaboration of acquirer-target teams is one approach to knowledge orchestration (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991; Puranam et.al. 2006). However, in some cases, target teams are granted 
autonomy to develop absent feature functionality through leveraging the potential of target 
resources to generate innovation (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). This mitigates the possibility of 
negative spillovers across knowledge orchestration routines that may arise from lower degrees of 
relatedness (Puranam et.al., 2006) Through autonomous knowledge orchestration, target teams 
augment the knowledge orchestration efforts of acquirer teams thereby effectively addressing the 
feature implementation gap (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). A third approach to developing absent 
feature functionality involves acquiring firms that have feature functionality absent from the 
acquirer’s evolving product design (Puranam et.al., 2003, 2006). Thus, absent features are directly 
introduced into the acquirer’s product design or alternatively, acquirers may use target product 
lines to cannibalize their own product lines that are prone to the feature implementation gap.  
A parallel advantage of acquisitions lies in their potential as mechanisms of strategic 
maneuvering wherein acquirers increase their control over technology ecosystems through 
preemption of upstream and downstream assets (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Drees and 
Heugens, 2013). Consequently, product designs with newly incorporated absent feature 
functionality can be protected from competitive pressures as they carve out product market niches. 
Hence, the prospects of commercialization and strong competitive positioning improve as resource 
dependence concerns are mitigated (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Acquisitions also improve the 
visibility of acquirer product designs thereby enhancing their prominence in the ecosystem and the 
broader institutional environment (Bettinazzi and Zollo, 2017). Thus, they ensure that acquirers 
gain legitimacy from institutional stakeholders through a process of collective strategizing (Greve 
36 
 
and Zhang, 2017). These advantages of acquisitions enable firms to successfully address the 
feature implementation gap and mitigate the threat to product market survival. 
H4: In an era of ferment, acquisition activity weakens the negative effect of the feature 
implementation gap on firms’ product market survival. 
 
 
2.3 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.3.1 Empirical context 
 
The context was the digital camera product market as it witnessed an era of ferment due to the 
technological convergence of three sets of industries- computing (SIC 3571, 3572, 3577 and 5045), 
consumer electronics (SIC 5064 and 5065) and photography (SIC 3861 and 5043) (Benner and 
Tripsas, 2012). Convergence was the consequence of a technological discontinuity in the form of 
digital photography that enabled computer and consumer electronics firms to develop 
technological and market related capabilities pertinent to the mass market photography ecosystem 
(Aoshima and Fukushima, 1998). This triggered an era of ferment that led to the set of features 
that would comprise the digital photography dominant design. Digital camera products had a high 
level of modularity indicating that firms had discretion regarding the choice of features to include 
in their product lines (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). I chose the years 
1991 to 2006 since the first digital camera was released in the U.S. in 1991and in 2007, the iPhone 
stimulated another round of ferment (Logitech press release, 1991; Digital Camera History 
website). This period was also the ‘coming of age’ of the digital photography standard wherein the 
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features of the dominant design evolved from 1992 onwards and the six features comprising the 
dominant design were institutionalized by 2004 (i.e. when > 50 percent of all digital camera models 
adopted the features of the dominant design (Benner and Tripsas, 2012) (table 1). This significantly 
revolutionized the mass market photography ecosystem and shifted the strategic focus of firms and 
the preferences of customers towards digital cameras. 
 
2.3.2 Data 
 
I used the COMPUSTAT database to collect financial data for public firms in the three industries. 
The total number of firms in the sample was 62 - 16 computing, 24 consumer electronics and 22 
photography firms resulting in 843 firm year observations. I included a firm only if it had 
introduced a digital camera model with any combination of features of the dominant design (table 
1) in the mass market digital camera product market (digital single lens and reflex- DSLR). Hence, 
SLR and web based cameras were excluded from the analysis. Firm alliancing and acquisition 
activity data was collected using the Thompson Financial SDC database and through public 
announcements through Lexis-Nexis. My dataset included 72 alliances and 51 acquisitions formed 
for accessing knowledge specific to digital photography (technological, upstream or downstream). 
To determine whether an alliance/acquisition was related to digital photography, I referred to 
alliancing and acquisition announcements provided in SDC as well as company and industry 
sources. For internal development (feature specific knowledge breadth and depth), I collected 
patenting data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database for feature 
specific patents using feature and company names. I complemented my dataset by including data 
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corresponding to the patent classes of the digital camera product market as mentioned by Benner 
and Tripsas (2012).  
 
2.3.3 Dependent variable 
 
Product market survival was a dichotomous variable coded one in the year when a firm exit the 
digital camera product market and zero otherwise. Using Lexis-Nexis, official company 
documents and public sources, exit was recorded when a firm ceased operations and/or 
discontinued production of digital cameras in their product markets (Josefy et.al., 2017). I did not 
code a firm as having exit if it was taken over and given operational autonomy or was bailed out 
and ex post it resumed operations related to digital cameras. In my sample, 30 of the 62 firms (48 
percent) did not survive and the remaining 32 cases were treated as right censored for empirical 
analysis (Allison, 1984).  
 
2.3.4 Independent variable  
 
Feature implementation gap – The digital camera’s dominant design evolved over the sample 
period with several features introduced but only six institutionalized as shown by Benner and 
Tripsas (2012). The operationalization of the feature implementation gap accommodated the 
introduction and the institutionalization of the features of the product dominant design. A firm 
experienced a feature implementation gap if it did not introduce an evolving product dominant 
design feature once it was introduced. The gap intensified after the feature had been 
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institutionalized because if a feature survived the selection window and was institutionalized, it 
became one of the features of the product dominant design.  
Table 1 shows the features comprising the digital camera dominant design, the years each 
feature was introduced and institutionalized. Benner and Tripsas (2012) defined feature 
institutionalization as ‘the year when 50 percent of the total digital camera products possessed a 
given feature’.  I reconfirmed their findings using several sources (e.g., company websites, trade 
publications, Future Image Report, PC Photo and digital camera web sites (e.g., dpreview.com, 
imaging-resource.com, digicamhistory.com and dcviews.com).  For each firm, the yearly 
calculation of the feature implementation gap involved two steps (see Appendix A for an example). 
 
Step 1) Feature level coding: Once a feature of the dominant design was introduced I assigned a 
‘yearly absent feature score’ δpt for each firm (‘p’ represents a given feature and ‘t’ a specific 
year). I first ascertained whether a firm implemented a given feature by examining the features of 
each digital camera model to evaluate whether and when any model had introduced the feature in 
a given year. I then coded the yearly absent feature score (δ) for feature ‘p’ for year ‘t’ as follows: 
if the firm had implemented the feature δpt was coded zero (not absent); if it had not introduced 
the feature in the year, δpt was coded one (absent). If the firm had not introduced a feature after it 
was institutionalized, I multiplied δpt by a factor φ (the number of years after institutionalization) 
to capture the additional threat posed to a firm’s product design by an absent feature that was 
institutionalized. My coding approach was dynamic on a year-by-year basis i.e. if a firm 
implemented feature ‘p’ in year ‘t’ (coded as 0), but then removed the feature ‘p’ from its model 
in year ‘t+1’, I recoded ‘δpt+1’ to 1 for ‘t+1’. Through this, I ensured that the measure was 
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methodologically congruent with the evolving product dominant design (Argyres et.al., 2015; 
Suarez et.al., 2015).  
 
Step 2) Feature implementation gap score: For each year, I repeated step 1 for each feature 
(once it had been introduced). I then summed the yearly absent feature scores and divided it by the 
number of features introduced up to that year to get the firm’s product feature implementation gap 
score for that year. The gap for a given year ‘t’ is thus given by:  δFIGt = (∑ 𝛅𝐩𝐭𝒏𝒑=𝟏 )/n where δFIGt 
is the feature implementation gap score for a given year ‘t’, δpt is the absent feature score for 
feature ‘p’ and ‘n’ takes values from one to six based on how many features had been introduced 
by year ‘t’. The gap score had a range between zero and one (0 ≤ gap ≤ 1) where zero implied an 
absence of a gap (e.g., all six features present) and one implied the maximum gap (e.g., all six 
features absent). Alternative operationalizations of the feature implementation gap variable are 
presented in the robustness tests section.  
 
2.3.5 Moderator variables 
 
a) Firm alliancing activity – Operationalized as the sum of all alliances formed by a firm each 
year. Lagged by one year to control for learning effects (Mowery et.al., 1996).  
 
b) Feature specific knowledge breadth was calculated as the diversity in patenting activity across 
all features for each firm in each year using a Blau index given as 𝟏 −  ∑ 𝒑𝒊𝒏 𝒊=𝟏
𝟐
. Here, pi represents 
the ratio between the number patents that a firm had with respect to the ith feature and the total 
number of patents across ‘n’ features. (Fernhaber and Patel, 2012; Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  
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c) Feature specific knowledge depth – For a given digital camera feature, for each patent, I 
counted the number of citations made to other patents based on the given feature (feature specific 
citations). I then calculated a ratio of the sum of citations made to other patents to the total citations 
to arrive at the feature specific knowledge depth variable for the given feature (Fernhaber and 
Patel, 2012; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). I repeated this process for all the patents across all six 
features for each firm year as shown,   where x = number of 
features that a firm patented in for each year and y = number of patents (j) that a firm had in a 
given feature ‘i’. Both knowledge breadth and depth were lagged by one year.  
 
d) Firm acquisition activity - Operationalized as the sum of all acquisitions formed by a firm 
each year. Lagged by one year to control for learning effects (Puranam et.al., 2006). 
 
2.3.6 Control variables 
 
The operationalization and rationale for inclusion of the controls are in table 2. With the exception 
of product market size, population density, product market/time fixed effects and feature 
implementation/institutionalization dummy variables, all controls were lagged by one year. 
 
2.3.7 Empirical methodology 
 
I used event history modeling given its ability to handle data with right censoring (Allison, 1984; 
Cleves, Gould and Marchenko, 2016). For each set of hypotheses, I used a proportional hazards 
42 
 
 
Table 2. Control variables, operationalization and rationale for inclusion 
 
 
Control variable Operationalization Data source Reference Rationale for inclusion 
Firm size Natural logarithm of revenue COMPUSTAT NA Firm size is an important driver of 
corporate scope as well as a 
determinant of survival during 
different types of environmental 
change 
Product market 
size 
Natural logarithm of 
shipments (millions of units 
sold) 
Standard and Poor 
Industry Survey 
Handbooks, Mergent 
Online, IBIS World 
Suarez and 
Utterback (1995) 
Shipment values indicate market 
demand and are indicators of 
munificence affecting the 
likelihood of survival 
Product market 
population density 
Natural logarithm of number 
of firms in product market 
Standard and Poor 
Industry Survey 
Handbooks, Mergent 
Online, IBIS World 
Suarez and 
Utterback (1995) 
Population may affect firm 
survival depending on the 
competitive dynamics in the 
product market 
Entry before 
dominant design 
introduction 
dummy 
Dummy variable code 1 if a 
firm entered the digital 
camera product market 
before the year 1999 when 
the full dominant design (all 
six features) was introduced; 
0 otherwise 
Future Image Report, 
PC Photo and digital 
camera web sites (e.g., 
dpreview.com, 
imaging-resource.com, 
digicamhistory.com 
and dcviews.com) 
Benner and 
Tripsas (2012); 
Suarez and 
Utterback (1995) 
Firms that enter the product 
market prior to the introduction of 
the dominant design may have a 
greater or lower likelihood of 
survival 
Entry before 
dominant design 
Dummy variable code 1 if a 
firm entered the digital 
camera product market 
Future Image Report, 
PC Photo and digital 
camera web sites (e.g., 
Benner and 
Tripsas (2012);  
Firms that enter the product 
market prior to the 
institutionalization of the 
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institutionalization 
dummy 
before the year 2004 when 
the full dominant design was 
institutionalized (i.e. >50 
percent of digital camera 
models had all the six 
features of the dominant 
design) ; 0 otherwise 
dpreview.com, 
imaging-resource.com, 
digicamhistory.com 
and dcviews.com) 
Suarez and 
Utterback (1995) 
dominant design may have a 
greater  likelihood of survival 
Feature 
institutionalization 
dummy 
Dummy variable coded 1 for 
the years between 1997-2004 
as features 
institutionalization began and 
occurred during this period; 
0 otherwise 
Future Image Report, 
PC Photo and digital 
camera web sites (e.g., 
dpreview.com, 
imaging-resource.com, 
digicamhistory.com 
and dcviews.com) 
Benner and 
Tripsas (2012) 
Ex post institutionalization, 
product market exits increased as 
shown in panel 1b of figure 1. 
This variable controls for 
extraneous factors that may have 
expedited exit. 
Product market 
fixed effects 
Dummy variable code 1 
when the firm was present in 
a photography product 
market (SIC 5064, 5065); 0 
otherwise 
NA NA The photography product market 
firms had a higher probability of 
introducing a greater number of 
digital camera models compared 
to the other two product markets 
Time fixed effects Dummy variable code 1 for 
the year 2001; 0 otherwise 
NA Hsu and Prescott 
(2017) 
The technology crash (dotcom 
bubble) of 2001 was a significant 
macroeconomic event affecting 
the entire technology sector 
Corporate 
diversification 
intensity 
Number of four digit SIC 
codes that a given firm was 
present 
Standard and Poor 
Industry Survey 
Handbooks, Mergent 
Online, IBIS World 
Villalonga (2004) Diversified firms may have a 
broader variation of technological 
and market resources that enable 
firm survival during the era of 
ferment 
Digital camera 
product portfolio 
breadth 
Natural logarithm of the 
cumulative number of digital 
camera models introduced by 
a firm  
Future Image Report, 
PC Photo and digital 
camera web sites (e.g., 
dpreview.com, 
Benner and 
Tripsas (2012) 
Firms having a broader product 
range of digital camera models 
may have a higher likelihood of 
mitigating the feature 
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imaging-resource.com, 
digicamhistory.com 
and dcviews.com) 
implementation gap and 
improving the likelihood survival 
Prior R&D 
expense 
Natural logarithm of (R&D 
expenditure/Total Revenue) 
for each firm year 
COMPUSTAT Benner and 
Ranganathan 
(2012) 
Firms that invest heavily in R&D 
may have a greater likelihood of 
addressing and mitigating the 
feature implementation gap and 
enhancing the likelihood of 
survival 
Organizational 
slack 
Natural logarithm of (total 
assets - total liabilities)  
COMPUSTAT Benner and 
Ranganathan 
(2012) 
Unabsorbed slack contributes to 
acquisitions in terms of providing 
resources and precludes the need 
for liquidity related or 
performance enhancing 
divestitures  
Prior firm 
performance 
Natural logarithm of 
(Operating profits/Total 
assets) 
COMPUSTAT NA Influences subsequent acquisition 
and divestiture activity from an 
aspiration performance gap 
perspective 
Prior alliancing 
experience 
Cumulative number of all the 
alliances made by a firm for 
each year 
SDC Platinum, Lexis 
Nexis 
Kale et.al. (2000) Prior alliancing may positively 
influence future alliancing and 
hence have greater competence in 
extramural knowledge 
orchestration 
Prior acquisition 
experience 
Cumulative number of all the 
acquisitions made by a firm 
SDC Platinum, Lexis 
Nexis 
Puranam et.al. 
(2006) 
Past acquisition experience may 
lead to firms doing more 
acquisitions in future and hence 
have greater proficiency in 
extramural knowledge 
orchestration 
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mixed effects Cox regression model. An important benefit of the Cox model is that it does not pose 
restrictive assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard and permits estimation using time-
varying covariates (Cleves et.al., 2016).  
Each firm has a unique hazard function ht(t) = h0(t) exp (βX [t]); where ‘t’ is the time at 
which a firm exit, h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, X[t] is a matrix of covariates at time ‘t’ and 
β is a vector of modeled coefficients. I used a mixed effects specification (frailty) for the model 
using the shared option in STATA 14.1 to control for time dependence in individual firm 
observations and unobserved heterogeneity across firms (Allison, 1984; Cleves et.al., 2016). I 
estimated the hazard rate of product market exit as the ‘event’ of interest given the main effect of 
the feature implementation gap and the moderating effects of the corporate scope variables. 
 
2.3.8 Endogeneity concerns 
 
The study may be prone to external drivers or omitted variables that lead to endogeneity regarding 
how firms may have self-selected into implementing an evolving dominant design feature to 
address the feature implementation gap and improve the likelihood of product market survival 
(Benner and Tripsas, 2012). In this, firms that introduced features ex post institutionalization 
displayed endogeneity through adapting behavior while those that did so ex ante did so through 
endogeneity in experimentation intended to shape the evolution of the dominant design (Eggers, 
2016). The limitation of endogeneity also affects corporate scope decisions as they represent 
knowledge accessing adaptive mechanisms that can address the feature implementation gap 
(Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  
46 
 
To address this potential limitation, I controlled for endogeneity in feature introduction and 
corporate scope decisions using a two-stage procedure (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). First, for 
each firm year, I determined whether a firm was an ‘adapter’ (coded 0) or a ‘shaper’ (coded 1) by 
calculating the ratio between the number of features introduced ex ante and ex post 
institutionalization (a value > 1 implied a proclivity to shape while one < 1 implied a proclivity to 
adapt). For the corporate scope variables, I evaluated the likelihood that a firm used alliancing, 
patenting or acquisitions (coded as zero, one and two respectively) or a combination of the three 
(coded as 3) to address the feature implementation gap. I developed two instrumental variables – 
feature introduction proclivity (natural log of the absolute value of the difference between the 
number of ‘shapers’ and ‘adapters’) and corporate scope activity (natural log of the total firms in 
a year that used any of the three corporate scope decisions). 
Empirically, I observed that the null hypothesis of regressor exogeneity was rejected (p< 
0.05) indicating that endogeneity was an issue. I found that the null hypothesis of the Hansen J 
statistic χ2 test was rejected (p> 0.1) justifying the validity of the instruments. I ran two first stage 
probit models to predict the likelihood of feature introduction and making corporate scope 
decisions using my variables and the respective instruments. I used the predict procedure to save 
the predicted values of the residuals (inverse Mills ratios) for both equations and included them in 
the second stage model to control for endogeneity. 
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2.4 RESULTS 
 
Correlations and descriptive statistics are shown in table 3. Multi-collinearity was not a concern 
since the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) was 1.80 with individual variable values < 3 (Berry, 
1993). The mean of the feature implementation gap variable was 0.38 indicating that on average, 
about two features were absent from a firm design over the sample period. Table 4 contains the 
endogeneity adjusted mixed effects Cox proportional hazards regression results. A negative 
coefficient for a variable indicates a lower hazard of product market exit (higher likelihood of 
product market survival) while a positive coefficient indicates a higher hazard of product market 
exit (lower likelihood of product market survival) (Allison, 1984; Cleves et.al., 2016).  
Figure 2 shows the empirical context underpinning the era of ferment for the digital camera 
product market ecosystem. Over the sample period, the feature implementation gap decreased by 
over 50 percent (solid line) indicating that firms with product designs that had a high gap value 
exited the product market over time (broken line) showcasing a ‘selection’ effect. The timelines 
for feature introduction and feature institutionalization are at the bottom of the graph. Twenty-two 
of the 30-product market exits (73 percent) occurred during the period of institutionalization 
(1997-2004). The timeline of feature introduction and institutionalization are shown where ‘X’ 
and ‘O’ indicate features introduced and institutionalized in a given year respectively. 
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Figure 2. Empirical context 
 
 
 
The empirical results are shown in table 4. The controls (model 1 in table 4) offered 
important insights. Alliance and acquisition experience were significant and positively related to 
product market survival because they provide access to external knowledge (Mowery et.al., 1996; 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Fixed time effects had a negative effect on product market 
survival and product market size had a positive effect consistent with the concept of munificence 
(Suarez and Utterback, 1995). Corporate diversification had a positive and significant effect on 
product market survival as firms could redeploy resources towards the digital camera business unit 
to improve adaptive capability (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004).  
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Table 3. Correlations and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Firm size 1             
 2. Product market size 0.15 1            
 3. Population density -0.14 0.61 1           
4. Dominant design. intro- 
duction 
0.02 0.00 0.01 1          
5. Dominant. design. 
institutionalization 
-0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.02 1         
6. Feature institutionalization 0.38 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 1        
7. Product. market fixed 
effects 
0.31 0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.35 1       
8. Time fixed effects 0.06 0.43 -0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 1      
9. Diversification 0.38 0.30 -0.28 0.01 0.08 0.79 0.23 0.09 1     
10. Product portfolio breadth -0.01 -0.08 0.14 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03 1    
11. R&D expense 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 1   
12. Organizational Slack 0.68 0.16 -0.15 -0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.16 0.01 0.14 0.00 -0.05 1  
13. ROA 0.21 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.14 0.09 1 
14. Alliance experience 0.27 0.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.30 0.48 0.01 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 
15. Acquisition experience 0.11 0.35 -0.32 -0.02 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.12 0.47 -0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.00 
16. Feature gap  -0.10 -0.40 0.39 0.02 -0.01 -0.17 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 0.05 0.03 -0.13 -0.07 
17. Alliancing activity  0.39 0.04 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.28 0.00 0.29 0.05 0.02 0.33 0.04 
18. Knowledge breadth -0.20 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.09 -0.16 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.07 -0.22 -0.07 
19. Knowledge depth 0.36 0.34 -0.41 -0.03 -0.02 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.26 -0.04 -0.05 0.28 0.04 
20. Acquisition activity -0.11 -0.35 0.32 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12 -0.47 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 
21. Product market survival -0.09 0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.25 -0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.22 
Mean 2.47 2.10 3.97 0.05 0.04 0.44 0.14 0.24 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.87 0.08 
Standard deviation 1.04 1.16 0.21 0.06 0.04 0.71 0.35 0.43 1.33 0.29 1.11 1.27 0.58 
Maximum 4.97 3.31 4.22 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.99 1.81 7.04 1.82 
Minimum 0.54 0.24 3.37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.00 2.69 0.13 
N= 843 firm year observations. All values ≥0.10 and ≤ -0.10 are significant at p<0.05. 
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Table 3. (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N= 843 firm year observations. All values ≥0.10 and ≤ -0.10 are significant at p<0.05. 
 
 
Variable 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
14. Alliance experience 1        
15. Acquisition experience 0.01 1       
16. Feature gap  0.02 0.02 1      
17. Alliancing activity  0.26 0.28 -0.00 1     
18. Knowledge breadth -0.10 -0.11 0.03 -0.15 1    
19. Knowledge depth 0.35 0.09 -0.17 0.34 -0.20 1   
20. Acquisition activity -0.01 -0.25 0.17 -0.16 -0.09 -0.21 1  
21. Product market survival -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 -0.04 -0.09 1 
Mean 1.44 1.23 0.38 0.88 0.86 0.60 0.06 0.06 
Standard deviation 3.09 1.89 0.21 2.59 0.18 0.14 0.24 0.24 
Maximum 19 9 1.00 9 1 0.98 4 1 
Minimum 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 
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Hypothesis 1 proposed that the feature implementation gap had a negative effect on product 
market survival. It was supported in model 2 of table 4 (β= 0.62, p< 0.05). When all six features 
of the digital camera dominant design were absent from a firm’s product design, the hazard rate of 
product market exit increased by 86 percent (exp (1*0.62) = 1.86 or (1.86-1) *100). This result 
was materially supported as firms that exit the digital camera product market had an average 
feature implementation gap of 58 percent (~ 2-3 absent features) while those that survived the 
sample period had a gap of 22 percent (~ 1 absent feature). Also, as 48 percent of the sample firms 
exited the product market, the gap was an important driver of product market exit. 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that firms’ alliancing activity had a weakening effect on the 
negative relationship between the feature implementation gap and product market survival. It was 
supported in model 3 of table 4 (β= - 0.58, p< 0.05). As the feature implementation gap increased 
by one feature, for each additional alliance formed, the hazard rate of product market exit 
decreased by (exp (0.17* -0.58) = 0.91 or (1-0.91) *100) or 9 percent. Panel 3a of figure 3 shows the 
moderation effect . As the gap decreased, the hazard rate of product market exit for firms with low 
levels of alliancing activity (broken line) decreased exponentially relative to firms with high levels 
of alliancing activity (solid line) for whom the decrease in hazard rate was relative flatter. Firms 
with low alliancing activity were ~ four times more likely to exit the product market than those 
with high alliancing activity when all six features were absent from their camera models. This 
difference in relative hazard of exit decreased as the gap decreased (i.e. as firms adopted more 
features of the evolving dominant design).   Low alliancing activity firms were only twice more 
likely to exit compared to high alliancing activity firms when one feature was absent. Thus, 
alliancing was a survival enhancing strategy particularly when firms had higher values of the gap  
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Table 4. Event history modeling results (endogeneity adjusted estimates) 
 
 
Control variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Firm size -0.78* (0.36) -1.11**(0.45) -1.44** (0.44) -0.68 (0.53) -0.63** (0.24)  -0.43 (0.50) 
Product market size  -0.38**(0.07) -0.39**(0.08) -0.42 (0.89) -0.72** (0.18)   -0.21** (0.05)  -0.11** (0.02) 
Product market population density 0.20 (0.17) 0.65 (1.91) 0.41* (0.19) 0.53 (2.61)  0.32** (0.09)  -0.17 (0.29) 
Entry before dominant design 
introduction dummy 
0.36 (0.63) 
 
0.16 (0.63) 
 
0.02 (0.58) 
 
0.76 (0.78) 
 
   0.46 (1.09) 
 
   0.68 (0.84) 
    
Entry before dominant design 
institutionalization dummy 
-0.66 (0.48) -1.02 (0.56) 
 
-1.07+ (0.58) 
 
-1.37+ (0.74) 
 
 0.49* (0.02) 
 
   -0.34 (0.77) 
    
Feature institutionalization dummy 0.66+ (0.36) 0.56 (0.57) 0.82* (0.39) 0.10 (0.56)    0.71** (0.22)     0.66 (0.53) 
Product market fixed effects -1.30 (0.94) -0.77 (1.01) -0.25* (0.11) -0.71 (1.60)    0.21** (0.06)     0.45 (1.77) 
Time fixed effects 0.25** (0.08) 0.32** (0.09) 0.21* (0.09) 0.42* (0.16)    0.22** (0.06)     0.55** (0.19) 
Corporate diversification  -1.71**(0.48)   -1.54*(0.76)   -1.64**(0.50)  -1.91* (0.96)     -3.01 (2.19)     -3.52* (1.31)  
Digital camera portfolio breadth -1.48 (0.96) -0.78 (0.94) -0.29 (0.95) -0.23 (0.15)  -0.16** (0.05)     -0.39* (0.19) 
Prior R&D expense 0.16+ (0.09) 0.09 (0.10) 0.07 (1.11) 0.01 (1.25)  0.24** (0.07)      0.21+ (0.12) 
Organizational slack -0.03 (0.35) -0.11 (0.11) 0.70+ (0.40) 1.27 (0.84)      -1.02 (1.11)     -0.11 (0.59) 
Prior firm performance (ROA) -0.09 (0.10) 0.05 (0.13) 0.39** (0.15) 0.21 (0.23) -0.12** (0.04)      0.23 (0.29) 
Prior alliancing experience -0.27**(0.09) -0.04 (0.19) -0.24 (0.08) -0.03 (0.27)   -0.11* (0.04)      -0.32(0.28) 
Prior acquisition experience -0.61+ (0.36)  -0.44 (0.39) -0.68+ (0.38) -0.27 (0.56)   -0.59** (0.20)    -0.26* (0.13) 
H1: Feature implementation gap  0.62* (0.32) 1.04**  (0.28) 3.77 (2.56) 0.48** (0.14)    0.07+ (0.04) 
H2: Gap * Firm alliancing 
activity 
  -0.58* (0.22) -0.89* (0.33)   -0.27** (0.09)   -0.99** (0.34)  
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Notes for table 4: a) n= 62 firms with 843 firm year observations.  
b) The first value for each variable in each model is the regression coefficient. The value in brackets is the standard error calculated through the concept of 
shared frailty that accounts for dependence between observations and unobserved heterogeneity. 
c) ** p<0.01, * p< 0.05 and + p< 0.1. 
d) Bold values refer to the hypotheses results.  
e) When the LR test of theta is not significant, unobserved heterogeneity (frailty) is accounted for in the model.  
 
 
Table 4. (continued) 
Firm alliancing activity   -0.10 (0.09) -0.20 (0.12)   -0.13** (0.04)  -0.17 (0.14) 
H3a: Gap * Feature related 
knowledge breadth 
   0.46+ (0.25) 
 
   0.50** (0.14) 
 
     0.75* (0.36) 
    
Feature related knowledge breadth    -0.64 (0.92)   -0.15** (0.04)     -0.13 (0.12)     
H3b: Gap * Feature related 
knowledge depth 
      -0.35** (0.12) 
 
    -0.96* (0.47) 
   
Feature related knowledge depth     -0.21* (0.09)     -0.27 (0.21)  
H4: Gap * Firm acquisition 
activity 
        -0.97** (0.34) 
Firm acquisition activity         -0.10* (0.04) 
Inverse Mills Ratio – Feature 
introduction proclivity 
0.34 (0.62) 
 
-0.12 (0.09) 
 
-1.47+ (0.82) 
 
-0.11 (0.09) 
 
     0.02 (0.32) 
 
     0.51 (1.32) 
   
 
Inverse Mills Ratio – Corporate 
scope activity 
 
0.05 (0.14) 
 
 
-0.06 (0.16) 
 
 
0.17 (0.17) 
 
 
0.46 (0.34) 
   
    1.01* (0.37) 
     
   
     0.32 (0.47) 
   
Over-dispersion (frailty) (θ) 0.66 0.32 0.86 1.61       1.38   1.30 
LR test (χ2) of θ (p-value) 0.01 (0.99) 0.04(0.49) 0.05(0.50) 0.01(0.99)  0.01 (0.99)     0.01 (0.99) 
# of events (product market exits) 30 30 30 30     30   30 
Firm year observations 843 843 843 843      843   843 
Log likelihood 4.14 7.67 14.42 16.88   22.46   23.79 
Likelihood ratio test χ2 (df) 105.80 (17) 110.44(18) 126.35(20) 126.16(22)   133.29(24)  140.34(26) 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of moderation effect hypotheses 
 
 
 
Panel 3a Panel 3b 
Panel 3c Panel 3d 
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(i.e. more absent features). This result was materially supported as I found that firms that survived 
the era of ferment made 48 of the 72 alliances (67 percent) in my sample. 
Hypothesis 3a proposed that the breadth in feature related knowledge had a strengthening 
effect on the negative relationship between the feature implementation and product market 
survival. From model 4 in table 4, hypothesis 3a received partial support (β= 0.46, p< 0.1). For a 
firm with all six features absent from its design, patenting in any one of the features would increase 
the hazard rate of product market exit by 8 percent. Panel 3b of figure 3 shows the moderation 
effect wherein the relative hazard rate of exit for firms with high levels of knowledge breadth (solid 
line) was ~ two times that of firms with low levels of knowledge breadth (broken line) irrespective 
of the gap. Also, for firms with low levels of breadth, the hazard rate of exit decreased marginally 
as the gap decreased (i.e. firms adopted features of the evolving dominant design). This finding 
implies that lower levels of breadth may have been particularly beneficial for product market 
survival when only a few features were absent. This result was materially supported as firms that 
did not survive the era of ferment had an average knowledge breadth of 86 percent implying that 
their patenting activity spanned at least five of the six features of the evolving dominant design. 
Hypothesis 3b proposed that the depth in feature related knowledge had a weakening effect 
on the negative relationship between the feature implementation gap and product market survival. 
From model 5 in table 4, hypothesis 3b was supported (β= -0.35, p< 0.01). For a firm that had all 
six features absent from its design, a 10 percent increase in knowledge depth in any one feature 
decreased the hazard rate of product market exit by six percent. Panel 3c of figure 3 shows the 
moderation effect wherein the relative hazard rate of exit for firms with low levels of knowledge 
depth (broken line) was ~ three times that of firms with high levels of knowledge depth (solid line).  
This difference in relative hazard of exit increased with a decrease in the gap (i.e. as firms adopted 
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more features of the evolving dominant design). For instance, firms with low knowledge depth 
were > three times likely to exit compared to high knowledge depth firms when one feature was 
absent. This finding implies that low levels of depth had negative implications for product market 
survival particularly when only a few features were absent. This result was materially supported 
wherein survivors had an average knowledge depth of 62 percent. On average, 62 percent of 
survivors’ patent citations for a given feature were to patents that were based on that feature. 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that firms’ acquisition activity had a weakening effect on the 
negative relationship between the feature implementation gap and product market survival. From 
model 6 in table 4, hypothesis 4 was supported (β= -0.97, p< 0.01).  As the feature implementation 
gap increased by one feature, for each additional acquisition, the hazard rate of product market 
exit decreased by 15 percent. Panel 3d of figure 3 shows the moderation effect wherein the relative 
hazard rate of exit for firms with low acquisition activity (broken line) was ~ one and  half times 
that of firms with high acquisition activity (solid line) irrespective of the gap. This difference in 
relative hazard of exit decreased as the gap decreased (i.e. as firms adopted more features of the 
evolving dominant design). Low acquisition activity firms were only 20 percent more likely to exit 
compared to high acquisition activity firms when one feature was absent. Thus, when the gap was 
low, acquisitions did not significantly exert a survival enhancing effect for firms. This result was 
materially supported with firms that survived making 45 of the 51 acquisitions (90 percent).   
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2.4.1 Robustness checks 
 
To assess the robustness of the feature implementation gap variable, I created a ‘design proximity’ 
variable to measure how close a firm’s design was to the evolving dominant design in terms of 
features. I operationalized the variable by subtracting the original gap variable in each firm year 
from one. If a firm’s product design had a low (high) value on the feature implementation gap, the 
inverse design proximity variable would indicate a high (low) level of proximity with the evolving 
product design. I expected the proximity variable to exert a positive effect on product market 
survival because it measured the overlap or similarity between a firm’s product design and the 
evolving dominant design. The proximity variable was marginally significant (β= -0.39, p< 0.1) 
with the negative sign indicating a decrease in the hazard rate of product market exit). This result 
showed that my findings were consistent with the technological evolution literature on dominant 
designs wherein a high degree of similarity with the evolving dominant design implies a higher 
likelihood of product market survival (Argyres et.al., 2015; Eggers, 2016; Tegarden et.al., 1999).  
A case could be made that the feature implementation gap should be measured only when 
features became institutionalized to address the question of how could a firm have ex ante 
knowledge of which features to implement. My theory does not rest on this assumption because it 
centers on how firms used corporate scope decisions to address a gap regardless of whether they 
were aware or unaware of the features of evolving product dominant design. However, I 
empirically addressed this issue through two approaches. First, I divided the sample into two 
periods; (1) from the beginning of the sample period until the first feature had been 
institutionalized (1991 – 1997) and (2) from when the first feature had been institutionalized until 
the end of the sample period (1997 – 2006). I re-ran the main effect model with these truncated 
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samples and in both cases, the main effect of the feature implementation gap was significant (p< 
0.01 and p< 0.05 respectively) indicating that the gap negatively affected product market survival 
irrespective of whether a firm had ex ante knowledge of what features to implement.  
Second, I lagged the gap measure by one, two and three years and used it as a dependent 
variable in fixed effects regression models that used the corporate scope decisions as independent 
variables. I observed that firm alliancing and acquisition activity had a negative effect on the gap 
(decreased the gap) that was significant in the models using the two and three year lagged gap 
variable. Depth in feature knowledge (patenting) had a negative effect on the gap in the model 
using the one year lagged gap variable. I tested the above models over the entire sample period. 
The results indicated that corporate scope decisions were knowledge accessing mechanisms that 
enabled firms to introduce features in their product designs ex ante to the introduction and 
institutionalization of the evolving product dominant design (1991-1997) and facilitated firms in 
addressing the feature implementation gap (adaptation) ex post to the introduction and 
institutionalization of the evolving product dominant design (1997-2004). 
In the operationalization of the feature implementation gap variable, if a firm implemented 
a specific feature, the yearly absence score was coded as zero and if the firm had not implemented 
the feature, it was coded as a one. While I controlled for firm diversification, the operationalization 
did not provide for the possibility that diversified firms could share technology across businesses.  
That is, if a diversified firm had the capability for a given feature in other business units, it could 
share it with the digital camera business unit. For example, the presence of a video recording option 
in Canon Inc.’s camcorder business unit meant that the capability could be transferred to digital 
cameras unit (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004). To control for the possibility of capability transfer 
through economies of scope, I re-operationalized the feature implementation variable using an 
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additional coding of 0.5 for firms that had the capability to implement a given feature in their 
digital camera models (by measuring firm patenting in the concerned feature) but had not done so 
as of the specific year in the sample period. I ran the models using this variable and the main effect 
of the revised feature implementation gap variable was marginally significant and slightly lower 
than the original variable indicating that fungibility of feature related capabilities in a firm was an 
important mechanism that benefited product market survival (β = 0.46, p< 0.1).  
Finally, as a counterfactual argument to the hazard rate assumption, I tested for a 
monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard rate using piecewise exponential, Weibull and 
Gompertz specifications that allow for such a trend in the hazard rate (Allison, 1984; Cleves et.al., 
2016). The results were robust but the model fit was superior for the Weibull specification over a 
Gompertz specification. The Wald test of STATA 14.1 indicated that a piecewise exponential 
assumption was not suitable. I also tested for a parametric distribution that allowed for a non-
monotonic hazard rate (lognormal) and the model fit was inferior indicating a lack of support for 
using a non-monotonic hazard rate assumption. The results were also not robust to a lognormal 
specification (that allows for a non-monotonic trend of hazard rate) with inferior fit indicating that 
my assumption of a non-monotonic hazard rate was appropriate. 
 
 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
 
I motivated this paper with the observation that eras of ferment are increasingly common in 
technology ecosystems and their negative effect on firms’ product market survival is undeniable. 
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One of the primary antecedents explaining the negative effect on firms’ product market survival is 
demand side change, especially changes in the features of an evolving product dominant design 
arising from changing customer preferences for products.  I theorized that during an era of ferment 
firms that did not introduce features of the evolving product dominant design faced a feature 
implementation gap that increased their likelihood of product market exit.  
Given demand side changes and the need for firms to minimize a feature implementation 
gap, I asked a strategically important question: during an era of ferment, how do corporate scope 
decisions (alliancing, internal development and acquisitions) acting as knowledge accessing 
adaptive mechanisms at the supply-side to moderate the feature implementation gap-product 
market survival relationship. I found that alliancing, acquisitions and feature specific knowledge 
depth in patenting weakened the negative effect of a feature implementation gap increasing the 
likelihood of product market survival. However, feature specific knowledge breadth in patenting 
strengthened the negative effect of a feature implementation gap and decreased the likelihood of 
survival. In an era of ferment, supply side corporate scope decisions matter because they affect the 
selection of demand side product features aligned with the evolving product dominant design thus 
increasing the likelihood of product market survival in the evolving technology ecosystem.   
 
2.5.1 Contribution 
 
Eras of ferment are periods of change for technology ecosystems affecting both their demand and 
supply sides (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Lee, 2013). From a demand side perspective, 
changes in customer preferences for product features influence the desirability of a firm’s products 
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(Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Benner and Waldfogel, 2016). From a supply side perspective, 
corporate scope decisions and their access to different types of knowledge affect the types of 
product features that a firm offers in the changing ecosystem (Capron and Mitchell, 2012). Thus, 
during an era of ferment, both demand and supply changes to an ecosystem have important 
consequences for firms’ product market survival (Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2016). My 
contributions to the era of ferment and corporate scope streams of research build on this insight. 
My first contribution informs era of ferment research by clarifying why adopting a demand 
side perspective explains product market survival. I do this by focusing theoretical and empirical 
attention at the product level – product features that comprise the evolving dominant design of the 
digital camera. By conceptualizing a feature implementation gap as the absence of features of the 
evolving product dominant design in a firm’s product design, I demonstrate how taking a demand 
side perspective to eras of ferment reveals a threat to a firm’s product market survival. Conversely, 
my work shows how evolving demand side dynamics in terms of customer preferences for specific 
product level features pose supply side firm adaptation imperatives in an era of ferment. For 
example, in 1994, the Apple Quick Take 100 was one of the earliest digital camera models but it 
did not include an optical zoom feature while their external storage feature only permitted transfer 
of images to an Apple Mac computer (Kaplan and Segan, 2008). Both features were part of the 
evolving digital camera dominant design. Their absence from the Quick Take 100 design created 
a feature implementation gap. The model exited the product market in 1997 due to a lack of 
enthusiasm from non-Apple users and those that preferred an optical zoom feature (Kaplan and 
Segan, 2008). 
This work also identified a liability of ferment mechanism that theoretically explains the 
negative relationship between a feature implementation gap and product market survival. The 
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liability of ferment mechanism explains the threat posed to product market survival arising from 
competitive disadvantages in the product market ecosystem and delegitimization by institutional 
stakeholders in the social system (Tegarden et.al., 1999; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). The lack 
of alignment of a firm’s product design with the evolving product dominant design threatens 
product market survival as customers and ecosystem players withdraw their endorsement and de-
legitimize the firm. For example, panel 2 in figure 2 shows that the average yearly feature 
implementation gap decreased over time as firms exit their respective product market. This 
supports a selection effect as firms with lower values of the feature implementation gap limited 
their liability of ferment and survived.   
Analogous to research that has applied the ‘liability’ mechanism to firm age (Henderson, 
1999), geographic origin (Edman, 2016) and location (Un, 2016), applying the liability of ferment 
mechanism to firm idiosyncratic attributes generates novel insights into how firms become 
susceptible to an era of ferment. While my work focused at the product level, I propose that 
cognitive limitations (individual level), resource and capability limitations (capability level) and 
firms’ structural and cultural limitations (firm level) also create feature implementation gaps. 
Additionally, as per the principle of mechanism ‘concatenation’ the various levels are mutually 
reinforcing (Gambetta, 1998). Hence, era of ferment scholarly work would benefit from research 
within and across the levels of analysis. 
My second contribution is theoretically identifying supply side corporate scope decisions 
as moderators of the relationship between the demand side feature implementation gap and product 
market survival. Corporate scope decisions act as knowledge accessing adaptive mechanism that 
can mitigate or attenuate the negative effect of a feature implementation gap. Ex-ante to the 
institutionalization of the evolving product dominant design, to remain competitive firms choose 
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features that form their product design. These choices are contingent on knowledge assets within 
a firm’s boundaries along with relevant technological and product market resources and 
capabilities that the firm can access externally (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Martin and Mitchell, 
1998). However, given the stochastic way a product dominant design evolves, a feature 
implementation gap manifests due to the knowledge orchestration of a firms’ ex-ante corporate 
scope decisions. In my sample, Ricoh Co Ltd. faced a high feature implementation gap until 1995 
as it had not introduced the optical zoom, removable storage and greater than VGA resolution 
features that were part of the evolving digital camera dominant design. However, it leveraged 
internal R&D through patents at its R&D facility in California to not only introduce these features 
but also pioneer the introduction and institutionalization of the video recording feature through 
breakthrough innovation in color image compression (Ricoh Company History, 2016). 
Scholarly research on eras of ferment typically focus on a supply side (Argyres et.al., 2015; 
Eggers, 2016; Suarez et.al., 2015; Tegarden et.al., 1999) or a demand side perspective (Benner and 
Tripsas, 2012; Martin and Mitchell, 1998). I provide a novel perspective by theorizing how the 
interaction of demand and supply side decisions (i.e., features and corporate scope) affect product 
market survival. The linking of the supply and demand side of the product market ecosystem, my 
work suggests that embracing a product market ecosystem perspective during eras of ferment will 
develop additional theoretical insights of era of ferment dynamics. Through both my contributions, 
I add to scholarly research on eras of ferment by highlighting how threats to product market 
survival arise and how they can be mitigated. 
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2.5.2 Managerial implications 
 
For practicing managers, my study provides two implications of note. First, I demonstrated that 
strategic renewal of organizational knowledge and the features selected to comprise a firm’s 
evolving product design during periods of technological change are important predictors of 
product market survival (Capron and Mitchell, 2012). Thus, my work draws managers’ attention 
to the importance of continually renewing their knowledge base through external venturing and 
internal development while also developing knowledge integration capabilities and reconfiguring 
knowledge orchestration routines (Grant, 1996a, b; Helfat et.al., 2007; Winter, 1987; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002).  At the same time, the conceptualization of the feature implementation gap captures 
the threat posed to product market survival due to the misalignment of product configurations with 
the evolving dominant design driven by a distillation of ecosystem and institutional expectations. 
Augmenting the knowledge base within a firm’s boundary by improving the depth of existing 
knowledge while expanding its knowledge base through alliances and acquisitions facilitate 
establishing the competitive robustness and the legitimacy of firms in evolving technology 
ecosystems experiencing design competition. My work also exhorts the importance of 
experimentation and recombination in knowledge work as a key driver of breakthrough innovation 
wherein the roles of scientists, R&D personnel and owners of organizational knowhow take 
initiatives that inculcate and preserve a culture of knowledge driven product innovation.  
Second, my work emphasizes the importance of managing the diversity (Harrison and 
Klein, 2007) of a firm’s corporate development portfolio to facilitate the strategic renewal of 
organizational knowledge and its product portfolio during an era of ferment. For instance, I 
focused on two approaches to managing the diversity of a corporate development portfolio - 
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expansion (through alliancing and acquisitions) and sustenance (through internal development of 
feature specific knowledge breadth and depth). Each approach has different effects in terms of 
augmenting a firm’s knowledge and affecting its product market survival. Further, the importance 
of leveraging multiple knowledge sourcing options in the corporate development function is 
evident through my theory development of how knowledge orchestration and product development 
are linked as the firm’s product portfolio evolves in response to ecosystem and technological 
change. Hence, managers who leverage a diverse range of corporate scope decisions during periods 
of technological change have a greater chance of improving the likelihood of product market 
survival. For example, Eastman Kodak used patenting to pioneer the greater than VGA resolution 
feature within the digital camera dominant design while acquiring several targets that had 
capabilities in digital imaging (Digital Camera Museum). It formed alliances with Adaptive 
Solutions Inc. and IBM to improve digital imaging and external storage capabilities for digital 
cameras (Kodak Company History).  
These findings suggest that the management of diversity in corporate development 
decisions can be a crucial managerial capability that facilitates the creation, modification and 
renewal of firm knowledge in a manner that help managers minimize the threat to product market 
survival during eras of ferment (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Helfat et.al., 2007). 
  
2.5.3 Limitations and future research directions 
 
I based the operationalizations of the four corporate scope decisions on archival data. Thus, a future 
research opportunity is to use field-based research designs (Edmondson and McManus, 2007) to 
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identify and operationalize fine grain, processes and process-oriented variables of how firms 
choose to develop their corporate development portfolio while shaping or adapting to eras of 
ferment. An interesting dilemma for most firms is the trade-offs between and coordination of 
making sequentially versus simultaneously corporate scope decisions. For example, a firm with 
high levels of knowledge depth face a dilemma of whether and when to leverage internal 
knowledge or expand corporate scope through accessing extramural knowledge. I suggest that 
unpacking process-related aspects of corporate scope decisions would not only enlighten strategy 
scholars on how firms adapt their corporate scope in eras of ferment but also provide insight into 
the evolution and management of a firm’s corporate scope over time. 
For the development of feature related variants, I limited my theory development on the 
moderation effects to the transition between knowledge orchestration teams and product 
development teams. Thus, I did not articulate the practices through which such intra-firm 
collaboration takes place. Further, since I operationalized knowledge breadth and depth through 
patenting, the internal development variable was limited to ‘upstream’ knowledge orchestration 
thereby limiting its scope.  Future research should include alternative internal development 
practices such as R&D innovation processes, corporate ventures and product development 
dynamics. I propose that a practice theory lens for understanding when, why and how firms use a 
‘go it alone’ approach and intra-firm collaboration to adapt to eras of ferment would shed light on 
the role of management preferences, organizational routines and firm artifacts (Feldman and 
Worline, 2016).  
My conceptualization of corporate scope as knowledge accessing mechanisms is an 
adaptation oriented approach to managing in an era of ferment (Child, 1997). Thus, a boundary 
condition is that I did not focus on how firms shaped the era of ferment through feature introduction 
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and strategic maneuvering to institutionalize features in the evolving dominant design. For 
example, through strategic and institutional maneuvering with ecosystem actors, a firm could 
proactively influence the evolution of the dominant design ex ante thereby minimizing exposure 
to the liability of ferment (Garud and Rappa, 1994; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). Scholarly 
research on how firms shape an era of ferment through strategic and institutional maneuvering 
would complement adaptation perspectives and would yield rich theory. 
Finally, a limitation of my dataset involved the absence of private firms for whom control 
variables, performance measures and corporate scope decision data was limited or unavailable. 
Benner and Tripsas’ (2012) research on how prior industry affiliation affected feature introduction 
included 40 private firms in the digital camera product market. To assess if the exclusion of the 40 
private firms affected my findings, I collected data on product market survival and calculated the 
feature implementation gap for these firms. I found that 9 of the private firms (22 percent) exited 
their product market during the era of ferment with an average feature implementation gap of 0.51 
(~three absent features). For the 31 survivors, the feature implementation gap was 0.26 (~two 
absent features).  These results align with hypothesis 1that a feature gap has a negative effect on 
product market survival. 
 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Highlighting the importance of a feature implementation gap that threatens product market 
survival during eras of ferment and the adaptive role of corporate scope decisions, my study 
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emphasized the importance of linking demand-side and supply side perspectives to increase 
understanding of product market survival. A liability of ferment mechanism explains the demand 
side threat that a feature implementation gap poses to survival because it creates competitive 
disadvantages in the product market ecosystem and delegitimization by institutional stakeholders 
in the broader social system. On the supply side, corporate scope decisions provide access to 
diverse sets of extramural knowledge while leveraging internal knowledge facilitating the 
development of product designs that improve the likelihood of survival during eras of ferment.  
Developing and testing theory that links the era of ferment and corporate scope streams of 
research will provide novel insights as to how and why ecosystems change, the role of corporate 
scope in shaping or adapting to ecosystem change and how their interaction affects firms’ product 
market survival. Given the increasing number of industries that have witnessed an era of ferment 
or are currently experiencing one, the time is ripe for engaging managers and scholars alike to the 
joint effects of the demand and supply sides of the changing ecosystem during eras of ferment.   
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3. ESSAY TWO - “PROLIFERATE AND MOBILIZE” – HOW FIRMS EXPLORE AND  
EXPLOIT THROUGH GROWTH MODES TO SURVIVE IN EVOLVING 
TECHNOLOGY ECOSYSTEMS 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Firm growth is an important cornerstone of corporate strategy research (DeSantola and Gulati, 
2017; Gulati, 2004; Penrose, 1959). Scholars have addressed the antecedents of growth (Greve, 
2008; Kotha and Nair, 1995), effect of technological innovation regimes (Stuart, 2000), effect on 
firm survival (Audretsch, 1995), interplay with corporate investment and profitability (Prescott, 
Kohli and Venkatraman, 1986; Yu et.al., 2017), strategic approaches to achieving growth 
outcomes (Chen, Williams and Agarwal, 2012; Favaro et.al., 2012), how firms formulate and 
implement growth initiatives (Lechner and Kreutzer, 2010) and corporate development decisions 
(internal development, alliances, acquisitions and divestitures) as ‘growth modes’ (McKelvie and 
Wiklund, 2010). However, notwithstanding the importance accorded to corporate development 
decisions as drivers of growth strategies by scholars and managers, how these decisions influence 
the relationship between firm growth and survival in changing technology ecosystems has not been 
addressed in scholarly work on firm growth or corporate strategy.  
Technological change in product market ecosystems adversely impacts firm survival due 
to the threat of technological substitution and obsolescence (Adner and Kapoor, 2016; Christensen 
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et.al., 1998). A firm’s growth orientation increases its likelihood of surviving technological change 
as it is an adaptive response to technological change (Favaro et.al., 2012; Gulati, 2004; Penrose, 
1959). Growth orientation is defined as ‘the relative emphasis placed on the investment of firm 
resources towards increasing revenue and market share’. It is based on identifying and accessing 
new growth opportunities for increasing revenue and market share (Dowell and Swaminathan, 
2006; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1993). It also entails committing resources to develop 
and leverage a limited subset of growth opportunities while diverting resources away from less 
attractive growth opportunities (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Chakrabarti et.al., 2011; Kaul, 2012). 
Thus, a firm’s growth orientation decreases the threat of failure in evolving technology ecosystems 
as it involves searching and selecting opportunities for increasing revenue and market share.  
A firm’s corporate development decisions - internal development, alliances, acquisition 
and divestitures represent growth modes that drive the revenue and market share growth 
imperatives of firms (Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Dyer et.al., 2004). Firm growth modes can be 
viewed as adaptive mechanisms that influence the relationship between growth orientation and the 
likelihood of firm failure through their ability to support the survival enhancing benefits of a 
growth orientation (Chakrabarti et.al., 2011; Kim, Haleblian and Finkelstein, 2011; Singh and 
Mitchell, 2005). As a constantly evolving technology ecosystem environment is increasingly 
complex and unpredictable for firms to maneuver, growth mode decisions represent a strategic 
alternative for managers through which they can adapt to the rapidly changing ecosystem 
environment and avoid the possibility of failure.  
For instance, in my empirical context of technological change in the telecommunication 
equipment and computer networking product market ecosystems, firms assumed a modest growth 
orientation on average and chose over 14 different growth mode decisions to adapt to and survive 
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technological change. Notwithstanding these efforts, 49 percent of the firms did not survive the 
sample period. As firm failure is an outcome of unsuccessful adaptation to environmental change 
(Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Christensen et.al., 1998; Josefy et.al., 2017), how growth modes act 
as adaptive mechanisms that affect the growth orientation-firm failure relationship is a strategic 
issue that merits scholarly and managerial attention. However, the current lack of scholarly insight 
on the adaptive and survival enhancing role of growth modes during technological change blurs 
clarity on how they contribute to corporate longevity. The importance of this issue for managers 
and the lack of scholarly insight on it motivated my research question – ‘In evolving technology 
ecosystems, how do growth modes - internal development, alliances, acquisitions and divestitures 
moderate the relationship between growth orientation and the likelihood of firm failure?’ 
To address this research question, I borrow from the continuum perspective offered by 
exploration/exploitation scholars (Gupta, Smith and Shalley, 2006; Lavie, Stettner and Tushman, 
2010; March, 1991). I propose that growth modes represent domains through which firms 
selectively determine the degree of exploration and exploitation - the relative emphasis on 
exploratory or exploitative corporate development decisions aligned to a given growth mode 
(Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavie et.al., 2011; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011; Stettner and 
Lavie, 2014). A high degree of exploration within a growth mode implies a focus on distant search 
and technological variation - entering new product markets to identify and access opportunities for 
revenue and market share growth (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and 
Singh, 1993). A high degree of exploitation within a growth mode implies local search or selection 
- committing resources to develop and leverage a limited subset of opportunities and diverting 
resources away from less attractive growth opportunities for achieving growth related outcomes 
(Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Chakrabarti et.al., 2011; Kaul, 2012). As growth modes allow firms 
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to selectively modify the relative emphasis on exploration or exploitation, they represent adaptive 
mechanisms that support the benefits of a growth orientation and decrease the likelihood of firm 
failure.  
I theorize that the degree of exploration and exploitation in growth modes moderates the 
relationship between growth orientation and the likelihood of firm failure during technological 
change. To study this moderation effect, I theorized on the degree of exploration within two growth 
modes– internal development and alliance activity (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Stettner and 
Lavie, 2014). I borrow from extant research that emphasizes the survival enhancing potential of 
exploration in both modes (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell and Singh, 1993; Reuer and 
Tong, 2010). I also theorized on degree of exploitation in two alternative growth modes – 
acquisition activity and divestiture activity (Moschieri and Mair, 2017; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). 
I borrow from extant research that emphasizes the importance of exploitation in both modes 
towards positive influencing firm survival (Kaul, 2012; Kuusela, Keil and Maula, 2017; Vidal and 
Mitchell, 2015). For this, I captured the relative emphasis on exploration within the internal 
development and alliance activity growth modes and the relative emphasis on exploitation within 
the acquisition and divestiture activity growth modes. I then developed and tested hypotheses for 
the moderation effect of each of the four growth modes on the relationship between growth 
orientation and firm failure.  
My empirical context is a salient case of technological change involving the convergence 
between the equipment and networking product market ecosystems during 1989-2003 (Hsu and 
Prescott, 2017; Lee, 2007). The threat of firm failure and the importance of developing a growth 
orientation resulted from growth opportunities springing up due to technological convergence 
between both sets of product markets (Greenstein and Khanna, 1997; Seaberg et.al., 1997). Using 
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a sample of 3,327 growth mode decisions made by firms across sets of product markets, I examined 
my hypotheses using event history modeling. First, I found that maintaining a growth orientation 
had a negative effect on the likelihood of firm failure. Subsequently, I found that a high degree of 
exploration in the internal development and alliance activity growth modes exerted a ‘growth 
proliferation effect’ that strengthened the negative effect of growth orientation on firm failure. The 
growth proliferation effect enabled firms to identify and access opportunities for increasing 
revenue and market share thereby mitigating the threat of firm failure (Dowell and Swaminathan, 
2006; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1993).  
Finally, I found that a high degree of exploitation in the acquisition and divestiture activity 
growth modes exerted a ‘growth mobilization effect’ that strengthened the negative effect of 
growth orientation on firm failure.  A growth mobilization effect enabled firms to commit 
resources to develop and leverage a limited subset of growth opportunities while diverting 
resources away from declining markets thus decreasing the likelihood of firm failure (Chakrabarti 
et.al., 2011; Kaul, 2012; Kuusela et.al., 2017). Thus, my findings indicate that firms that selectively 
emphasized exploration in certain growth modes i.e. internal development and alliance activity 
while emphasizing exploitation in alternative growth modes i.e. acquisition and divestiture activity 
were less likely to fail. This is attributed to their ability to manage the twin imperatives of search 
and selection with their growth modes for superior adaptability to a changing technology 
ecosystem. 
This paper makes two contributions to strategy research. First, I contribute to scholarly 
research at the intersection of corporate strategy and firm growth by demonstrating how firm 
growth modes serve as adaptive mechanisms during change in technology ecosystems. By 
theorizing on the growth proliferation and growth mobilization effects, I demonstrate that a 
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plausible driver of firm heterogeneity refers to the differences in firm growth mode choices and 
their influence on the relationship between growth orientation and survival during technological 
change. Second, I contribute to scholarly work on exploration/exploitation by showing the role of 
exploration and exploitation towards firm growth – a theoretical link that has received scant 
attention (cf. Raisch, 2008). By theorizing and finding support for the two effects, I extend research 
at the intersection of corporate strategy and exploration/exploitation by showing how selectively 
modifying the relative emphasis on exploration and exploitation in a firm’s growth modes 
improved the adaptive capability of the firm thus increasing its likelihood of survival in evolving 
technology ecosystems. 
 
 
3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.2.1 Growth orientation, technological change and firm failure 
 
Technological change requires firms to adapt their growth strategies or face the threat of failure 
due to technological substitution and obsolescence (Adner and Kapoor, 2016; Christensen et.al., 
1998; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Rapidly evolving technology ecosystems are characterized by 
the emergence of new product markets (growth markets) underpinning opportunities for increasing 
revenue and market share (Luksha, 2008; Navis and Glynn, 2010; Woolley, 2010). Firms that 
realign their revenue and market share enhancement strategies around growth markets are more 
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likely to survive as they can overcome the threats of technological substitution and obsolescence 
(Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1993).  
In this context, a firm’s growth orientation - ‘the relative emphasis placed on the investment 
of firm resources towards increasing revenue and market share’ assumes importance as it enables 
adaptation to the changing technology ecosystem by realigning its revenue and market share 
generation logic (Favaro et.al., 2012; Gulati, 2004; Penrose, 1959). Maintaining a growth 
orientation equips firms to access opportunities for increasing revenue and market share while 
exiting product markets vulnerable to technological substitution and obsolescence (Chakrabarti 
et.al., 2011; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Kaul, 2012). Technological/product market 
diversification underpins the benefits of distant search and exploration across growth markets 
leading to a proliferation of opportunities for increasing revenue and market share (Dowell and 
Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell and Singh, 1993). However, as the revenue generation potential of 
opportunities may not be evident ex ante (Luksha, 2008; Schilling, 2015), adopting a growth 
orientation encourages firms to develop broad sets of growth opportunities across several 
ecosystem niches (Reuer and Tong, 2010; Vassolo, Anand and Folta, 2004). Growth opportunity 
sets enable firms to record modest increases in revenue and market share in growth markets thereby 
shifting and grounding revenue and market share generation strategies around these avenues (Folta 
and Miller, 2002; Rindova et.al., 2012). Hence, a growth orientation decreases exposure to 
technological substitution and obsolescence thus decreasing the likelihood of failure.  
A parallel outcome of a firm’s growth orientation involves expansion programs that 
commit resources for developing and leveraging a limited subset of opportunities for broader and 
more substantial increase in revenue and market share (Folta and Miller, 2002; Ghemawat, 1991; 
Maritan, 2001). To facilitate this, de novo or de alio entry form two key underpinnings of growth 
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strategies that contribute to higher scale and scope across multiple growth markets (Bercovitz and 
Mitchell, 2007; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Penrose, 1959). Both approaches lead to ‘speed 
capabilities’ through early mover advantages in growth markets (Hawk, Pacheco-de-Almeida and 
Yeung, 2013). These include raising entry barriers by developing significant revenue streams and 
market share through minimum efficient scale (Ghemawat, 1991), network effects (Schilling, 
2002), process innovation (Benner and Tushman, 2003) and exclusivity in access to 
complementary assets (Roy and Cohen, 2017). To support these expansion programs, exit from 
declining markets allows for the possibility of slack availability and resource redeployment for 
greater control over growth markets (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron et.al., 2001; Kaul, 2012). 
As firms appropriate revenues and market share in growth markets, positional advantages accruing 
from market dominance further decrease their vulnerability to failure in the product market 
ecosystem (Barnett, Greve and Park, 1994; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1993).  
Finally, proactively communicating a growth orientation to the broader technology 
ecosystem leads to legitimacy spillovers from ecosystem and institutional actors (Benner and 
Ranganathan, 2013; Lev, Petrovits and Radhakrishnan, 2010; Ozcan and Gurses, in press). 
Symbolic attributions of institutional legitimacy through socially constructed categories enhance 
the visibility of firms with a growth orientation (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). Ecosystem wide 
endorsements decrease the possibility of resource dependence issues that create roadblocks to the 
quest for growth outcomes (Cascario and Piskorski, 2005; Zheng, Singh and  Mitchell, 2015; 
Greve and Zhang, 2017). Thus, firms adopting a growth orientation proactively reconfigure their 
revenue and market share generation logic thus mitigating the possibility of firm failure. Hence: 
H1: Growth orientation will have a negative effect on the likelihood of firm failure in 
evolving technology ecosystems. 
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3.2.2 Corporate development decisions as exploratory and exploitative growth modes 
 
Given the importance of a growth orientation as technology ecosystems change, how firms choose 
to identify, access and commit resources to opportunities for increasing revenue and market share 
is a key strategic issue. To theoretically address this, I borrow from the continuum perspective of 
the exploration exploitation lens (Gupta et.al., 2006; Lavie et.al., 2010; March, 1991). I propose 
that a firm’s growth modes – internal development, alliances, acquisitions and divestitures (Capron 
and Mitchell, 2012; Dyer et.al., 2004) serve as domains that permit firms to selectively determine 
the degree of exploration and exploitation (Choi and McNamara, 2018; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 
2006; Lavie et.al., 2011; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). Through this, growth modes serve as adaptive 
mechanisms that facilitate identifying, accessing and committing resources to opportunities for 
increasing revenues and market share.  
I propose that by enabling firms to selectively emphasize exploration over exploitation or 
vice versa, growth modes can either strengthen or weaken the effect of growth orientation on firm 
failure. A high degree of exploration within a growth mode indicates a high relative emphasis on 
distant search and variation in terms of new product market entry and experimentation with new 
technologies and product lines to identify and access opportunities that can contribute to revenue 
and market share growth (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavie et.al., 2011; Stettner and Lavie, 
2014). A high degree of exploitation within a growth mode implies a high relative emphasis on 
local search or selection - committing resources to develop and leverage a limited subset of 
opportunities and diverting resources away from less attractive opportunities to achieve the above-
mentioned growth outcomes (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). 
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In line with existing research, I defined the degree of exploration as the ratio of the total 
number of exploratory decisions made within a specific growth mode to the total number of 
decisions made within it. I defined the degree of exploration as the ratio of the total number of 
exploratory decisions made within a specific growth mode to the total number of decisions made 
within it (Choi and McNamara, 2018; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavie et.al., 2011; Stettner and 
Lavie, 2014). Next, I develop hypotheses theorizing that a high degree of exploration in the internal 
development and alliance activity growth modes and a high degree of exploitation in the 
acquisition and divestiture growth modes will strengthen the negative effect of growth orientation 
on firm failure during technological change. The full model is shown in figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4. Theoretical model 
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3.2.3 The internal development growth mode 
 
The internal development growth mode encompasses the autonomous decisions of firms to achieve 
growth related outcomes (Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Favaro et.al., 2012; Penrose, 1959). De novo 
exploration enables firms to evaluate and devote resources to opportunities for increasing revenue 
and market share via greenfield establishments, incubators and new ventures (Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001; Day, 1994; Raisch and Tushman, 2016). These exploratory forms benefit from autonomous 
charters that encourage distant search and experimentation (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Fang, 
Lee and Schilling, 2010). They increase the possibility of developing technology/product related 
breakthroughs and new business models aligned to a new revenue generation logic (Chesborough 
and Rosenbloom, 2002; Luksha, 2008). As commercialization possibilities, market penetration and 
ecosystem actor buy-in become feasible, the innovative output of de novo organizational forms 
initiates nascent revenue streams that allow firms to sustain and build on strategic positions in 
multiple growth markets (Fosfuri, Giarratana and Roca, 2016; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  
Alternatively, de alio entry into growth markets involves diversified expansion to access 
opportunities for increasing revenue and market share (Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991). 
Contingent on the degree of relatedness between existing resources and growth opportunities, de 
alio entry corresponds to separate product market diversification initiatives or through resource 
redeployment driven economies of scope (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 
2004). Due to the strategic focus on exploration, the temporal spans involving new resource 
development, commitment driven allocation and scale can be avoided thereby leading to positional 
advantages across multiple growth markets (Barnett et.al., 1994; Greve, 2008; Hawk et.al., 2013). 
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Hence, de novo and de alio approaches permit firms to identify and access opportunities 
that contribute revenue and market share enhancement thereby invoking a growth proliferation 
effect. Through these approaches, exploration in the internal development growth mode decreases 
exposure to declining markets thus alleviating the prospective threat of firm failure due to exposure 
in declining markets (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1993).  
From the above, firms that maintain a high degree of exploration in the internal 
development growth mode have a greater probability of overcoming the threat of failure. As firms 
choose to de-emphasize exploration, they decrease the relative emphasis on identifying and 
accessing opportunities for increasing revenue and market share. The resulting tradeoff requires 
them to increase the relative emphasis on committing resources to further develop and leverage a 
limited subset of opportunities while eliminating low potential opportunities (Gupta et.al., 2006; 
Lavie et.al., 2010; March, 1991). This decrease in emphasis on exploration involves a concomitant 
increase in resource allocation/redeployment (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004), incurring capital 
expenditure (Maritan, 2001) and develop operational scale and scope as part of a commitment 
driven strategy (Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Penrose, 1959).  
As these decisions are associated with the complex dynamics of intra-organizational 
ecology (Burgelman, 1991; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000), they can be characterized as infrequent 
events involving irreversible degrees of commitment without the benefit of prior heuristics 
(Ghemawat, 1991; Noda and Bower, 1996; Souder et.al. 2016). Thus, firms are less likely to resort 
to this category of commitment oriented decisions due to a significant opportunity cost of the 
exploration/exploitation tradeoff that arises from de-emphasizing exploration. When these 
decisions are taken ex ante to the growth proliferation effect, the lack of strategic insight into the 
true revenue and market share growth potential of opportunities mandates early or premature 
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resource commitment and leads to positional disadvantages and high opportunity costs due to the 
irreversibility of such investment (Folta and Miller, 2002; Ghemawat, 1991).  
Also, ex-ante resource commitment may be vulnerable to competency traps, resource 
rigidity and cognitive embeddedness in declining markets (Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Fang and 
Levinthal, 2009; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Both these possibilities are likely to compromise the 
firm’s growth orientation due to the opportunity cost being locked out of alternative opportunities 
with higher revenue generation potential. If the above-mentioned decisions are taken ex post the 
growth proliferation effect, they can contribute to tangible growth-related outcomes as firms 
develop strategic insights into the true potential of growth opportunities ex ante to resource 
commitment (Barnett, 2008; Folta and Miller, 2002).  
In either case, the survival enhancing potential of the internal development growth mode 
requires that firms maintain a high degree of exploration for the growth proliferation effect. This 
allows them to identify and access opportunities for increasing revenue and market share in growth 
markets and alleviates the threat of firm failure. Hence: 
H2/Growth proliferation effect: In evolving technology ecosystems, a high degree of 
exploration in the internal development growth mode will strengthen the negative effect of 
growth orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. 
 
3.2.4 The alliance activity growth mode 
 
The alliance activity growth mode involves the use of collaborative arrangements with external 
partners in technology ecosystems (Davis, 2016; Lee, 2007). Collaborative exploration facilitates 
the joint identification and access to opportunities for increasing revenue and market share in 
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growth markets thus leading to the development of growth opportunity sets (Reuer and Tong, 
2010; Rindova et.al., 2012; Vassolo et.al., 2004). A significant advantage of this is linked to lower 
levels of resource commitment, decreased turnaround times and higher flexibility regarding the 
identification and development of opportunities for increasing revenues and market share (Barnett, 
2008; Folta and Miller, 2002; Rindova et.al. 2012). Alternatively, equity based alliances or joint 
ventures contribute to the reconfiguration of growth strategies through greater resource 
commitment and deeper levels of collaborative exploration arising from relational embeddedness 
between partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Focused exploration in these agreements allows partners 
to develop revolutionary technology breakthroughs and novel product lines thus enabling them to 
jointly appropriate growth opportunities over time (Luo, 2002a, b; Singh and Mitchell, 2005; 
Stuart, 2000). In other instances of interfirm collaboration in technology ecosystems, product 
redeployment through cross-selling, complementarity based bundling or cross licensing help 
develop to new revenue streams across growth markets (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2004).  
Exploratory alliancing also contributes to relational ties with high status ecosystem actors, 
R&D and standard setting consortia and institutional entities hence leading to legitimacy spillovers 
through the development of relational and social capital (Axelrod et.al., 1995; Doz, Olk and Ring, 
2000; Koka and Prescott, 2002). This relieves resource dependence concerns ensuring that growth 
outcomes are not hindered by ecosystem or institutional level mandates (Lev et.al., 2010; Zheng, 
et.al., 2015).  Through the above-mentioned outcomes of exploratory collaboration, the alliance 
activity growth mode contributes to the growth proliferation effect through the joint identification 
and development of revenue and market share growth opportunities. In this, it directs strategic 
focus towards the more attractive niches to the evolving technology ecosystem (Davis and 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Davis, 2016; Stuart, 2000). 
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Thus, maintaining a high degree of exploration is more likely to be favored in the alliance 
activity growth mode to attenuate the likelihood of firm failure. As the uncertainty associated with 
evolving growth markets and niches recedes, firms with a high degree of exploration are better 
positioned to identify and access opportunities that have a high revenue and market share growth 
potential through the growth proliferation effect (Folta and Miller, 2002; Reuer and Tong, 2010; 
Rindova et.al., 2012). This leads to lower turnaround times in achieving growth outcomes as firms 
benefit from a broad range of exploratory ties at the technology, operational, functional and value 
chain levels of the ecosystem (Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; 
Luo, 2002b; Roy and Cohen, 2017). Thus, firms with a high degree of exploration in the alliance 
activity growth mode are more likely to achieve the tangible increments in revenue and market 
share as they are gain a greater degree of strategic insight into the true growth potential of different 
types of opportunities across the evolving technology ecosystem. 
Conversely, firms that proactively maintain a low degree of exploration or de-emphasize 
exploration may be vulnerable to failure. De-emphasizing exploration arises from a persistence 
with repeat alliancing with existing partners over legacy technologies and product lines . Hence, it 
may reinforce the inertia of structural and positional embeddedness in existing interfirm ties 
(Madhavan, Koka and Prescott, 1998). The concomitant mechanisms of collaborative myopia, 
over-socialization in pre-existing alliance networks and negative transfers from exploitation also 
undermine the growth proliferation effect as they privilege commitment to existing interfirm ties 
over the creation of new linkages (Jiang et.al., 2018; Knudsen and Srikanth, 2014; Lumineau and 
Oliveira, 2018). From a growth opportunity perspective, a low degree of exploration compromises 
the need for requisite variation in alliance portfolios leading to redundancies and sub-additive 
outcomes that undermine the mandate of a growth orientation (Vassolo et.al. 2004). These 
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dynamics pose significant opportunity costs to the growth proliferation effect and preclude the 
likelihood of identifying new growth opportunities through collaborative exploration.  
Finally, firms that choose to de-emphasize exploration must adhere to the accompanying 
tradeoff requiring higher resource commitment and managerial attention for developing and 
leveraging a limited subset of growth opportunities and collaborative arrangements that have a 
high revenue and market share growth potential (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavie et.al., 2010, 
2011). However, this approach can only contribute to tangible survival enhancing growth related 
outcomes ex post the growth proliferation effect that yields strategic insights into the revenue and 
market share generation potential of growth opportunity sets and collaborative arrangements (Folta 
and Miller, 2002; Ghemawat, 1991). Thus, firms that maintain a high degree of exploration in the 
alliance activity growth mode are strategically positioned to secure the benefits of the growth 
proliferation effect and decrease the likelihood of failure. Hence: 
H3/Growth proliferation effect: In evolving technology ecosystems, a high degree of 
exploration in the alliance activity growth mode will strengthen the negative effect of growth 
orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. 
 
3.2.5 The acquisition activity growth mode 
 
The acquisition activity growth mode involves the purchase of new technology targets, 
start-ups or assets across the broader technology and product market ecosystems (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Puranam et.al., 2003, 2006). Exploration in the acquisition activity growth mode de-
contextualizes strategic focus around declining product markets through the discontinuous and 
path-breaking nature of acquisitions (Barkema and Schjiven, 2008; Karim and Mitchell, 2000; 
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Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). When targets are integrated within firm boundaries, recombinant 
outcomes with existing resources interrupt the momentum of legacy operations in declining 
product markets by creating opportunities for diversification across growth markets (Barkema and 
Schjiven, 2008; Graebner, 2004; Karim and Mitchell, 2000). These outcomes of acquisitions 
enable firms to increase revenue and market share through greater control over growth 
opportunities hence decreasing the likelihood of failure. 
However, these failure mitigating benefits of exploration in the acquisition activity growth 
mode are most likely to be achieved when the relative emphasis on exploration is low. As agents 
of discontinuous and path-breaking change, exploratory acquisitions are survival enhancing to the 
extent that they enable firms to realign their growth strategies around opportunities for increasing 
revenue and market share (Graebner, 2004; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). A high degree of 
exploration causes frequent recalibrations of the firm’s strategic direction that decreases coherence 
in growth strategy thereby undermining growth-related outcomes (Teece et.al., 1994). A key driver 
of this is the persistently unstable organizational context that emerges due to complexity and 
unpredictability injected by the lack of relatedness of exploratory targets with legacy resources 
leading to significant burden on managerial sense-making (Hannan, Polos and Carroll, 2003; 
March, Sproull and Tamuz, 1991). Operationally, this translates into decreased clarity over 
integration approaches (Puranam et.al., 2006; Stahl and Voigt, 2008), negative synergies due to 
target unfamiliarity (Harrison et.al., 1991) employee demotivation (Buono and Bowditch, 1989), 
time compression diseconomies (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002), inertia arising from established 
power equations (Ganz, 2018) and expectation misalignment across management levels (Vuori, 
Vuori and Huy, 2018). These downsides of exploration detract from the primary aim of increasing 
revenue and market share in growth markets decreasing the survival enhancing potential of the 
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acquisition activity growth mode. Over time, the broader context of technological change in the 
ecosystem is lost to firms as the myopia of acquisition integration compromises strategic focus.  
Firms that manage the tradeoff posed by the continuum perspective of 
exploration/exploitation in the acquisition activity growth mode are more likely to decrease the 
threat of failure (Choi and McNamara, 2018; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). In this, while a low degree 
of exploration is beneficial for realigning growth strategies, the corresponding tradeoff requiring 
a high degree of exploitation allows firms to commit resources to develop and leverage a specific 
subset of growth opportunities (Choi and McNamara, 2018; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). Thus, a 
high degree of exploitation reinforces the path-breaking and discontinuous growth trajectory set 
by exploration through broader and more comprehensive growth-related outcomes through a 
growth mobilization effect. Through the growth mobilization effect, exploitation in the acquisition 
activity growth mode contributes to survival enhancing outcomes such as focused resource 
commitment or redeployment to develop scale and scope across multiple ecosystem niches 
(Capron et.al., 1998; Seth, 1990), increased product portfolio breadth and line depth to preserve 
and develop revenue streams (Kaul and Wu, 2016; Puranam et.al., 2003) and consolidation around 
declining product markets to tap residual revenue and market share possibilities (Anand and Singh, 
1997). Alternatively, exploitation also mitigates resource dependence through vertical integration 
and strategic maneuvering (Cascario and Piskorski, 2005; Greve and Zhang, 2017).  
Building on the relatedness and coherence imperatives of exploitation, the growth 
mobilization effect can be magnified through acquisition programs that increase the firm’s 
capability in developing and leveraging growth opportunities in multiple growth markets 
(Chatterjee, 2009; Laamanen and Keil, 2008). Acquisition programs mitigate the causal ambiguity 
and ‘rareness’ inherent to acquisitions through learning outcomes that mitigate negative transfer 
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effects, superstitious learning and incoherent implementation approaches (Puranam et.al., 2006; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004; Zollo, 2009). Thus, exploitation in the acquisition activity growth mode 
creates a virtuous cycle as frequent acquisitions contribute to learning and experience spillovers 
that underpin subsequent acquisitions (Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
Consequently, firms that de-emphasize exploration and adhere to the resultant tradeoff of 
increasing the relative emphasis on exploitation in the acquisition activity growth mode can 
effectively realign the firm’s growth orientation around revenue and market share enhancement 
opportunities and subsequently develop a growth mobilization effect. As a result, these firms will 
have a lower likelihood of failure leading to the following hypothesis: 
H4/Growth mobilization effect: In evolving technology ecosystems, a high degree of 
exploitation in the acquisition activity growth mode will strengthen the negative effect of growth 
orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. 
 
3.2.6 The divestiture activity growth mode 
 
The divestiture activity growth mode involves the elimination or spinoff of business units and 
strategic assets from firm boundaries (Lee and Madhavan, 2010). Spinoffs allow firms to segregate 
exploratory innovation aimed at developing breakthrough technologies and product lines within 
isolated organizational forms (Chesborough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Cirillo, Brusoni and 
Valentini, 2014; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001). Structural and contextual differentiation and 
positive spillovers from parental affiliation optimize the probability of developing nascent revenue 
streams in growth markets thus decreasing vulnerability in declining product markets (Argyres 
and Mostafa, 2016; Fang, Lee and Schilling, 2010; Ito, 1995). Alternatively, exploration also 
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manifests through discontinuous restructuring targeted towards developing and leveraging 
opportunities for revenue and market share growth while eliminating the inefficiencies of declining 
product markets (Girod and Whittington, 2015; Wiersema and Liebeskind, 1995).  
However, these failure mitigating benefits of the acquisition activity growth mode are most 
likely to be achieved when the relative emphasis on exploration is low. Exploratory initiatives lead 
to a prolonged context of outcome related uncertainty, cognitive and behavioral biases arising from 
entrepreneurial attitudes and operational re-alignment in spinoffs and restructuring initiatives lead 
to complexity and unpredictability in the firm’s growth strategy (Hannan et.al., 2003; Lampel, 
Shamsie and Shapira, 2009). Thus, irregular and continuous re-alignment arising from disruptions 
in activity systems, intra-firm structural and relational patterns (DeWitt, 1993; Shah, 2000), 
employee mobility (Buono and Bowditch, 1989) and stakeholder demotivation (Gopinath and 
Becker, 2000) subvert the achievement of growth related outcomes. To address these disruptions, 
strategic resources and managerial attention get re-directed towards the tactical aspects of the 
transformation process that assumes a ‘life of its own’ instead of the strategic imperative of growth 
(McKendrick and Wade, 2010). These drawbacks associated with a high degree of exploration 
indicate that it is likely to be survival enhancing only when used sporadically i.e. for introducing 
strategic and contextual discontinuities that persuade managerial incumbents to reconfigure 
growth strategies for avoiding failure. 
Thus, firms that manage the tradeoff posed by the continuum perspective of 
exploration/exploitation in the divestiture activity growth mode are more likely to decrease the 
threat of failure (Lee and Madhavan, 2010; Moschieri and Mair, 2017). In this, while a low degree 
of exploration is beneficial for realigning growth strategies, the corresponding tradeoff requiring 
a high degree of exploitation allows firms to effectively divert resources away from declining 
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markets through redeployment or asset retrenchment (Anand and Singh, 1997; Kaul, 2012; 
Kuusela et.al., 2017). For instance, asset retrenchment or selloff exerts a selection effect as it 
rationalizes the growth opportunity sets aligned to the growth proliferation effect thus limiting 
focus towards high potential growth opportunities for subsequent resource commitment (Mitchell, 
1994; Ozcan, 2018; Vassolo et.al., 2004). This decreases the cognitive and information processing 
burden on managers over resource allocation decisions, temporal commitment and attention 
(Barnett, 2008; Bennett and Feldman, 2017). At the firm level, exploitative divestiture refines the 
firm’s asset utilization capability by eliminating legacy resources posing opportunity costs to the 
growth mobilization effect or compromising it due to high aspiration-performance gaps (Feldman, 
2014; Kaul, 2012). In this, exploitation also assumes a resource ‘liberating’ role as it increases the 
degree of organizational slack available for redeployment towards growth opportunities (Kuusela 
et.al., 2017; Vidal and Mitchell, 2015). Hence, divestiture calibrates resource allocation decisions 
in support of growth opportunities thereby supplementing the resource mobilization effect.  
A second advantage of exploitation in the divestiture activity growth mode lies in its 
contribution to the growth mobilization effect through the elimination of redeployment of acquired 
resources (Capron et.al., 1998, 2001). These decisions rationalize the asset base of the acquirer 
thereby improving its revenue and market share generation potential in growth markets while 
‘milking’ declining markets through consolidation strategies (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron 
et.al., 2001; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004). The presence of a divestment capability increases the 
risk appetite of firms regarding acquisition decisions in growth markets thus inculcating a survival 
enhancing virtuous cycle of resource reconfiguration through both growth modes to achieve 
broader outcomes of revenue and market share growth (Barkema and Schjiven, 2008; Chakrabarti 
et.al., 2011; Kaul, 2012). Thus, firms that de-emphasize exploration in the divestiture activity 
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growth mode while adhering to the corresponding tradeoff of a high degree of exploitation will 
have a lower likelihood of failure leading to the following hypothesis: 
H5/ Growth mobilization effect: In evolving technology ecosystems, a high degree of 
exploitation in the divestiture activity growth mode will strengthen the negative effect of growth 
orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. 
 
 
3.3 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.3.1 Empirical context 
 
My empirical context involves an era of technological convergence in the equipment (SICs 3661, 
3663, and 3669) and networking (SIC 3576) product market ecosystems from 1989-2003 
established in strategy research as a period of technological change (Hsu and Prescott, 2017; Lee, 
2007). The equipment ecosystem was based on the legacy technology of circuit switching for voice 
calling across a ‘dedicated’ communication channel while the networking ecosystem was based 
on packet switching technologies that facilitated data transmission (Greenstein and Khanna, 1997; 
Eugsters, Besio and Hawn, 1998). Over time, the packet switching technologies developed by 
networking firms developed technological capabilities in voice calling through the transmission of 
voice signals in data packets (Bhise et.al.,1999; Eugsters et.al., 1998). While it was superior for 
voice calling, circuit switching was not optimal for data transmission. Thus, firms in the equipment 
ecosystem faced the threat of failure as packet switching encompassed voice calling capabilities 
leading to circuit switching becoming redundant (Bhise et.al., 1999; Seaberg et.al., 1997).  
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Due of the high growth potential of networking product markets, equipment firms began 
entering networking product markets to access growth opportunities and establish operations to 
tap into new sources of revenues while developing market share (Lee, 2007). These entry decisions 
led to convergence between both sets of product markets underpinning structural changes that led 
to an evolving new technology ecosystem (Bhise et.al., 1999; Greenstein and Khanna, 1998; Hsu 
and Prescott, 2017). As convergence increased, firms developed integrated voice and data 
solutions requiring voice calling and data transmission capabilities aligned with circuit and packet 
switching technologies respectively (Eugsters et.al., 1998; Lee, 2007; Seaberg et.al., 1997). In this 
context, a growth orientation underpinning a focus on increasing revenue and market share was 
imperative to ensure firm survival. This was because the growth potential of product markets 
shifted from packet switching product markets to niches based on integrated voice and data product 
lines (Bhise et.al., 1999; Seaberg et.al., 1997).  
Thus, networking firms began to explore circuit switching based equipment product 
markets while simultaneously exploiting packet switching technologies. Equipment firms retained 
their initial growth strategy of exploring networking product-markets while exploiting circuit 
switching to develop integrated product lines. These decisions had implications for the choice of 
growth modes in both sets of product markets regarding their relative emphasis on exploration or 
exploitation (Eugsters et.al., 1998; Greenstein and Khanna, 1997). This context is hence suitable 
to study how firms in both product markets used exploratory and exploitative growth modes to 
decrease the possibility of failure in a converging technology ecosystem. The empirical context of 
the paper is hence significantly fluid as firms had to adapt to a shift from circuit switching to packet 
switching and subsequently to a focus around integrated product lines involving voice and data 
capabilities (Bhise et.al., 1999; Eugsters et.al., 1998; Seaberg et.al., 1997).  
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3.3.2 Data  
 
I used the COMPUSTAT database to identify firms in both sets of product markets. The beginning 
of the sample period was 1989 when the first networking product was introduced (Lee, 2007). The 
total number of sample firms was 231 with 4,200 firm years (147 equipment; 84 networking firms). 
I included a firm if it had a product offering in either circuit switching (voice) or packet switching 
(data) technologies. I collected data two years prior to (1986-1988) and after (2003-2005) my 
sample frame to capture any significant shift in contextual or firm related measures ex ante to and 
ex post the chosen sample period. Performance and control variable data was collected from 
COMPUSTAT. Data on alliance, acquisition and divestiture activity was collected using the 
Thompson Financial Securities & Data Commission Platinum database (Kaul, 2012). Data on 
firms’ growth orientation was obtained from COMPUSTAT and the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database (Benner and Ranganathan, 
2013). Data on internal development (product-market entry) was collected using the CORPTECH 
Database (Hsu and Prescott, 2017; Lee, 2007). The total number of growth mode decisions in my 
sample was 3,327 for the four growth modes. 
 
3.3.3 Dependent variable  
 
I used the multi-dimensional conceptualization proposed by Josefy et.al. (2017) to operationalize 
firm failure. I estimated this by recording failure through three modes during the sample period 
(Josefy et.al., 2017). The variable was coded as one in the year firms ceased operations and/or 
discontinued production of voice or data related product lines (operations related failure), the year 
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when a firm was acquired and integrated within the operations of the acquirer and ceased to operate 
as an autonomous entity (ownership related failure) or the year when a firm was dissolved or filed 
for bankrupt (solvency related failure). Otherwise, the variable was coded as zero. I used Lexis-
Nexis and public sources of data to ascertain the year and underlying driver of firm failure. Of the 
231 sample firms, 111 firms (48%) did not survive the sample period with the remaining 120 cases 
treated as right censored (Allison, 1984).  
 
3.3.4 Independent variable  
 
Growth orientation was operationalized using a structural equation model comprising two 
measures of a firm’s prior performance outcomes – financial ratio indicators and mutual fund 
ratings by security analysts. Extant research at the intersection of corporate strategy and corporate 
finance proposes two approaches to estimating a firm’s strategic focus on increasing revenue and 
market share– its intrinsic performance outcomes (financial ratio indicators) and outcomes aligned 
to the external perception of institutional investors (mutual fund analyst ratings) (Benner and 
Ranganathan, 2013; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2010).  
First, I obtained data on three market performance related financial ratio indicators (stock 
price/earnings ratio, market/book ratio and stock price/cashflow ratio) and three accounting 
performance related financial ratio indicators (revenue growth, capital gains/dividend ratio and 
retained earnings as percentage of revenue). A high value on these six ratio indicators for a firm 
implies that it has a high growth orientation in terms of a focus on revenue and market share growth 
(Lakonishok et.al., 1994; Koller et.al., 2010). For each firm year, I calculated percentiles for each 
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indicator and then calculated an aggregate indicator percentile score - the arithmetic means of the 
percentiles for all the six financial ratio indicators (Lakonishok et.al., 1994).  
Second, the ratings of mutual fund analysts on mutual funds comprising a firm’s securities 
(e.g. stocks/bonds) also provide insight into strategic focus on revenue and market share growth 
through categorization of financial securities (Benner and Ranganathan, 2013). To measure this, I 
used the approach employed by Benner and Ranganathan (2013). I developed investor profile 
percentile scores for each firm year using a weighted measure of the different types of mutual 
funds (growth, value or mixed) that held a firm’s stock multiplied by ratio of the number of 
securities held in each mutual fund and the total number of outstanding securities. A high value on 
these this score for a firm indicated a high growth orientation. Using this approach, I ensured that 
the operationalization was congruent with the theory development around a firm’s growth 
orientation (Koller et.al., 2010).   
I performed confirmatory factor analysis using structural equation modeling (sembuilder 
option in STATA 14.1) to estimate the measurement model (Kline, 2011). The standardized factor 
loading of both percentile measures onto the composite independent variable (growth orientation) 
was significant at p<0.01. The goodness of fit statistics were within the range as per Kline (2011) 
(RMSEA = 0.04, Tucker Lewis Index = 0.96, Comparative fit index = 0.99). Detailed results are 
available from the author. The Cronbach alpha for the composite variable was 0.88 and the 
individual measure alphas were > 0.72. I calculated the growth orientation for each firm year as a 
weighted sum of the product of both percentile measures (aggregate indicator percentile score and 
investor profile percentile score) and their respective standardized factor loadings as ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖2𝑖=1  , 
where wi refers to the loading of the ith variable and xi refers to the value of the ith variable. Hence, 
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the growth orientation was expressed as an overall percentile rank. If a firm had a high growth 
orientation, it was ranked in a higher percentile and vice versa. I lagged this variable by one year. 
 
3.3.5 Moderator variables  
 
a) Internal development growth mode: For each firm year, I conceptualized decisions aligned 
to the internal development growth mode using data on the number of product markets that firms 
entered through autonomous operation. Product-market entry data was collected from the ‘Who 
makes What’ section of the CORPTECH Database that records 37 networking product-markets 
and 28 equipment product-markets (Hsu and Prescott, 2017; Lee, 2007). For each firm year, I 
subtracted the entries made into product-markets through alliances and acquisitions (from SDC) 
from the total entries (from CORPTECH) to arrive at the number of product-markets enter through 
internal development. An internal development growth mode decision was coded as exploratory if 
a firm entered a product-market based on a new technology (e.g. an equipment firm entering a 
packet switching based data product market) for the first time.  
I excluded cases where a firm entered a product-market based on a familiar technology, if 
a firm re-entered a product-market that it had exit earlier or if an entry decision was based on 
augmenting existing operations in a product market as these decisions were exploitative. Thus, 
ADC Telecommunication Inc.’s entry into the local area network (LAN) product market in 1993 
(a networking product market as per Corp Tech) was coded ‘exploratory’ as its prior operations 
were based around voice technologies or data technologies different from LAN. 
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b) Alliance activity growth mode: I coded an alliance activity growth mode decision as 
exploratory if it provided a license or access to a new technology, involved a technological 
knowledge creating R&D agreement (e.g. a packet switching technology alliance made by an 
equipment firm) or provided access to a new technology product market through a joint venture 
(Arora et.al., 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Luo, 2002a, b). I excluded alliances and joint 
ventures aimed at enhancing the scale and scope of prior collaborations between partners or based 
on developing process improvements (e.g. an alliance between networking firms to decrease the 
cost of networking solutions or accessing complementary assets). For instance, Ericsson Business 
Communication’s alliance with Network Equipment Technology in 1993 for developing the next-
generation of asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switching equipment was coded ‘exploratory’ 
because its prior alliances were based on developing incremental variants of voice technologies or 
data technologies that did not include ATM. 
Next, for each of these two growth modes, the degree of exploration was operationalized 
as the ratio of the total exploratory decisions in a growth mode (internal development or alliance 
activity) and the total of all decision in that growth mode for a given firm year (Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). 
 
c) Acquisition activity growth mode: I coded an acquisition activity growth mode decision as 
exploitative if it was based on augmenting the firm’s existing resources/capabilities in a familiar 
technology or entering product markets based on a familiar technology to achieve scale or expand 
technological scope (e.g. a networking firm acquiring another firm to increase scale in operation) 
(Seth, 1990). I excluded acquisitions where the target provided access to new technology 
resources/capabilities (e.g. a networking firm acquiring the patent portfolio of an equipment firm) 
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or if the target provided the acquirer with an alternative to explore new product markets (Puranam 
et.al., 2003, 2006). Hence, Cisco Inc.’s acquisition of Kalpana Inc., in 1994 was coded as 
‘exploitative’ since Cisco had existing technological capabilities in Ethernet switching and the 
acquisition of Kalpana was aimed at gaining market leadership in the Ethernet switching product 
market (New York Times, 1994).  
 
d) Divestiture activity growth mode: A divestiture activity growth mode decision was coded as 
exploitative in two instances – a) if it involved exiting product markets, selling business units or 
eliminating technology and product market resources intended to increase revenue generation 
through greater operational efficiency (Vidal and Mitchell, 2015) and b) when it facilitated the 
release of organizational resources that could be redeployed in alternative product markets (Anand 
and Singh, 1997). I excluded exploration based spinoffs or carveouts (e.g. subsidiaries created to 
support new technology exploration in growth markets (Cirillo et.al., 2014). Thus, Lucent Inc.’s 
sale of its voice technology based computer telephony assets in 1998 was coded ‘exploitative’ as 
it increased strategic focus on computer networking by exiting voice related product markets 
(ResponseSource, 1998) 
Next, for each of these two growth modes, the degree of exploitation was operationalized 
as the ratio of the total exploitative decisions in a growth mode (acquisition or divestiture activity) 
and the total of all decision in that growth mode for a given firm year (Choi and McNamara, 2018; 
Stettner and Lavie, 2014). 
This approach to operationalization measures the relative emphasis placed on exploration 
or exploitation as per the continuum perspective of the exploration/exploitation lens (Gupta et.al., 
2006; Lavie et.al., 2010).  
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3.3.6 Control variables 
 
The operationalization and rationale for inclusion of control variables are in table 5. Apart from 
the product market growth, product market/time fixed effects and degree of product market 
convergence variables, controls were operationalized at the firm level. All controls were lagged 
by one year unless mentioned otherwise.  
 
3.3.7 Empirical methodology 
 
I used event history modeling for given its ability to handle data with right censoring (Allison, 
1984; Cleves et.al., 2016). For testing each hypothesis, I used a proportional hazards mixed effects 
Cox regression model. A key advantage of the Cox model is that it does not pose restrictions on 
the form of the baseline hazard and permits estimation using time-varying covariates (Allison, 
1984; Cleves et.al., 2016). Each firm had a unique hazard function ht(t) = h0(t) exp (βX [t]); where 
‘t’ is the year of firm failure (time to event), h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, X[t] is a matrix 
of covariates at time ‘t’ and β is a vector of modeled coefficients. I used a mixed effect specification 
(frailty) for the model using the shared option in STATA 14.1 to control for time dependence in 
individual firm observations and unobserved heterogeneity across firms (Cleves et.al., 2016). I 
estimated the hazard rate of firm failure as the ‘event’ under the main effect of a firm’s growth 
orientation (H1) and the moderating effects of the four growth modes (H2-H5).  
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3.3.8 Endogeneity concerns 
 
My study may be prone to external drivers or omitted variables that lead to endogeneity in firms 
regarding their growth orientation (Gulati, 2004; Favaro et.al., 2012; Penrose, 1959). A firm’s 
focus on maintaining or augmenting a growth orientation may be also be an approach to avoiding 
failure during environmental change (Chakrabarti et.al., 2011; Kuusela et.al., 2017). The limitation 
of endogeneity also affects growth mode decisions as established by Shaver (1998). Firms employ 
growth modes when their respective product markets have a prior record of such activity or to  
leverage the advantages of a growth orientation to avoid firm failure during technological change 
(Anand and Singh, 1997; Kaul, 2012; Singh and Mitchell, 2005).  
I controlled for endogeneity in growth orientation and growth mode decisions using a two-
stage procedure (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). First, for each year, I evaluated the likelihood of 
either the aggregate indicator percentile score or the investor profile percentile score or both scores 
increasing (coded zero, one and two respectively). For the growth mode variables, I evaluated the 
likelihood that a firm made an exploratory internal development decision/alliance or an 
exploitative acquisition/divestiture (coded zero and one respectively) or a combination of both 
(coded two). I developed two instrumental variables – i) growth focus as the natural log of the total 
number of firms that recorded an increase in either or both scores and ii) growth mode activity as 
the natural log of the total number of firms that used any combination of the both sets of 
exploratory and exploitative growth mode decisions. Empirically, I observed that the null 
hypothesis of regressor exogeneity was rejected (p< 0.05) indicating that endogeneity was an issue. 
I found that the null hypothesis of the Hansen J statistic χ2 test was rejected (p> 0.1) justifying the 
validity of my instruments. I ran two first stage probit models to predict the likelihood of percentile 
 
 
 
Table 5. Control variables, operationalization and rationale for inclusion 
 
 
Control variable  Operationalization Data Source Reference Rational for inclusion 
Firm size Natural log of revenue COMPUSTAT NA Size influences a firm's growth 
orientation as well as its corporate 
strategy in terms of exploration and 
exploitation in corporate scope 
decisions 
Firm age Natural log of the difference 
between current year and 
founding year 
COMPUSTAT NA Older firms may have a higher 
proclivity for exploitation while 
younger firms may have a higher 
proclivity for exploration using 
corporate scope decisions 
Product market 
revenue growth 
% year on year growth in 
revenue for both product 
markets 
Standard and 
Poor industry 
reports 
Mitchell and 
Singh (1993) 
High growth product markets 
provided a more munificent context 
for growth orientation in firms 
Product market fixed 
effects - equipment  
Dummy variable code 1 if 
SIC code is 3661/63/69, 0 
otherwise 
NA Lee (2007) The equipment product markets faced 
a threat of substitution from packet 
switching and hence were likely to 
endogenously choose specific 
exploratory/exploitative corporate 
scope decisions over others for 
adaptation 
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Product market fixed 
effects - networking  
Dummy variable coded 1 if 
SIC code is 3576, 0 otherwise 
NA Lee (2007) The networking product market was a 
source of disruption for equipment 
product markets and hence firms 
were likely to choose different 
corporate scope decisions from 
equipment firms.  
Time fixed effects Dummy variable- coded 1 if 
year was 2001; 0 otherwise 
NA Hsu and Prescott 
(2017) 
The technology crash of 1999-2001 
was a significant macroeconomic 
event that adversely impacted firm 
growth as well as the decision to 
explore and exploit 
Degree of product 
market convergence 
 CORPTECH Hsu and Prescott 
(2017) 
The degree of product market 
convergence is a measure of cross 
product market diversification that 
proxies the intensity of technological 
change in the equipment and 
networking product markets.  
 
In the denominator of the formula, 
1036 is calculated as 37*28 as there 
were 37 networking product markets 
(j) and 28 equipment product markets 
(i). rij is the number of firms that 
were present in a specific product 
market pair ij concurrently. 
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Tobin's Q Ratio of the market value of a 
company's assets (as 
measured by the market value 
of its outstanding stock and 
debt) divided by the 
replacement cost of the 
company's assets (book value) 
COMPUSTAT Koller et.al. 
(2010) 
Past market performance reinforces 
the growth orientation of a firm and 
affects what type of corporate scope 
decisions will be implemented.  
Prior performance 
(ROA) 
Natural log of (Operating 
profits/Total assets) 
COMPUSTAT Harrison et.al. 
(1991) 
Influences subsequent corporate 
scope activity from an aspiration 
performance gap perspective 
R&D intensity Natural log of (R&D 
expenditure/Total Revenue) 
COMPUSTAT Harrison et.al. 
(1991) 
Diversified firms may have greater 
R&D expenditure committed to 
internal development that precludes 
the need for alliances acquisitions 
and divestitures. 
Debt to equity ratio Ratio of market value of 
equity and total debt (long 
term liabilities + short term 
liabilities+ current liabilities) 
COMPUSTAT Harrison et.al. 
(1991) 
Greater debt to equity ratios may 
represent an alternative explanation 
of exit due to insolvency 
Patent portfolio 
diversity 
Blau index of digital 
technology patents vis a vis 
the total of analog and digital 
photography patents 
United States 
Patent and 
Trademark 
Office 
Katila and Ahuja 
(2002) 
Patenting is viewed as a proxy to 
internal development that could 
substitute for acquisitions and legacy 
divestitures 
Capital expenditure Natural log of capital 
expenditure 
COMPUSTAT Benner and 
Ranganathan 
(2012) 
Capital expenditure represents an 
alternative form of internal 
development and maintaining a 
growth orientation as opposed to 
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alliances, acquisitions and 
divestitures 
Unabsorbed slack Natural log of (total assets - 
total liabilities) 
COMPUSTAT Benner and 
Ranganathan 
(2012) 
Firms can deploy slack resources to 
maintain or develop a growth 
orientation or invest in corporate 
scope decisions 
Prior alliance 
experience 
Cumulative number of all the 
alliances made by a firm 
SDC Platinum, 
Lexis Nexis 
Kale and Singh 
(2007) 
Prior alliancing may positively 
influence future alliancing to generate 
growth options  
Prior acquisition 
experience 
Cumulative number of all the 
acquisitions made by a firm 
SDC Platinum, 
Lexis Nexis 
Puranam et.al. 
(2006) 
Past acquisition experience may lead 
to firms doing more acquisitions in 
future.  
Prior divestiture 
experience 
Cumulative number of all the 
divestitures made by a firm 
SDC Platinum, 
Lexis Nexis 
Vidal and 
Mitchell (2015) 
Past divestiture experience may lead 
to firms doing more divestitures in 
future 
Prior product market 
entry experience 
Cumulative number of 
exploratory and exploitative  
internal product market  entry 
moves 
CORPTECH NA Firms that enter a larger number of 
product markets using internal 
development may prefer to use the 
same mode  in the future 
Dividend payout 
decision 
Dummy variable coded 1 for 
the year the firm announced a 
dividend, 0 otherwise 
COMPUSTAT Koller et.al. 
(2010) 
Firms with high growth orientation 
may choose not to pay out dividends 
while firms with a low orientation are 
stable in dividend payouts 
Stock repurchase 
decision 
Dummy variable - coded 1 if 
firm made a repurchase 
announcement in a given 
year; 0 otherwise 
SDC Platinum, 
Lexis Nexis 
Benner and 
Ranganathan 
(2012) 
Firms use stock repurchases when 
they have a low growth orientation 
and may not find suitable avenues of 
investment 
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score increase and growth mode decisions using my variables and the respective instrument. I used 
the predict procedure to save the predicted values of the residuals (inverse Mills ratios) for both 
equations and included them in the second stage model to control for endogeneity. 
 
 
3.4 RESULTS 
 
Panels 5a-b of figure 5 show the empirical context of this study. Panel 5a shows revenue growth 
for the equipment and networking product markets. It can be observed that between 1996-2003, 
the growth in revenue for the networking product market increased relative to the equipment 
product market and was ~five times higher (on average) than that of the equipment product markets 
that recorded modest growth in revenue over the entire sample period. Panel 5b shows the pattern 
of firm entry into both product markets. After 1991, the cumulative number of firms entering the 
networking product were greater than those entering into the equipment product market with the 
trend persisting throughout the sample period. 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations. The mean growth orientation percentile 
scores for survivor and non-survivor firms was 0.57 and 0.39 respectively i.e. on average, survivors 
and non-survivors had growth orientation percentile ranks of 57 and 39 respectively. This 
difference was significant (p< 0.01) as indicated by a two-sample t-test. This shows that the relative 
emphasis on increasing revenue and market share was 46 percent higher for survivors than non-
survivors. Table 7 presents the mixed effects proportional hazards Cox model results. Assumptions 
for event history modeling were met and multicollinearity was not an issue (full model VIF = 2.33; 
individual variables maximum. VIF = 2.64). 
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Figure 5. Empirical context and material effects 
 
 
 
 
Panel 5a Panel 5b 
Panel 5d 
Panel 5c 
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Table 6. Correlations and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1) Firm size 1             
2) Firm age 0.16 1            
3) Market growth 0.04 -0.10 1           
4) Equipment fixed effect 0.10 0.24 0.00 1          
5) Networking fixed effect 0.16 0.02 0.12 -0.00 1         
6) Time fixed effect 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.45 -0.00 1        
7) Market convergence 0.24 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.58 -0.01 1       
8) Tobin’s Q 0.22 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.22 1      
9) Prior performance (ROA) 0.42 0.09 0.02 -0.05    0.06 -0.00 0.12 0.43 1     
10) R&D intensity 0.31 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.08 0.30 0.28 1    
11) Debt equity ratio 0.34 0.25 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.10 0.22 0.25 0.18 1   
12) Patent diversity 0.43 0.09 -0.06 -0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.33 0.55 0.40 0.27 1  
13) Capital expenditure 0.96 0.26 -0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.42 0.31 0.21 0.10 0.63 1 
14) Unabsorbed slack 0.32 0.22 -0.08 0.04 0.13 -0.02 0.23 0.32 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.46 0.46 
15) Prior alliance exp. 0.36   0.22 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.35 0.44 0.36 0.23    0.32 0.60 
16) Prior acquisition exp. 0.32 0.22 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.26 0.34 0.31 0.25 0.38 
17) Prior divestiture exp. 0.29 0.25 -0.07 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.28 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.32 
18) Prior entry exp. 0.46 0.16 -0.09 0.02 0.24 -0.01 0.38 0.45 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.41 0.27 
19) Dividend decision 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.26 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.16 
20) Repurchase 0.19 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.09 -0.01 0.13 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.06 
21) Growth orientation 0.39 -0.21 0.24 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.38 0.24 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.04 
22) Internal dev. – explore 0.17 0.11 -0.08 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.11 
23) Alliance – explore 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 
24) Acquisition – exploit 0.24 0.02 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 -0.23 -0.22 -0.15 -0.52 -0.23 -0.13 
25) Divestiture - exploit 0.30 0.24 -0.14 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.30 0.11 0.24 0.10 0.42 0.46 
26) Firm failure -0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.13 -0.13 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 
Mean 1.06 0.18 0.14 0.64 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.75 0.08 0.34 0.36 0.33 
S.D. 1.13 0.16 0.19 0.48 0.44 0.44 0.17 0.26 1.56 0.60 1.14 2.91 1.29 
Minimum value 0.68 0.13 -0.17 0 0 0 0 -0.51 0.01 -2.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum value 4.72 0.52 0.85 1 1 1 0.49 1.06 1.60 7.26 1.18 0.53 2.22 
      N= 4200 firm year observations. All values ≥0.20 and ≤ -0.20 are significant at p< 0.05. 
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Table 6. (continued) 
 
Variable 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
14) Unabsorbed slack 1             
15) Prior alliance exp. 0.42 1            
16) Prior acqn. exp 0.39 0.73 1           
17) Prior div. exp 0.36 0.50 0.45 1          
18) Prior prod. mkt exp 0.72 0.37 0.40 0.31 1         
19) Dividend decision 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.11 1        
20) Repurchase 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.04 1       
21) Growth orientation 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.10 1      
22) Int dev. – explore 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.41 0.13 0.03 0.02 1     
23) Alliance – explore -0.00 -0.15 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.42 0.01 0.02 -0.16 1    
24) Acqn – exploit -0.17 -0.20 -0.23 -0.16 -0.26 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.14 -0.00 1   
25) Divest - exploit 0.89 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.65 0.09 0.04 -0.04 0.18 -0.06 -0.14 1  
26) Firm failure 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.02 1 
Mean 2.97 1.14 0.26 1.16 0.20 0.09 0.21 0.47 0.22 0.52 0.32 0.44 0.03 
S.D. 0.11 0.49 0.14 2.54 0.62 0.28 0.53 0.29 0.22 0.16 0.78 0.31 0.16 
Minimum value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
Maximum value 127 97 24 27 1 1 1 0.99 0.50 0.83 0.77 0.64 1 
       N= 4200 firm year observations. All values ≥0.20 and ≤ -0.20 are significant at p< 0.05. 
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Table 7. Event history modeling results (endogeneity adjusted estimates) 
 
Control variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Firm size -0.84**(0.17) -0.83** (0.18) -0.77**(0.15) -0.82** (0.14) -0.78**(0.13) -0.86**(0.18) 
Firm age -0.09**(0.02) -0.07** (0.02) -0.19 (0.18) -0.13 (0.18) -0.27 (0.18) -0.79 (0.82) 
Product market revenue growth -0.32* (0.14) -1.33 (1.39) -0.99 (1.40) -1.09 (1.40) -1.75 (1.39) -1.91 (1.19) 
Product market fixed effect 1 (equipment) 0.79* (0.33) 0.11** (0.03) 0.72* (0.31) 0.76* (0.32) 0.76* (0.30) 0.53* (0.27) 
Product market fixed effect 2 (networking) -0.23 (0.42) -0.10 (0.38) -0.72* (0.04) -0.55 (0.36) -0.42 (0.36) -0.34 (0.31) 
Degree of product market convergence  0.26** (0.05) 0.22** (0.05) 0.21** (0.04) 0.20**(0.05) 0.25**(0.05) 0.31**(0.04) 
Time fixed effect -0.28 (0.49) -0.29 (0.49) -0.38 (0.36) -0.37 (0.48) -0.12 (0.48) -0.23 (0.38) 
Tobin’s Q -0.39+ (0.23) -0.28** (0.05)  -0.26**(0.05) -0.11 (0.07)  -0.12+ (0.07) -0.26 (0.18) 
Prior performance (ROA) -0.27* (0.13) -0.15(0.13) -0.30*(0.14) -0.11(0.13) -0.15 (0.09) -0.16 (0.11) 
R&D intensity -1.00 (1.08) -1.19 (1.12) -0.83 (1.37) -0.87 (1.42) -0.56 (1.28) -0.37 (1.09) 
Debt equity ratio 0.59 (0.61) 0.57 (0.64) 0.65 (0.71) 0.21+ (0.12) 0.22+ (0.13) 0.44 (0.55) 
Patent portfolio diversity 0.07 (1.04) -0.13 (0.10) 0.05 (0.11) -0.06 (0.09) -0.04 (0.08) -0.20**(0.08) 
Capital expenditure -0.31**(0.14) -0.36** (0.10) -0.44*(0.10) -0.43** (0.10) -0.28**(0.09) -0.13(0.10) 
Unabsorbed slack -0.14 (0.10) -0.04 (0.09) -0.11 (0.12) -0.19+ (0.11) -0.23* (0.11) -0.27+ (0.15) 
Prior alliance experience -0.02 (0.12) -0.17 (0.13) -0.06 (0.15) -0.03 (0.13) -0.07 (0.13) -0.15 (0.11) 
Prior acquisition experience -0.11 (0.29) -0.02 (0.10) -0.05 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) -0.06 (0.09) -0.03(0.08) 
Prior divestiture experience -0.73 (0.45) -0.30 (0.38) -0.45 (0.46) -0.41 (0.45) -0.43 (0.48) -0.39 (0.43) 
Prior product market entry experience -0.20**(0.07) -0.18**(0.07) -0.18**(0.06) -0.16*(0.06) -0.20**(0.06) -0.19**(0.05) 
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Notes for table 7: a) n= 231 firms with 3200 firm year observations.  
b) The first value for each variable in each model is the regression coefficient. The value in brackets is the standard error calculated through the concept of 
shared frailty that accounts for dependence between observations and unobserved heterogeneity. 
c) ** p<0.01, * p< 0.05 and + p< 0.1. 
d) Bold values refer to the hypotheses results.  
e) When the LR test of theta is not significant, unobserved heterogeneity (frailty) is accounted for in the model.
Table 7. (continued) 
Dividend payout decision 0.20 (0.26) 0.23 (0.26) 0.28 (0.22) 0.05 (0.25) 0.05 (0.24) 0.08 (0.23) 
Stock repurchase decision -0.21**(0.08) -0.20**(0.07) -0.24** (0.08) -0.21**(0.07) -0.20**(0.08) -0.15**(0.06) 
H1: Growth orientation (main effect)  -0.09**(0.02) -0.10**(0.02) -0.11**(0.02) -0.08**(0.02) -0.11**(0.02) 
H2: Growth orientation * Degree of 
exploration in internal development  
  -6.95*(2.97) -7.47**(2.90) 10.35**(2.69) -12.42**(2.6) 
Degree of exploration in internal development   -1.26(1.22) -1.23(1.23) -1.48(1.24) -2.87**(1.08) 
H3: Growth orientation * Degree of 
exploration in alliance activity  
   -3.44*(1.76) -3.05+(1.75) -3.75*(1.97) 
Degree of exploration in alliance activity     -1.10(1.10) -0.69(1.01) -1.09(1.03) 
H4: Growth orientation * Degree of 
exploitation in acquisition activity  
    -5.24**(1.37) -5.99**(1.43) 
Degree of exploration in acquisition activity      -1.73*(0.74) -3.26**(1.27) 
H5: Growth orientation * Degree of 
exploitation in divestiture activity  
     -1.58*(0.68) 
Degree of exploration in divestiture activity      -0.23(0.22) 
Inverse Mills ratio 1 – Growth focus 0.18(0.22) 0.13(0.19) -0.05(0.22) -0.13(0.22) -0.02(0.08) -0.11(0.24) 
Inverse Mills ratio 2 – Growth mode activity 0.00(0.09) -0.12(0.14) 0.05(0.29) 0.01(0.14) -0.18(0.24) 0.05(0.11) 
Over-dispersion (frailty) (θ) 0.41 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 
LR test (χ2) of θ (p-value) 2.67 (0.05) 0.98(0.50) 0.67(0.49) 0.69(0.49) 0.16(0.49) 0.12 (0.49) 
Log likelihood -356.73 -335.66 -334.12 -333.29 -330.99 -328.90 
Wald χ2 (df) 141.06 (22) 157.37 (23) 167.69 (25) 173.43 (27) 173.59(29) 208.81 (31) 
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A positive (negative) coefficient for a variable indicates that it increases (decreases) the 
hazard rate of firm failure thus decreasing (increasing) the likelihood of survival (Allison, 1984). 
The controls in model 1 of table 7 reveal important insights. Product market revenue 
growth and firm size had a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of firm failure. 
Equipment firms had a higher likelihood of failure compared to those in the networking product 
market as shown by the opposite signs of both product market fixed effect variables. The product 
market convergence variable captures the intensity of technological change (see table 5) and has a 
positive relationship with the likelihood of firm failure indicating that convergence had survival 
threatening implications regardless of the firm’s product market presence. Prior performance 
(ROA) and a firm’s capital expenditure decision decreased the likelihood of failure. Of the growth 
mode decision experience variables, prior experience in entering product markets (internal 
development) had a negative and significant effect on firm failure while prior experience in 
alliances, acquisitions and divestitures had negative effects that were not significant.  
Hypothesis 1 proposed that growth orientation had a negative effect on its likelihood of 
firm failure in evolving technology ecosystems. It was supported (table 7, model 2: β= - 0.09, p< 
0.01). For a unit increase in a firm’s growth orientation percentile rank, the hazard rate of firm 
failure in the convergence driven evolving technological ecosystem decreased by nine percent (1-
(exp (0.1 * - 0.09) =0.09). The result was materially significant as on average, survivor firms were 
ranked in the 57th percentile compared to non-survivor firms that were ranked in the 39th 
percentile in terms of having a growth orientation i.e. survivors had a 46 percent greater emphasis 
on increasing revenue and market share across the ecosystem as compared to non-survivors. In 
panel 5c of figure 5, it is observed that surviving firms had a higher average growth orientation 
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percentile rank compared to non-survivor firms over the sample period hence indicating material 
support for hypotheses 1. 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that in evolving technology ecosystems, a high degree of 
exploration in the internal development growth mode strengthened the negative effect of growth 
orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. This was supported (table 7, model 3: β= - 6.95, p< 
0.05).  For a unit increase in a firm’s growth orientation percentile rank, increasing the relative 
emphasis on exploration by 10 percent decreased the hazard rate of firm failure by 49 percent (1-
(exp (0.1 * - 6.95) =0.49). Panel 6a of figure 6 shows that the hazard rate of failure for firms with 
a high degree of exploration (solid line) was consistently lower relative to the hazard rate for firms 
with a low degree of exploration (broken line). However, this difference was negligible for firms 
that had a very high growth orientation percentile rank (> 87). Beyond this threshold rank, the 
relative hazard was zero (i.e. firm failure was unlikely) irrespective of the relative emphasis on 
exploration. Thus, for the internal development growth mode, de-emphasizing exploration did not 
pose a tangible threat to firm survival after the threshold rank of 87 was passed. This result was 
materially supported in panel 5d of figure 5 as the average degree of exploration was 66 percent 
for survivors and 32 percent for non-survivors for the internal development growth mode (i.e. 
survivors had > two times higher emphasis on exploration). 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that in evolving technology ecosystems, a high degree of 
exploration in the alliance activity growth mode strengthened the negative effect of growth 
orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. It was supported (table 7, model 4: β= - 3.44, p< 0.05). 
For a unit increase in a firm’s growth orientation percentile rank, increasing the relative emphasis 
on exploration by 10 percent decreased the hazard rate of firm failure by 29 percent. Panel 6b of 
figure 6 shows that the lines of high and low degrees of exploration intersect at a growth orientation 
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percentile rank of 14. For the alliance activity growth mode, a high degree of exploration was a 
failure mitigating strategy for firms that had a growth orientation percentile > 14. When firms 
ranked below this threshold placed a higher emphasis on exploration, they actually exacerbated 
their risk of failure instead of mitigating it. This result was materially supported in panel 5d of 
figure 5 as the average degree of exploration in the alliance activity growth mode was 57 percent 
for survivors but 21 percent for non-survivors (i.e. survivors had ~ three times greater emphasis 
on exploration).  
Hypothesis 4 proposed that in evolving technology ecosystems, a high degree of 
exploitation in the acquisition activity growth mode strengthened the negative effect of growth 
orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. The hypothesis was supported (table 7, model 5: β= - 
5.24, p< 0.01). For a unit increase in a firm’s growth orientation percentile rank, increasing the 
relative emphasis on exploitation by 10 percent decreased the hazard rate of firm failure by 41 
percent. Panel 6c of figure 6 shows that the lines corresponding to high and low degrees of 
exploitation intersect at a growth orientation percentile rank of 46. Thus, for the acquisition activity 
growth mode, increasing the emphasis on exploitation was a survival enhancing strategy only when 
firms had a growth orientation percentile rank > 46. Prior to this threshold rank, emphasizing 
exploration in the acquisition activity growth mode was more likely to decrease the hazard rate of 
failure. This result was materially supported in panel 5d of figure 5 as the average degree of 
exploitation in the acquisition activity growth mode was 72 percent for survivors but 54 percent 
for non-survivors (i.e. survivors had a 33 percent greater emphasis on exploitation). 
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Figure 6. Graphical representation of moderation effect hypotheses 
 
 
 
Panel 6a 
Panel 6c 
Panel 6b 
Panel 6d 
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Hypothesis 5 proposed that in evolving technology ecosystems, a high degree of 
exploitation in the divestiture activity growth mode strengthened the negative effect of growth 
orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. It was supported (table 7, model 6: β= - 1.58, p< 0.05). 
For a unit increase in a firm’s growth orientation percentile rank, increasing the relative emphasis 
on exploitation by 10 percent decreased the hazard rate of firm failure by 15 percent. Panel 6d of 
figure 6 shows that the lines corresponding to high and low degrees of exploitation intersect at a 
growth orientation percentile rank of 28. Thus, for the divestiture activity growth mode, increasing 
the emphasis on exploitation was a survival enhancing strategy only when firms had a growth 
orientation percentile rank > 28. Prior to this threshold rank, switching emphasis in favor of 
exploration decreased the hazard rate of failure. This result was materially supported in panel 5d 
of figure 5 as the average degree of exploitation in the acquisition activity growth mode was 89 
percent for survivors but 62 percent for non-survivors (i.e. survivors had a 43 percent greater 
emphasis on exploitation). 
 
3.4.1 Supplementary analyses  
 
The results of H3, H4 and H5 also indicate that firms that chose to emphasize exploration 
and exploitation in the alliance, acquisition and divestiture activity growth modes selectively and 
contingent to their growth orientation percentile ranks were less likely to fail. For instance, for the 
alliance activity growth mode, increasing the degree of exploration at very low growth orientation 
percentile ranks (< 14) was likely to increase the hazard rate of firm failure – an outcome that can 
be linked to complex adaptation issues arising from attempting to transition to exploration from a 
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prior posture of exploitation (Swift, 2016). However, for firms that managed this transition and 
persisted with emphasizing exploration beyond the percentile rank of 14, the corresponding 
decrease in the hazard rate may be linked to learning outcomes inculcating absorptive capacity and 
the development of alliance management capabilities that were supportive of exploration through 
alliancing (Davis, 2016; Kale and Singh, 2007; Lane et.al., 2001; Schildt et.al., 2012).  
Conversely, for H4 and H5, at low to intermediate growth orientation percentile ranks, 
firms that chose to emphasize exploration in the acquisition and divestiture activity growth modes 
had lower hazard rates of failure. While this is a result contrary to my hypotheses, it indicates that 
a low percentile rank values, a high degree of exploration through the acquisition and divestiture 
growth modes was a mechanism that decreased inertia arising from exposure to declining product 
markets and introduced path breaking and discontinuous change (Girod and Whittington, 2015; 
Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). However, as firms surpassed the 
requisite growth orientation percentile rank thresholds (46 and 28 for acquisitions and divestiture 
activity growth modes respectively), a high degree of exploitation decreased the hazard rate of 
failure as it allowed firms to develop and leverage growth opportunities aligned to the growth 
trajectories developed by exploration while exiting declining markets through asset retrenchment 
and resource redeployment (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron et.al., 1998, 2001). 
From an exploration/exploitation standpoint, these results demonstrate the importance of 
ambidexterity within growth modes wherein the capability to explore and exploit at different 
junctures contingent to the firm’s growth orientation could be instrumental to ensuring firm 
survival in evolving technology ecosystems -  a result consistent with the work of Lavie and 
colleagues.  
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3.4.2 Robustness checks 
 
I used several robustness checks to ensure the validity and consistency of the results. First, the 
individual effects of the aggregate indicator and investor profile percentile scores may be conflated 
within the structural model constructed to create the independent variable (Kline, 2011). This may 
lead to overestimation or underestimation of the hypotheses testing results. To avoid this, I used 
each individual measure as an estimate of a firm’s growth orientation and re-ran all models. While 
the results of table 7 were supported in both cases, the models comprising the aggregate indicator 
percentile score as the independent variable had superior fit compared to the models that used the 
investor profile percentile score. This may imply that the intrinsic performance of a firm is a better 
measure of its focus on increasing revenue and market share as opposed to the extrinsic perception 
of mutual fund analysts through security ratings (Koller et.al., 2010).  
Second, how firms choose their growth orientation may include the effect of different 
mechanisms contingent on the intensity of technological change that may have varied over time. 
This issue also affects the growth mode variables and their effect on the growth orientation- firm 
failure relationship. That is, at what point in time firms choose to explore or exploit and which 
growth mode decisions they choose to explore or exploit is likely to affect how firms’ growth 
orientation influences its likelihood of surviving technological change. To control for this, I 
included a time trend variable (1 for 1989....14 for 2003) to control for alternative mechanisms 
that may have influenced a firm’s growth orientation and their choice to explore or exploit using 
specific growth mode decisions (Hsu and Prescott, 2017). My results were robust to this variable.  
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Third, I created a more conservative measure of the degree of exploration and exploitation 
in the moderator variables by re-evaluating whether firms made growth mode decisions that had a 
mixed emphasis on both exploration and exploitation. Of the 3327 growth mode decisions in my 
sample, about 623 decisions could arguably have had a mixed emphasis on exploration and 
exploitation in terms of technology, product lines or value chain activity (Stettner and Lavie, 
2014). Since this figure was ~ 20 percent of the total number, I re-ran all models using the re-
calculated moderator variables. While my results were robust, the model fit values were inferior 
to the models in table 7. Hence, it is likely that firms did not place a mixed emphasis on exploration 
or exploitation in any given growth mode decision but used different decisions to explore and 
exploit in entirety - a result congruent with Stettner and Lavie (2014).  
Fourth, from panel 5c of figure 5, it can be observed that there is a temporal trend in the 
average growth orientation percentile rank of surviving firms over the sample period. There is a 
consistent decrease in the average rank between 1994 and 2003. To avoid this trend biasing my 
results, I re-ran each model for a truncated sample comprising firm years between 1994 and 2003. 
The results were robust to this check but were weaker than the results presented in table 7, an 
outcome that can be attributed to the declining average growth orientation percentile rank in the 
truncated sample.  
Fifth, there were instances in my sample where firms with a high average growth 
orientation percentile rank did not survive (e.g. 3Com Inc.’s acquisition of Chipcom in 1996) or 
where firms choosing growth modes hypothesized to be survival enhancing by my theoretical 
model did not survive (e.g. Bay Network Inc.’s acquisition by Northern Telecom in 1999). As this 
aspect of the data did not conform to my hypotheses, I re-ran my models by eliminating these firms 
from my sample to observe whether my empirical results were stronger in the absence of these 
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outlier firms. My results were supported but there were not noticeably stronger indicating that the 
above-mentioned firms may not have survived due to the competing risks inherent to the 
environmental context (Allison, 1984; Cleves et.al., 2016).   
Finally, I tested the developed model using alternative distributional assumptions - 
proportional hazards Weibull and Gompertz specification (both allowing for monotonically 
increasing/decreasing hazard functions). The results were supported but model fit was poor 
compared to the Cox model in table 3 (Cleves et.al., 2016). We tested for the piecewise exponential 
distribution (a special case of the Weibull distribution when the scale parameter = 1) and found 
results in favor of the Weibull model. We also ran a fixed effects model with robust standard errors 
clustered on individual firms to which our results were robust.  
 
 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Drawing on the exploration/exploitation lens, I asked the following research question - 
During technological change, how do corporate development decisions or growth modes (i.e. 
internal development, alliances, acquisitions and divestitures) moderate the relationship between 
growth orientation and the likelihood of firm failure? I motivated my research question by stressing 
the significance of a growth orientation and the role of growth modes as adaptive mechanisms in 
mitigating the threat of firm failure in evolving technology ecosystems. I found that a firm’s growth 
orientation decreased the likelihood of firm failure. The growth proliferation effect facilitated firms 
in identifying and accessing opportunities for increasing revenue and market share in growth 
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markets. The growth mobilization effect allowed firms to develop and leverage a specific subset 
of opportunities for achieving these growth outcomes while strategically exiting declining markets. 
The growth proliferation and mobilization effects are mechanisms that explain the moderation 
effect of firm growth modes on the growth orientation-firm failure relationship. 
 
3.5.1 Contribution  
 
Firms maintain a corporate level focus on growth through several approaches - top management 
agendas (Gulati, 2004), structural arrangements (Favaro et.al., 2012), entrepreneurial orientation 
(Yu et.al., 2018), growth modes (Capron and Mitchell, 2012; Dyer et.al., 2004) and resource 
development tradeoffs (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). By introducing the theoretical construct of 
growth orientation, I demonstrate that the imperative of increasing revenue and market share in 
growth markets is a central aspect of firms’ growth strategies. Moreover, I show that 
conceptualizing a firm’s growth orientation as a strategic focus around increasing revenue and 
market share has survival enhancing implications during technological change. By theorizing on 
and testing the growth proliferation and growth mobilization effects, I unpack their role as adaptive 
mechanisms that strengthen the negative effect of growth orientation on firm failure. In this, I 
contribute to scholarly research on growth modes by demonstrating how they align with the 
broader imperative of a firm’s growth orientation (Capron and Mitchell, 2012; McKelvie and 
Wiklund, 2010). Firms that used the internal development and alliance activity growth modes for 
identifying and accessing opportunities in growth markets (exploration) while employing the 
acquisition and divestiture activity growth modes to develop and leverage specific subsets of 
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growth opportunities were less likely to fail. These findings indicate that how firms choose growth 
modes as adaptive mechanisms and the diverse effects of these choices on firm survival represent 
two prospective drivers of firm heterogeneity (Rumelt et.al., 1994).  
My findings also complement scholarly research on the exploration/exploitation lens with 
a firm growth perspective – a theoretical link that has received scant attention (cf. Raisch, 2008). 
I highlight the importance of exploration and exploitation for growth related outcomes in firms. 
They provide exploration/exploitation scholars with initial insights into this novel theoretical link 
that can be refined and expanded through subsequent theoretical and empirical efforts.  
Extant research on product market entry (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Mitchell, 1989; 
Mitchell and Singh, 1993) and strategic alliances (Davis, 2016; Lee, 2007; Luo, 2002a) has 
established the importance of exploration as a survival enhancing mechanism during 
environmental change. Through the growth proliferation effect, I show that increasing the relative 
emphasis on exploration in both these growth modes enabled firms to identify and access 
opportunities for increasing revenue and market share in growth markets. This strengthened the 
negative effect of growth orientation on the likelihood of firm failure. The growth proliferation 
effect was thus a mechanism that depicted the survival enhancing nature of maintaining a high 
degree of exploration in both these growth modes.  
Scholarly work on firm growth has stressed the importance of exploitation as a critical 
mechanism that improves the likelihood of firm survival during technological change (Bercovitz 
and Mitchell, 2007; Benner and Tushman, 2003). Through the growth mobilization effect, I show 
that de-emphasizing exploration by appreciating the tradeoff requiring a high degree of 
exploitation in the acquisition and divestiture activity growth modes enabled firms to increase 
resource commitment to a specific subset of growth opportunities while diverting resources away 
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from low potential opportunities. This strengthened the negative effect of growth orientation on 
the likelihood of firm failure. The growth mobilization effect was thus a mechanism that showed 
the survival enhancing nature of a high degree of exploitation in both these growth modes.  
Finally, my work has implications for scholarly research at the intersection of 
exploration/exploitation and corporate strategy (Choi and McNamara, 2018; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 
2006; Lavie et.al., 2011; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). For instance, the statistical and material results 
aligned to the growth proliferation and growth mobilization effects stress the importance of an 
ambidextrous posture across a firm’s growth mode choices but not within them – a result 
supporting that of Stettner and Lavie (2014). These results substantiate an approach to how 
ambidexterity can be woven across growth mode choices i.e. by increasing the relative emphasis 
on exploration in the internal development and alliance activity growth modes and exploitation in 
the acquisition and divestiture activity growth modes. Thus, the broader implications are that 
ambidexterity across a firm’s growth modes enabled firms to leverage the advantages of a growth 
orientation, improve their adaptive capability and lower the likelihood of firm failure. However, 
this was only likely when firms selectively and decisively chose to emphasize exploration or 
exploitation within a specific growth mode. My results indicate a prospective avenue through 
which firms can develop ambidexterity as a dynamic capability within a firm’s corporate strategy 
(Lavie et.al., 2010; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996).  
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3.5.2 Managerial implications  
 
My work offers two insights for checking the growth imperative ‘box’ on managerial agendas 
(Gulati, 2004). First, my conceptualization and measurement of growth orientation as a percentile 
rank is grounded in tangible growth outcomes - financial indicator ratios and mutual fund analyst 
ratings (Benner and Ranganathan, 2013; Koller et.al., 2010). As a significant portion of this data 
is publicly accessible, business analysts can replicate this measure or customize it to help managers 
benchmark their company’s growth orientation against that of competitors and alternative 
ecosystem actors. This may not only reveal the robustness of a firm’s revenue and market share 
growth strategies but also highlight its strategic positioning vis-à-vis key rivals (Prescott, 2001).  
Second, as growth orientation imperatives are socially constructed, they cannot be 
grounded solely around numerical ‘targets’ of revenue and market share but must be woven into 
top management rhetoric, board agendas, executive cognition and corporate narratives for 
corporate coherence (Alexander, Fennel and Halpern, 1993; Dweck, 2016; Teece et.al., 1994; 
Zajac and Westphal, 2004). While my work did not address these factors, top management teams 
may be advised to proactively communicate the growth imperative across the firm and to external 
actors to demonstrate a proactive corporate level focus on growth.  
A final message of note to managers from my work refers to the strategic management of 
the corporate development decision/growth mode portfolio (see Appendix B). The theoretical 
formulation of this paper indicates that growth modes can be used to search for new revenue and 
market share growth opportunities or commit corporate resources to leverage a subset of 
opportunities for growth. However, as shown by the statistical and material results, managers need 
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to be circumspect in matching the choice of growth mode with the intended outcome associated 
with its deployment. In this, two key challenges may have to be addressed. First, the growth mode 
portfolio of the firm needs to be broader in terms of the decisions available for administering the 
growth imperative (Capron and Mitchell, 2012). In my sample, companies with broader portfolios 
comprising four diverse growth mode decisions (‘build’, ‘borrow’, ‘buy’ ‘sell’) for achieving 
revenue and market share related outcomes were more likely to successfully navigate the choppy 
waters of technological change. Hence, proactively developing decision level and portfolio level 
capabilities could survival enhancing factors in environmental adversities (Kale and Singh, 2007; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
Second, managers may note the importance of developing agility in shifting strategic focus 
from the flexibility of experimenting with multiple growth opportunities (exploration - growth 
proliferation effect) to the commitment oriented stability required for leveraging specific subsets 
of opportunities (exploitation - growth mobilization effect). This is particularly important when 
managers must implement particularly types of growth mode decisions that require fast switching 
capabilities when a certain growth threshold has been passed (panels 3 b, c, d). The 
flexibility/stability tradeoff is well established in strategy research (Benner and Tushman, 2003) 
and managerial practice (Haanes, Reeves and Wurlord, 2018; Reeves et.al., 2013). My findings 
expand it to the strategic realm of a firm’s growth mode portfolio. However, the associated caveat 
for managers concerns the company’s capability to create structures, processes and cultures that 
enable these transitions within and across growth mode choices (Fang et.al., 2010; Ghoshal, 1997). 
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3.5.3 Limitations and future research directions 
 
The limitations of this paper indicate several interesting opportunities for future research. First, 
the operationalization of the independent variable employs an implicit working assumption of 
efficient markets where evolutionary dynamics are assumed away (Benner and Ranganathan, 
2013; Koller et.al., 2010). Thus, a lack of consideration for alternative factors driving firms’ 
growth strategies - environmental imperatives (Lev et.al., 2010), intra-organizational ecology 
(Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000), executive cognition (Dweck, 2016), resource and capability profiles 
(Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996) and tradeoff with other outcomes (Prescott et.al., 1986) limits the 
richness of the developed theory. In acknowledgement of the scholarly challenges associated with 
developing a middle range theory on firm growth (Shephard and Wiklund, 2009), my work invites 
scholarly effort into this area of corporate strategy research.  
Second, a limitation of the moderator variables lies in their being operationalized using 
archival data. In this, the internal development growth mode may be under-represented due to the 
restriction posed by product market entry data. Hence, theoretical and empirical insights on the 
importance of greenfield units, new ventures, incubators and spinoffs is limited due to a lack of 
granularity in my data sample (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Day, 1994; Raisch and Tushman, 2016). 
Also, process related insights into how growth modes were selected and how the relative emphasis 
on exploration/exploitation was altered for the growth proliferation and growth mobilization 
effects do not emerge from my work. In a similar vein, the statistical and material aspects of my 
results indicate that in three growth modes, there was a threshold growth orientation percentile 
rank that required firms to switch between a high degree of exploitation to a high degree of 
exploration (alliances) or vice versa (acquisitions and divestitures) (panels 3 b, c, d). However, the 
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empirical approach of deductive theory testing through regression models poses the limitation of 
a precision paradox (Dubin, 1978). Thus, how managers implemented the switch from exploration 
to exploitation or vice versa in the three growth modes cannot be ascertained or explained from 
the empirical results of H3-H5. This limitation of my study emphasizes the importance of recent 
progress made on how firms switch between exploration and exploitation (Swift, 2016) and vice 
versa thus suggesting that further scholarly effort in this topic are of organizational ambidexterity 
is required (Lavie et.al., 2010).   
Finally, the moderator variables represent isolated system states in the empirical model 
(Dubin, 1978). Hence, controlling for the effect of one growth mode while testing hypotheses 
aligned to alternative modes precludes theory development around how the interaction between 
different growth modes affected the growth orientation- firm failure relationship. For instance, 
extant research on growth modes has provided scholarly insight into the interaction between 
internal development/alliances (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010), alliances/acquisitions (Hsu and 
Prescott, 2017), acquisitions/divestitures (Kaul, 2012) and internal development/acquisitions 
(Karim and Mitchell, 2000). However, theory development around growth mode portfolios and 
implications of how interactions between modes affect portfolio evolution and firm outcomes need 
to be uncovered. I suggest that a prospective research stream of interest to scholars of firm growth 
is the study of how different growth modes interact with each other to influence relevant growth 
outcomes. This can be a first step in a broader research agenda addressing richer theory 
development and managerial insights into the role of growth mode decisions and portfolios 
towards corporate level outcomes.  
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This study demonstrates that during technological change, a growth orientation along with the 
growth proliferation and growth mobilization effects exerted by firm growth mode choices 
decrease the likelihood of firm failure. For corporate strategy scholars, my work emphasizes the 
role of a growth orientation and growth modes that enable firms to improve their adaptability and 
likelihood of survival in evolving technology ecosystems. For managers, it demonstrates the need 
to maintain robust growth strategies and supplement these through appropriate growth mode 
decisions as part of their firms’ corporate strategies to ensure firm survival during technological 
change. For both, it demonstrates the importance of developing a corporate development capability 
in firms that can espouse strategic decisions to serve as growth modes in dynamic, fast-paced 
environments characterized by technological change. 
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4. ESSAY THREE - “REINFORCE, ATTENUATE, RECONCILE” – HOW RESOURCE 
RECONFIGURATION THROUGH CORPORATE SCOPE DECISIONS OVERCOMES 
THE INERTIA OF A LEGACY TECHNOLOGY ORIENTATION 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Resource reconfiguration - the addition, subtraction, redeployment and recombination of firm 
resources is a topic of growing interest in corporate strategy research (Folta et.al., 2016; Galunic 
and Rodan, 1998; Karim and Capron, 2016). Scholars have studied its antecedents (Folta et.al., 
2016; Galunic and Rodan, 1998), role as an environment alignment mechanism (Chakrabarti et.al., 
2011); effect on technological innovation (Kaul, 2012), heterogeneity in reconfiguration 
approaches (Lavie, 2006), how multi-business firms reconfigure their businesses (Eisenhardt and 
Brown, 1999) and corporate scope decisions (acquisitions and divestitures) as modes of 
reconfiguration (Kaul, 2012; Kuusela, et.al., 2017). However, during technological change, a key 
challenge for firms in legacy technology ecosystems is to address the inertia arising from legacy 
technology oriented business units to adapt to the threat posed by a new technology (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
In evolving technology ecosystems, resource reconfiguration is an important adaptive 
mechanism when the emergence of a new technology poses a threat to firms that exhibit inertia  
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due to a ’legacy technology orientation’ – ‘a firm’s relative emphasis on technological knowledge 
and products aligned to an incumbent technology’. To improve the likelihood of product market 
survival, resource reconfiguration involves reconciling the tension between the inertia of a legacy 
technology orientation and adaptation to the new technology so that firm survival can be salvaged 
in evolving technology ecosystems (Adner and Snow, 2010; Albert, Kreutzer and Lechner, 2015).  
Corporate scope decisions and their associated structural arrangement choices are central 
to the reconciliation of the tension between legacy and new technologies (Puranam et.al., 2006, 
2009; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). Corporate scope decisions enable firms to acquire new 
technology resources or divest legacy technology resources to enhance their adaptability in 
evolving technology ecosystems (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
Feldman, 2014). The choice of structural arrangement associated with acquisitions/divestitures 
affects whether firms can jointly deploy resources that have a high potential for reconfiguration 
(i.e., capacity for redeployment, recombination and complementarity) from the legacy and the new 
technology while isolating resources that have low reconfiguration potential (Capron et.al., 1998, 
2001; Schweizer, 2005). Structural arrangement choices develop a ‘common ground’ when they 
leverage resources from both technologies that reconcile the tension between inertia and adaptation 
thus improving the likelihood of product market survival (Moschieri and Mair, 2017; Puranam 
et.al., 2009; Schweizer, 2005).  
An increasing number of firms in product markets aligned to legacy technology ecosystems 
currently face threats to survival from a new technology - internet television (Dowling, Lechner 
and Thielman, 1998), integrated banking and insurance (Cummins and Weiss, 2009), functional 
foods (Bornkessel et.al., 2016) and film and video game integration (Brookley, 2010). In this 
context, the role of corporate scope decisions and their structural arrangement choices as agents of 
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resource reconfiguration to address the inertia of a legacy technology orientation warrants 
theoretical attention due to its significant relevance for scholars and managers alike. 
For instance, in my empirical context of the mass market photography ecosystem, firms 
had a significant legacy technology orientation (derived from a commitment to analog 
photography) and on average, made over three corporate scope decisions as part of resource 
reconfiguration to adapt to the challenge posed by a new technology (digital photography). 
However, 48 percent of the firms did not survive the sample period and exit their product markets. 
As product market survival is an outcome of successful adaptation to changing environments 
(Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Christensen et.al., 1998), understanding how resource reconfiguration 
through corporate scope decisions and their structural arrangement choices enables firms to 
reconcile the inertia of a legacy technology orientation with a new technology and improve the 
likelihood of product market survival is a strategic issue. The lack of theoretical insight into this 
issue and its relevance for managers motivated my research question – ‘For firms with a legacy 
technology orientation, how does resource reconfiguration through corporate scope decisions and 
their structural arrangement choices affect the likelihood of product market survival in evolving 
technology ecosystems?’  
I approach this research question in three stages. First, I theorize that a legacy technology 
orientation exerts a ‘legacy reinforcement effect’ that decreases the likelihood of resource 
reconfiguration through scope expanding new technology acquisitions and scope reducing legacy 
technology divestitures. A legacy reinforcement effect is driven by inertia arising from relatedness 
and coherence narratives arising from a legacy technology orientation (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 
1991; Teece et.al., 1994). Second, I theorize that new technology alliance experience induces a 
‘legacy attenuation effect’ that weakens the negative effect of a legacy technology orientation and 
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increases the likelihood of acquisitions and legacy divestitures. Alliance experience, a knowledge 
accessing mechanism, enhances absorptive capacity in the new technology and directs managerial 
attention towards its potential to substitute the legacy technology or contribute to its obsolescence 
(Lane et.al., 2001; Maula et.al., 2013; Schildt et.al., 2012). 
Third, I theorize that in the event of new technology acquisitions or legacy technology 
divestitures, firms that choose hybrid structural arrangements (i.e., partial integration for 
acquisitions and partial selloffs for legacy divestitures) over pure structural arrangements (i.e., full 
integration or selloffs) have a higher likelihood of product market survival due to a ‘legacy 
reconciliation effect’. Hybrid structural arrangements involve the joint deployment of legacy and 
new technology resources that have a high reconfiguration potential while isolating resources with 
low potential (Moschieri and Mair, 2017; Schweizer, 2005; Zaheer et.al., 2013). These 
arrangements facilitate new resource creation or legacy resource renewal and harmonize the inertia 
associated with a legacy technology orientation context and the emerging new technology context 
by developing a ‘common ground’ between both technologies (Kale et.al., 2009; Puranam et.al., 
2009; Schweizer, 2005). Thus, they improve the likelihood of product market survival.  
Using a longitudinal dataset of 843 firm-years and 62 digital camera firms during a period 
of technological change in the mass market photography ecosystem, I found that a legacy 
technology orientation (linked to analog photography) exerted inertia and decreased the likelihood 
of new technology acquisitions (digital photography) and legacy technology divestitures while 
new technology alliance experience weakened this effect. Further, firms were more likely to 
survive when they made new technology acquisitions and legacy technology divestitures and chose 
hybrid structural arrangements over pure arrangements.  
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My study contributes to the scholarly conversation on the importance of resource 
reconfiguration by theorizing how corporate scope decisions and accompanying structural 
arrangements are mechanisms of resource reconfiguration that help firms overcome the inertia of 
a legacy technology orientation to improve the likelihood of product market survival in evolving 
technological ecosystems.   
Specifically, I theorize three inertia related effects associated with a legacy technology 
orientation. A legacy reinforcement effect is an outcome of the inertia of a legacy technology 
orientation that decreases the likelihood of new technology acquisitions and legacy technology 
divestitures.  New technology alliance experience creates a legacy attenuation effect that decreases 
the effect of inertia and increases the likelihood of acquisitions and legacy divestitures.  In the 
event of an acquisition or legacy divestiture, hybrid structural arrangements leverage high 
reconfiguration potential resources from both technologies while isolating low potential resources 
thus reconciling the tension between the inertia of a legacy technology orientation and adaptation 
to the new technology thus improving the likelihood of product market survival – a legacy 
reconciliation effect. Thus, corporate scope decisions and their structural arrangement choices are 
sources of firm heterogeneity in their capacity to overcome inertia associated with a legacy 
technology orientation and positively affect product market survival during technological change. 
 
 
4.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
I first theorize on my approach to resource reconfiguration, corporate scope decisions and their 
structural arrangement choices. Next, I theorize on how firms’ legacy technology orientation 
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exhibits inertia to technological change. I then develop hypotheses for the legacy reinforcement, 
attenuation and reconciliation effects. Figure 7 depicts the theoretical model of this study. 
 
Figure 7. Theoretical model 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Resource reconfiguration - Corporate scope decisions and structural arrangement 
approaches 
 
Corporate strategy scholars propose that corporate scope decisions and their associated structural 
arrangement choices are precursors to resource reconfiguration (Capron et.al., 1998, 2001; Karim 
and Mitchell, 2000; Kaul, 2012). New technology acquisitions provide access to new technology 
resources by expanding corporate scope (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). 
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Legacy technology divestitures are scope reducing as firms eliminate legacy technology resources 
from their boundaries (Feldman, 2014; Vidal and Mitchell, 2015). New technology alliances are 
technological knowledge accessing mechanisms that affect resource reconfiguration processes in 
firms (Schildt et.al., 2012; Schilling, 2015). 
In the event of a new technology acquisition or legacy technology divestiture, structural 
arrangement choices reflect how firms integrate acquired new technology resources and eliminate 
legacy technology resources as part of resource reconfiguration (Capron et.al., 1998, 2001; 
Puranam et.al., 2006, 2009).  Pure structural arrangements for acquisitions include i) full 
integration – absorption of new technology target resources by acquirers (Karim and Mitchell, 
2000; Puranam et.al., 2003) or ii) full autonomy – operational autonomy to the target resources 
(Kale et.al., 2009; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). For divestitures, pure arrangements include i) 
business unit/asset restructuring – the structural re-alignment of legacy technology resources 
(Karim and Kaul, 2015; Karim, Carroll and Long, 2016) or ii) business unit/asset selloffs – the 
elimination of legacy technology resources (Feldman, 2014). Hybrid structural arrangements for 
acquisitions include partial integration of acquired new technology resources and autonomy to 
residual resources (Schweizer, 2005). For legacy divestitures, a hybrid arrangement involves the 
partial restructuring of legacy technology units/resources and selling residual resources (Capron 
et.al., 2001; Moschieri and Mair, 2017).  
Structural arrangement choices are an important determinant of product market survival in 
evolving technology ecosystems as they enable firms to reconcile the inertia imposed by a legacy 
technology orientation with an emerging new technology context (Moschieri and Mair, 2017; 
Puranam et.al., 2006, 2009; Schweizer, 2005). The reconfiguration potential of resources is 
defined as their capacity for redeployment (Folta et.al., 2016), resource/unit recombination 
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(Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Karim and Kaul, 2015) and complementarity (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006). Hybrid structural arrangements involve the joint deployment of legacy and new 
technology resources that possess high reconfiguration potential while isolating those with low 
reconfiguration potential (Capron et.al., 1998, 2001; Schweizer, 2005). Hybrid arrangements 
generate resource combinations using both sets of resources that in turn enable new resource 
creation and legacy resource renewal (Graebner, 2004; Schweizer, 2005; Zaheer et.al., 2013). 
Hybrid arrangements harmonize the pre-existing legacy context with an emerging new technology 
context as they reconcile the tension between the inertia of a legacy technology orientation and the 
new technology through the creation of a ‘common ground’ between both technologies (Moschieri 
and Mair, 2017; Puranam et.al., 2009).  
Pure structural arrangements may lead to inferior resource combinations arising from the 
joint deployment of low potential reconfiguration resources or opportunity costs of isolating high 
reconfiguration potential resources (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007; Shaver, 2006). Pure structural 
arrangements isolate the pre-existing legacy context from the new technology context thereby 
aggravating the tension between the firm’s legacy technology and the new technology due to the 
conflicting priorities imposed by the co-existence of both technologies (Graebner, Eisenhardt and 
Roundy, 2010; Schweizer, 2005; Shaver, 2006).  
 
4.2.2 Legacy technology orientation 
 
Research on technological change and corporate diversification conceptualizes a firm’s legacy 
technology as underpinning its dominant logic through coherence and relatedness narratives 
(Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Teece et.al., 1994). The embodiment of the legacy technology 
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in the firm’s knowledge base, products and business units leads to a high degree of structural 
embeddedness (Karim, 2012; Karim et.al., 2016). Interaction with the legacy technology leads to 
cognitive and emotional embeddedness of managers and knowledge workers who identify with it 
and thereby imbue the firm with a distinctive identity (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). The legacy technology and associated coherence and relatedness narratives exert 
inertia that is reinforced by actors in the legacy technology ecosystem and legitimized by 
institutional entities (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Wessel, 
Levie and Siegel, 2016). These dynamics result in a legacy technology orientation - ‘a firm’s 
relative emphasis on technological knowledge and products aligned to an incumbent technology’.  
Notwithstanding the changing ecosystem dynamics arising from the emergence of a new 
technology, a legacy technology orientation privileges technological knowledge and products 
driven by the legacy technology thereby hindering adaptation to the threat posed by the emergence 
of a new technology (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). The inertia resulting 
from a lack of responsiveness to the new technology imperils product market survival when the 
new technology poses substitution threats to legacy technology resources (Christensen and Bower, 
1996; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). In this context, new technology adoption through resource 
reconfiguration enables firms to create or access new technology resources or modify existing 
legacy technology resources to address the threat of substitution and improve the likelihood of 
survival (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009). However, the inertia of a legacy technology orientation 
constrains the firm’s corporate scope decisions to those that adhere to coherence and relatedness 
narratives (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Silverman, 1999). Thus, the inertia imposed by a 
legacy technology orientation is likely to conflict with the imperative of new technology adoption 
(Adner and Snow, 2010; Albert et.al., 2015). Hence, an important condition for adaptation requires 
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reconciling the firm’s pre-existing legacy context with an emerging new technology context to 
adapt to the changing ecosystem context. Corporate scope decisions and their structural 
arrangement choices represent one approach through which firms can address the resource 
creation/renewal and reconciliation processes to improve their likelihood of survival. 
 
4.2.3 Legacy reinforcement effect – The inertia of a legacy technology orientation 
 
A firm’s legacy technology orientation is likely to pose inertia to resource reconfiguration through 
new technology acquisitions because of the low degree of coherence and relatedness between the 
firm’s legacy technology resource and the new technology resources to be acquired (Chatterjee 
and Wernerfelt, 1991; Hitt et.al., 1991; Silverman, 1999). The co-existence of both sets of 
resources contributes to negative synergies, sub-additivity in resource combinations due to a lack 
of complementarity and conflicting strategic and operational contexts within the firm (Capron and 
Pistre, 2002; Harrison et.al., 1991).  
The knowledge bases underlying new technology resources pose stickiness, context 
specificity and imperfect transferability challenges that hinder mindful learning and recombinant 
exploration ex post new technology acquisitions (Zollo, 2009). This lack of familiarity with new 
technology resources is likely to lead to excessive premiums in the market for corporate control 
that posit adverse selection issues and thus dissuade firms with a legacy technology orientation 
from acquiring (Coff, 2003). Prospective post-acquisition integration issues involve negative 
spillovers that further decrease the likelihood of acquisition. These spillovers arise from cultural 
disparities, demotivation in acquirer and target human capital and incentive misalignment (Kapoor 
and Lim, 2007; Paruchuri, Nerkar and Hambrick, 2006; Stahl and Voigt, 2008).  
137 
 
A third rationale for the opposition to new technology acquisitions may arise from the 
threat of delegitimization by ecosystem and institutional actors. This results from perceptions of 
unwarranted category spanning (Rajan et.al., 2000), inconsistent corporate scope decisions due to 
misaligned managerial incentives (Dalton et.al., 2007) and ecosystem ‘lockout’ by actors that 
privilege the legacy technology (Schilling, 1998). Due to a combination of these issues, firms are 
likely to experience a legacy reinforcement effect driven by the inertia of a legacy technology 
orientation that decreases the likelihood of a new technology acquisition. Thus, 
H1a/Legacy reinforcement effect: In an evolving technology ecosystem, a firm’s legacy 
technology orientation will have a negative effect on the firm’s likelihood of making scope 
expanding new technology acquisitions. 
The legacy reinforcement effect also decreases the likelihood of legacy technology 
divestitures. The orchestration of legacy technology resources through routines at the team and 
individual levels leads to interdependencies across business units resulting in an inertia driven 
equilibrium (Albert et.al., 2015; Porter and Siggelkow, 2008). These interdependencies create a 
legacy technology activity system wherein resources, knowledge, routines and individuals become 
tightly coupled hence strengthening the legacy technology orientation (Karim, 2012; Siggelkow, 
2011). In this scenario, legacy divestitures disrupt structural and relational patterns and processes 
as critical legacy resources, routines and individuals exit (Hannan et.al., 2003; Shah, 2000). 
Divestiture may also adversely affect legacy technology driven performance and demotivate 
human capital due to discontinuity introduced by structural change (Gopinath and Becker, 2000; 
Hannan et.al., 2003). Hence, a firm’s legacy technology orientation discourages divestiture as it 
leads to performance-related opportunity costs thus undermining legacy technology driven 
competitive advantage.  
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A second factor that deters legacy divestitures is the development of structural rigidity and 
cognitive inertia due to the embeddedness of resources, business units and individuals in a legacy 
technology context (Sandri et.al., 2010; Shimizu and Hitt, 2005). These factors reinforce coherence 
and relatedness narratives and introduce inertia through competence and learning traps, resource 
and routine rigidity and over-exploitation (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
Sull, Tedlow and Rosenbloom, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Ecosystem relationships and 
institutional legitimation concerns further discourage legacy divestitures as relevant actors develop 
interest in the legacy technology over time and expect firms to retain commitment to it 
(Christensen and Bower, 1996; Rajan et.al., 2000; Wessel et.al., 2016). These issues capture the 
inertia of a firm’s legacy technology orientation to divestiture - a legacy reinforcement effect. 
H1b/Legacy reinforcement effect: In an evolving technology ecosystem, a firm’s legacy 
technology orientation will have a negative effect on the firm’s likelihood of making scope 
reducing legacy technology divestitures. 
 
4.2.4 Legacy attenuation effect – Alliance experience as an inertia weakening mechanism 
 
A key advantage of alliances is that they facilitate inter-organizational learning by enabling access 
to new technology resources through collaboration in new technology ecosystems (Asgari, Singh 
and Mitchell, 2017; Davis, 2016). As alliance experience increases, teams and individuals develop 
absorptive capacity in the resource characteristics and reconfiguration potential of the new 
technology (Lane et.al., 2001; Schildt et.al., 2012). These insights improve clarity on how and why 
the new technology poses threats of substitution and hence enhance the motivation and rationale 
for new technology adoption (Eggers and Kaplan, 2009; Maula et.al., 2013). As these initiatives 
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increase familiarity with the new technology, alliance experience facilitates a shift away from the 
legacy technology orientation thereby mitigating inertia (Anand, Oriani and Vassolo, 2010; Hsu 
and Prescott, 2017). Over time, alliancing may also include the deployment of legacy technology 
resources that are complementary to the new technology and present possibilities of recombinant 
exploration (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Rothaermel and Boekar, 2008). 
To increase commitment to new technology adoption and more effectively mitigate the 
inertia of a legacy technology orientation, alliancing leads to to new technology acquisitions that 
enable firms to initiate broader programs of resource reconfiguration through greater levels of 
access to new technology resources (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Dyer et.al., 2004; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). Acquisitions benefit from positive spillovers through an ‘alliance transfer effect’ 
through which they enhance commitment to prior initiatives developed through alliancing activity 
decreasing the turnaround time in new resource creation (Hsu and Prescott, 2017; Zollo and Reuer, 
2010). Thus, alliances mitigate the inertia of a legacy technology orientation and increase the 
likelihood of new technology acquisitions – a legacy attenuation effect. 
H2a/ Legacy attenuation effect: In an evolving technology ecosystem, the negative effect 
of a firm’s legacy technology orientation on its likelihood of scope expanding new technology 
acquisitions is weakened by the firm’s new technology alliance experience. 
Since alliance experience weakens the inertia of a firm’s legacy technology orientation, the 
probability of legacy technology divestitures increases. Alliancing activity directs managerial 
attention towards the identification of legacy technology resources that are particularly vulnerable 
to the threats of technology substitution and impede reconfiguration processes if they have low 
reconfiguration potential (Kraatz, 1998; Koka and Prescott, 2008). Thus, alliancing augments 
‘preparedness’ for resource reconfiguration by easing the structural embeddedness of legacy 
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technology resources and overcoming managers’ cognitive embeddedness (Feldman, 2014; 
Shimizu and Hitt, 2005). Hence, the likelihood of divesting legacy technology resources increases 
to address the prospective aspiration-performance gap that may arise from the threat of substitution 
(Kuusela et.al., 2017; Vidal and Mitchell, 2015) 
As discussed, alliance experience leads to insights into complementarities and recombinant 
opportunities between legacy and new technology resources that present opportunities for new 
resource creation or legacy resource renewal (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Galunic and Rodan, 
1998). To avail of these opportunities, alliancing increases the possibilities of resource 
‘unbundling’ required for redeploying legacy technology resources while divesting residual 
resources with low reconfiguration potential (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron et.al., 2001). The 
influence of alliancing on the selloff of legacy technology resources or unbundling decreases the 
inertia of a legacy technology orientation and increases the likelihood of legacy divestiture to 
support resource reconfiguration through a ‘legacy attenuation effect’. Hence: 
H2b/Legacy attenuation effect: In an evolving technology ecosystem, the negative effect 
of a firm’s legacy technology orientation on its likelihood of scope reducing legacy technology 
divestitures is weakened by new technology alliance experience. 
 
4.2.5 Legacy reconciliation effect – Harmonizing inertia and adaptation through structural 
arrangements 
 
 In the event of an acquisition/legacy divestiture, an important requirement for improving the 
likelihood of product market survival is the joint deployment of acquired new technology resources 
and existing legacy technology resources that have high reconfiguration potential along with the 
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isolation of resources with low reconfiguration potential (Capron et.al., 1998, 2001; Schweizer, 
2005). The joint deployment of high reconfiguration potential resources facilitates recombinant 
innovation, super-additivity and complementarity resulting in resource combinations that form the 
precursor to new resource creation or legacy resource renewal and lead to a ‘common ground’ 
between both technologies (Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Kale et.al., 2009; Puranam et.al, 2009). The 
developed ‘common ground’ along with the isolation of low potential resources help mitigate 
conflicts that may arise from the co-existence of a legacy technology orientation and new 
technology adoption (Albert et.al, 2015; Puranam et.al, 2009; Schweizer, 2005). In the event of an 
acquisition/legacy divestiture, I theorize that a hybrid structural arrangement is central to achieving 
the twin aspects of resource creation/renewal and reconciling the tension between the inertia of a 
firm’s legacy technology orientation and new technology adoption thus benefiting survival.  
First, hybrid arrangements facilitate the partial integration of acquired new technology 
resources and partial restructuring of legacy technology resources through processes of ‘un-
bundling’ (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron et.al., 1998, 2001). Subsequently, hybrid arrangements 
facilitate the joint deployment of legacy and new technology resources through ‘grafting’ that 
leverages resource recombination processes facilitating new capability development or legacy 
capability renewal (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Puranam et.al., 2003). Alternatively, firms 
may implement business unit reconfiguration initiatives that promote joint deployment through 
structural recombination resulting in path breaking change through new resource creation (Karim 
and Mitchell, 2000; Karim and Kaul, 2015). Finally, joint deployment at the unit level - ‘patching’ 
legacy and new technology business units leverage the complementarity between them and 
facilitate legacy technology resource renewal (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999). These initiatives lead 
to resource combinations that represent a ‘common ground’ between both sets of technological 
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resources and are important for the reconciling the tension between both contexts (Kale et.al., 
2009; Puranam et.al., 2009). The joint deployment of high reconfiguration potential resources also 
mitigates relatedness and coherence narratives imposed by the legacy technology since the 
resource combinations oI their origin to both technologies and therefore correspond to an 
alternative conceptualization of relatedness (Moschieri and Mair, 2017; Puranam et.al., 2009; 
Schweizer, 2005).  
Second, hybrid arrangements isolate acquired new technology resources with low 
reconfiguration potential by granting them partial autonomy (Kale et.al., 2009). This enables 
targets to adopt entrepreneurial approaches for new technology resource development via charters 
that emphasize forward looking search and exploration (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Chesborough 
and Rosenbloom, 2002; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). Hence, through structural differentiation, 
firms achieve the benefit of ‘localized’ reconfiguration as isolation facilitates new resource 
creation through the autonomous operation of the target (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007; Puranam 
et.al., 2009). To ensure alignment with the broader reconfiguration context, firms align 
entrepreneurial charters using administrative control mechanisms that proactively avoid conflicts 
between the firm’s legacy technology orientation and the new technology (Kale et.al., 2009; 
Galbraith, 2014).  
For legacy divestitures, the process of business unit or resource ‘unbundling’ facilitates the 
segregation of legacy technology resources with low reconfiguration potential that can be 
eliminated through a market interface (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron et.al., 2001; Feldman, 
2014). Selloffs help firms reconcile the pre-existing legacy context with the emerging new 
technology context as they facilitate the exit of resources, knowledge and human capital that is 
prone to structural and cognitive inertia and hence represent potential sources of conflict between 
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both technological contexts (Sandri et.al., 2010; Shimizu and Hitt, 2005). While they decrease the 
opportunity cost of inertia posed by the eliminated resources, selloffs also enhance the availability 
of slack resources for the smooth progress of resource reconfiguration initiatives (Kuusela et.al., 
2017; Vidal and Mitchell, 2015). In doing so, selloffs thus exert a ‘selection effect’ that ensures 
only high reconfiguration potential resources are retained for joint deployment with new 
technology resources thus enhancing the likelihood of new resource creation and legacy resource 
renewal and development of a ‘common ground’ between both technologies (Barkema and 
Schijven, 2008; Capron et.al., 2001). Alternative forms of divestiture (e.g. spinoffs) provide the 
benefit of structural differentiation or isolation through which residual legacy technology resources 
may be ‘milked’ to their maximum potential while avoiding a direct conflict with an emerging 
new technology context (Chesborough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Jansen et.al., 2009).  
For acquisitions and legacy divestitures, hybrid arrangements facilitate the joint 
deployment of high reconfiguration potential resources while isolating low reconfiguration 
potential resources. Hence, they permit flexibility in collaboration routines, approaches to resource 
development/modification, organizational and workflow designs, incentives and acculturation 
approaches (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Karim and Williams, 2012). Consequently, they 
expedite the creation and renewal of new and legacy technology resources by forming an effective 
support system for resource reconfiguration (Graebner et.al., 2010; Zaheer et.al., 2013). Also, as 
hybrid arrangements isolate resources with low reconfiguration potential, the tension between the 
inertia of a legacy technology orientation and adaptation to the new technology is alleviated 
(Puranam and Srikanth, 2007; Puranam et.al., 2009). Hence, firms can harmonize the pre-existing 
legacy context with a new technology context benefiting from a ‘legacy reconciliation effect’ 
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(Puranam et.al., 2009; Schweizer, 2005). This benefits firm adaptability and increases the 
likelihood of product market survival (Schweizer, 2005). 
In contrast, pure structural arrangement choices result in inferior outcomes of resource 
reconfiguration and delay or hamper new resource creation and legacy resource modification. This 
is because they involve uniform approaches of joint deployment or isolation without factoring in 
the reconfiguration potential of both sets of resources (Graebner et.al., 2010; Puranam et.al., 2003, 
2006; Schweizer, 2005). Pure arrangement choices also aggravate the tension between the firm’s 
legacy technology orientation and the new technology either due to negative spillovers from 
structural co-location or conflicts in the technological resource characteristics of both technologies 
thereby precluding a ‘legacy reconciliation effect’ (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007; Shaver, 2006).  
For example, pure structural arrangements such as full integration (acquisitions) are 
vulnerable to inferior resource combinations when firms enforce the joint deployment of low 
reconfiguration potential resources that should have been isolated through partial autonomy 
(Puranam et.al., 2009; Shaver, 2006). Full autonomy choices isolate the target’s high 
reconfiguration potential resources and are hence susceptible to opportunity costs of foregone 
resource combinations with high reconfiguration potential legacy technology resources 
(Schweizer, 2005; Shaver, 2006). For legacy divestitures, business unit restructuring is based on 
structural re-alignment or redeployment of legacy technology resources being limited to 
incremental outcomes that at best facilitate legacy resource renewal as opposed to new resource 
development (Girod and Whittington, 2015; Karim et.al., 2016). Finally, unit selloffs result in the 
elimination of high reconfiguration potential legacy technology resources and thus raises 
opportunity costs to resource reconfiguration as critical resource combinations with acquired new 
technology resources may be lost (Moschieri and Mair, 2017).  Hybrid structural arrangements are 
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more effective in facilitating the process of resource creation/renewal and contributing to a ‘legacy 
reconciliation effect’ thus enhancing the likelihood of product market survival. Hence: 
H3a - Legacy reconciliation effect: In the event of a new technology acquisition, firms 
that use a hybrid structural arrangement for resource reconfiguration will have a greater 
likelihood of survival compared to firms that use a pure structural arrangement. 
H3b - Legacy reconciliation effect: In the event of a legacy technology divestiture, firms 
that use a hybrid structural arrangement for resource reconfiguration will have a greater 
likelihood of survival compared to firms that use a pure structural arrangement. 
 
 
4.3 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.3.1 Empirical context 
 
The digital camera product market ecosystem that emerged due to the technological and market 
convergence of three industries; computing (SIC 3571, 3572, 3577 and 5045), consumer 
electronics (SIC 5064 and 5065) and photography (SIC 3861 and 5043) was my empirical context 
(Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). The technological discontinuity of digital 
photography (the new technology) posed a threat of technological substitution and obsolescence 
to analog photography (the legacy or incumbent technology) (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). The 
sample period was 1991 to 2006 because the first digital camera in the United States was 
commercialized in 1991 while in 2007 the iPhone introduced the ‘feature phone camera’ with a 
technological substitution implication for digital cameras (Logitech press release, 1991).  
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4.3.2 Data 
 
The COMPUSTAT database provided financial data for firms in the three industries. The total 
number of sample firms was 62 (16 computing, 24 consumer electronics and 22 photography) with 
843 firm year observations. I included a firm if it had introduced analog and/or digital camera 
models (mass market camera segment). I extracted data on new technology alliances/acquisitions 
and legacy technology divestitures from the Thompson Financial SDC database. I used databases 
such as Lexis-Nexus and company websites to support the SDC data and identify additional 
alliances, acquisitions and legacy divestitures. I identified a total of 63 alliances, 41 acquisitions 
and 28 instances of legacy divestitures.  
I classified a new technology alliance as one that provided access to partner digital 
photography resources/capabilities or was based on an R&D agreement in the new technology i.e. 
digital photography (Schilling, 2015). For example, Sony Inc’s strategic alliance to share digital 
photography competence and co-develop digital cameras with Konica-Minolta was an example of 
a new technology alliance (Sony website, 2005). A new technology acquisition was identified 
when a firm purchased a target possessing digital photography resources/capabilities (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001). As per Feldman (2014), I identified a legacy technology divestiture when the 
eliminated resources were based on the legacy technology i.e. analog (film) cameras. Hence, in 
the above example, Konica-Minolta’s sale of their analog camera assets to Sony Inc. is a legacy 
divestiture (Konica-Minolta website, 2006).  I collected data for the structural arrangement choices 
for acquisitions and legacy divestitures using public corporate, news and trade documents.  
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4.3.3 Dependent Variables  
 
I used two dependent variables for H1a/b and H2a/b - Likelihood of new technology acquisition 
was coded one if a firm made a new technology acquisition (as described above) in a year and zero 
otherwise (Hsu and Prescott, 2017). Likelihood of legacy technology divestiture was coded one if 
a firm divested legacy technology resources/units in a year and zero otherwise (Feldman, 2014). 
For H3a/3b, I used product market survival as a dichotomous dependent variable coded one in the 
year when a firm exit the digital camera product market and zero otherwise. Using Lexis-Nexis 
and public sources, exit was recorded when a firm ceased operations and/or discontinued 
production of digital cameras in their product markets (Josefy et.al., 2017). I did not code a firm 
as having exit if it was taken over and given operational autonomy or was bailed out and resumed 
operations related to digital cameras ex post. In the sample, 30 of the 62 firms (48 percent) exit 
and the remaining 32 cases were treated as right censored for empirical analysis (Allison, 1984).  
 
4.3.4 Independent variables 
 
i) Legacy technology orientation - linked to analog photography and operationalized as a 
composite variable of three measures -  a firm’s patent portfolio (technological knowledge), digital 
camera model portfolio (products) and analog business units for each year (products and 
technological knowledge) (Kline, 2011).  I collected analog and digital photography patent data 
using the USPTO database as a proxy for the firm’s technological knowledge (Katila and Ahuja, 
2002). Second, to proxy a firm’s product base, I collected data on camera models (analog and 
digital) using a variety of sources (e.g., company websites, trade publications, Future Image 
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Report, PC Photo and digital camera web sites (e.g., dpreview.com, imaging-resource.com, 
digicamhistory.com and dcviews.com) (Benner and Tripsas, 2012).  
Third, I collected data for the number of business units based on analog photography for 
each firm using a two-step process. I first identified a firm’s product markets using S&P Industry 
Reports and the sources used to collect product model data. Next, I identified the 6-digit 
SIC/NAICS codes for each firm’s business units. If a firm had a business unit with products based 
on analog photography, I classified it as a legacy business unit (Feldman, 2014). I collected these 
data for each firm year. The composite measure of legacy technology orientation captures the 
inertia of the firm’s knowledge and products and is methodologically congruent with my theory 
(Karim, 2012). 
I operationalized the patent and product portfolio measures for each firm year as follows, 
panalog/{ panalog + pdigital} represents the proportion of patents based on analog (digital) photography 
in the firm’s patent portfolio or the proportion of analog (digital) photography camera models in 
the firm’s product portfolio. The business unit measure was operationalized as a Blau index of 
diversity: 1 – pi2 in each firm year, where pi represents the proportion of business units based on 
analog photography. A high value for each measure implies a high legacy technology orientation.  
I performed confirmatory factor analysis using structural equation modeling (sembuilder 
option in STATA 14.1) to estimate the measurement model comprising the composite legacy 
technology orientation measures. The standardized factor loading of each of the three measures 
onto the composite independent variable was significant at p<0.05. The goodness of fit statistics 
were within the range as prescribed by Kline (2011) (RMSEA = 0.03, Tucker Lewis Index = 0.95, 
Comparative fit index = 0.98). Detailed results are available. The Cronbach alpha for the composite 
variable was 0.83 and the individual measure alphas were > 0.75. I calculated the legacy 
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technology orientation variable for each firm year as a weighted sum of the product of the three 
measures and their respective standardized factor loadings as ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖3𝑖=1 , where wi refers to the 
standardized factor loading of the ith variable and xi refers to the value of the ith variable. I 
standardized the independent variable to facilitate interpretation and lagged it by one year. 
 
ii) Structural arrangement choices - For H3a/3b, I classified resource reconfiguration through 
acquisitions as a pure structural arrangement under two conditions. First, full integration - when 
the target was fully absorbed by the acquirer within its corporate hierarchy. For example, Kodak’s 
acquisition of Chinon Industries was full integration where Chinon’s R&D, manufacturing and 
marketing resources was merged within Kodak (Businesswire, 2004).  Second, full autonomy – 
when the acquirer assumed a majority stake in a target but ceded operational control by retaining 
the identity of the target as a separate unit within its boundaries (Kale et.al., 2009; Puranam and 
Srikanth, 2007). An instance of this was Kodak’s acquisition of PictureVision Inc. that provided 
full autonomy to the latter by retaining its identity as wholly owned subsidiary in an overseas 
location (The Washington Post, 1998). Resource reconfiguration through a hybrid structural 
arrangement occurred when the target was absorbed partially and granted partial operational 
autonomy (Zaheer et.al., 2013). Panavision Inc.’s acquisition of Plus 8 Digital used a hybrid 
arrangement. Panavision retained the Plus 8 brand name in specific product markets using an 
autonomous operation but integrated other brands with its product lines in other markets (The 
Hollywood Reporter, 2006).  
For legacy divestitures, pure structural arrangements included i) unit/asset restructuring – 
when a legacy technology business unit (or assets) was spun off, reconfigured through 
resource/personnel transfer or split up (Karim and Kaul, 2015; Karim et.al., 2016). For example, 
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Kodak restructured its analog camera business by laying off 15,000 personnel while redeploying 
resources towards digital photography (The Guardian, 2004) ii) unit/asset selloffs – when a firm 
sold a legacy technology business unit or assets through a market interface (Feldman, 2014). An 
instance of selloff was when Konica Minolta sold its film camera assets to Sony Inc. thereby 
exiting the mass market camera segment (Sullivan, 2006). The hybrid structural arrangement 
occurred when there was a partial unit sale with residual legacy technology resources retained 
within the firm (Moschieri and Mair, 2017). For example, Kyocera ceased production of its film-
based cameras (Contax and Yashica) and redeployed its manufacturing resources across its other 
businesses while selling relevant downstream assets to Tocad (Raymond, 2005).  
For each firm year where an acquisition or legacy divestiture was made, I coded the 
structural arrangements choice as one when a pure structural arrangement was selected for resource 
reconfiguration (full integration or full autonomy for acquisitions and unit/asset restructuring or 
selloff for legacy divestitures) and two for a hybrid structural arrangement. The years when a firm 
did not make an acquisition or a legacy divestiture were treated as a baseline case and coded as 
zero. I included firm years where no acquisitions/legacy divestitures were made to control for 
alternative drivers of product market survival and a clustering effect arising from dependence 
across multiple firm year observations corresponding to a firm (Cleves et.al., 2016; Shaver, 1998). 
This decision enabled me to partially control for endogeneity in decisions regarding making an 
acquisition/legacy divestiture. No firm made multiple acquisitions or legacy divestitures using 
more than one arrangement in a year. 
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4.3.5 Moderator variable  
 
For H2a/H2b, I operationalized new technology alliance experience as the cumulative number of 
alliances formed to access or jointly develop digital photography related capabilities and 
knowledge. The moderator variable was lagged by one year. (Lane et.al., 2001). 
 
4.3.6 Control variables 
 
The operationalization and rationale for inclusion of the control variables are in table 8. Apart from 
the product market size, population density, product market and time fixed effect variables, all 
controls were operationalized at the firm level. All controls were lagged by one year. 
 
4.3.7 Empirical Methodology 
 
I used event history modeling given its ability to handle data with right censoring (Allison, 1984; 
Cleves et.al., 2016). For each set of hypotheses, I used a proportional hazards mixed effects Cox 
regression model. An important benefit of the Cox model is that it does not pose restrictive 
assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard and permits estimation using time-varying 
covariates (Allison, 1984; Cleves et.al., 2016). Each firm has a unique hazard function ht(t) = h0(t) 
exp (βX [t]); where ‘t’ is the time at which a firm exit, h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, X[t] 
is a matrix of covariates at time ‘t’ and β is a vector of modeled coefficients. I used a mixed effects 
specification (frailty) for the model using the shared option in STATA 14.1 to control for time 
dependence in individual firm observations and unobserved heterogeneity across firms (Cleves 
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et.al., 2016). I estimated the hazard rate of new technology acquisition and legacy technology 
divestiture as ‘events’ given the main effects of legacy technology orientation (H1a/1b) and the 
moderating effect of alliance experience (H2a/2b). For H3a/3b, I estimated the main effect of the 
structural arrangement choices for acquisitions and legacy divestitures on the hazard rate of 
product market exit (the ‘event’). 
 
4.3.8 Endogeneity concerns 
 
My study may be prone to external drivers or omitted variables that lead to endogeneity in firms 
maintaining a legacy technology orientation rather than adopting the new technology (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Persistence with the legacy technology may be also be 
a case of self-selection when firms view it as a strategic response to the new technology (Sull et.al., 
1997). This limitation also affects corporate scope decisions as established by Shaver (1998). 
Firms may employ alliances, acquisitions and legacy divestitures when their respective product 
markets have a record of corporate scope activity (Anand and Singh, 1997). They also use these 
corporate scope decisions to address aspiration performance gaps by eliminating underperforming 
assets and allying with or acquiring high performing firms (Asgari et.al., 2017; Kaul, 2012).  
I controlled for endogeneity in legacy technology orientation and corporate scope decision 
variables using a two-stage procedure (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). For each year, I evaluated 
the likelihood that a firm added a new patent or camera model based on analog photography (coded 
zero and one respectively) or a combination of the two (coded two). For the corporate scope 
variables, I evaluated the likelihood that a firm made an alliance, acquisition or legacy divestiture 
(coded zero, one and two respectively) or a combination of the three (coded as 3). 
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I developed two instrumental variables – i) legacy technology persistence as the natural log 
of the total number of firms that introduced a new patent and/or camera model based on analog 
technology and ii) product market corporate scope activity as the natural log of the total number 
of firms that used any combination of the three corporate scope decisions. Empirically, I observed 
that the null hypothesis of regressor exogeneity was rejected at p< 0.1 indicating that endogeneity 
was an issue. I found that the null hypothesis of the Hansen J statistic χ2 test was rejected (p> 0.1) 
justifying the validity of the instruments to test for endogeneity. I ran two first stage probit models 
to predict the likelihood of patent and/or camera model introduction and corporate scope decisions 
using the variables and the respective instruments. I used the predict procedure to save the 
predicted values of the residuals (inverse Mills ratios) for both equations and included them in the 
second stage model to control for endogeneity. 
 
 
4.4 RESULTS 
 
4.4.1 Legacy reinforcement and legacy attenuation effect hypotheses  
 
Figure 8 shows aspects of my empirical context. In the top panel, the dotted line indicates that 
between 1991-1996, firms’ legacy technology orientation did not change significantly and less 
than 1 percent of legacy divestitures and less than 10 percent of new technology acquisitions being 
made in this period. These observations support the legacy reinforcement effect. As 18 of the 63 
new technology alliances (30 percent) were formed by 1996 (dashed line), a takeoff in new 
technology acquisitions (solid line) and legacy technology divestitures (dashed-dotted line) was 
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Table 8. Control variables, operationalization and rationale for inclusion 
 
  
Control variable  Operationalization Data Source Reference Rational for inclusion 
Firm size 
Natural log of 
revenue for a firm 
COMPUSTAT NA 
Firm size is an important driver of 
corporate scope through acquisition 
and divestiture as well as a 
determinant of survival during 
different types of environmental 
change 
Product market size 
Natural log of 
revenue of each 
product market 
Standard and Poor Industry 
Survey Handbooks,  
Mergent Online, IBIS World 
NA 
Varying levels of product market 
size are likely to affect acquisitions 
and divestitures in different ways as 
well as firm survival  
Product market 
population density 
Natural logarithm 
of number of firms 
in product market 
Standard and Poor Industry 
Survey Handbooks, Mergent 
Online, IBIS World 
Suarez and 
Utterback 
(1995) 
Population may affect firm survival 
depending on the competitive 
dynamics in the product market. 
Acquisitions and divestitures may be 
a result of high or low population 
density. 
Product market fixed 
effects 
Dummy variable 
code 1 if SIC code 
is 3861, 0 otherwise 
NA NA 
The photography firms had a higher 
probability of adopting digital 
photography compared to computing 
and consumer electronics firms that 
were diversified into alternative 
technologies 
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Time fixed effects 
Dummy variable- 
coded 1 if year was 
2001; 0 otherwise 
NA 
Hsu and 
Prescott 
(2017) 
The technology crash (dotcom 
bubble) of 2001 was a significant 
macroeconomic event affecting the 
entire technology sector with 
implications for corporate scope and 
firm survival 
Organizational slack 
Natural log of (total 
assets - total 
liabilities) 
COMPUSTAT 
Vidal and 
Mitchell 
(2015) 
Unabsorbed slack contributes to 
acquisitions in terms of providing 
resources and also precludes the 
need for liquidity related or 
performance enhancing divestitures. 
Slack benefits survival attempts 
during environmental change 
Corporate 
diversification 
Number of four 
digit SIC codes that 
a given firm was 
present 
Standard and Poor Industry 
Survey Handbooks,  
Mergent Online, IBIS World 
Chatterjee 
and 
Wernerfelt 
(1991) 
Diversified firms may be more 
likely to acquire and divest while 
leveraging fungible resources to 
improve firm survival. 
Prior performance 
(ROA) 
Natural log of 
(Operating 
profits/Total assets) 
COMPUSTAT 
Hitt 
et.al.(1991) 
Influences subsequent acquisition 
and divestiture activity from an 
aspiration performance gap 
perspective 
Debt to equity ratio 
Ratio of market 
value of equity and 
total debt (long 
term liabilities + 
short term 
COMPUSTAT 
Hitt 
et.al.(1991) 
Greater debt to equity ratios may 
increase the likelihood of firm 
divestiture for reasons of solvency 
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liabilities+ current 
liabilities) 
Prior R&D expenditure 
Natural log of 
(R&D 
expenditure/Total 
Revenue) 
COMPUSTAT 
Hitt 
et.al.(1991) 
Diversified firms may have greater 
R&D expenditure committed to 
digital photography that precludes 
the need for acquisitions and legacy 
divestitures. 
Prior alliance 
experience 
Cumulative number 
of all the alliances 
made by a firm 
SDC Platinum, 
Lexis Nexis 
Lane et.al. 
(2001) 
Prior alliancing may positively 
influence future alliancing that 
expedites the legacy attentuation 
effect and leads to firms decreasing 
the time taken for acquisitions and 
legacy divestitures 
Prior acquisition 
experience 
Cumulative number 
of all the 
acquisitions made 
by a firm 
SDC Platinum, 
Lexis Nexis 
Puranam 
et.al. (2006) 
Past acquisition experience may lead 
to firms doing more acquisitions in 
future.  
Prior divestiture 
experience 
Cumulative number 
of all the 
divestitures made 
by a firm 
SDC Platinum, 
Lexis Nexis 
Vidal and 
Mitchell 
(2015) 
Past divestiture experience may lead 
to firms doing more divestiture in 
future 
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observed. These findings support the legacy attenuation effect. In the bottom panel, survivors 
accounted for 81 percent of the hybrid arrangement choices but < 50 percent of the pure 
arrangement choices. Also, the mean legacy technology orientation for the sample firms decreased 
by 42 percent between 1991-2006. These findings support the legacy reconciliation effect. 
Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations. The legacy technology orientation 
variable had a mean value of 0.41 (41 percent) while the mean for surviving and non-surviving 
firms was 0.62 (62 percent) and 0.32 (32 percent). This implies that the relative emphasis of non-
survivors on analog photography was about twice that of survivors. Table 10 contains the mixed 
effects proportional hazards Cox model results for both dependent variables (acquisitions – models 
1-3; legacy divestitures – models 4-6). Assumptions for event history modeling were met and 
multicollinearity was not an issue for the full model (VIF = 1.62) or for individual variables (max. 
VIF = 3.62). A positive (negative) coefficient for a variable indicates a higher (lower) hazard of 
the event in question (i.e. acquisition/legacy divestiture) (Allison, 1984). 
The controls for the acquisitions and legacy divestitures hypotheses reveal important 
insights. For acquisitions (table 10: model 1), high levels of new technology knowledge breadth 
and prior R&D expenditure decreased the likelihood of acquisition indicating alternative modes of 
sourcing/developing new technologies (Capron and Mitchell, 2012). Prior performance and high 
levels of debt to equity ratio increased the likelihood of acquisition. For legacy divestitures (table 
10: model 4), higher prior R&D expenses decreased the likelihood of divestiture indicating 
contextual effects and legacy technology inertia. High debt to equity ratio and fixed time effects 
increased the likelihood of divestiture. 
 
158 
 
Hypothesis 1a proposed that in an evolving technology ecosystem, a firm’s legacy 
technology orientation had a negative effect on its likelihood of scope expanding new technology 
acquisitions. The hypothesis was supported (table 10, model 2: β= - 2.45, p< 0.01). For a 10 percent 
increase in legacy technology orientation, the hazard rate of an acquisition decreased by 22 percent 
(1-(exp (0.1 * - 2.45) =0.22). This result was material as firms that had a higher legacy technology 
orientation (≥ 25 percent) made only 11 of the 41 acquisitions (27 percent). 
Hypothesis 1b proposed that in an evolving technology ecosystem, a firm’s legacy 
technology orientation has a negative effect on its likelihood of scope contracting legacy 
technology divestitures. It was supported (table 10, model 5: β= - 2.82, p< 0.05). For a 10 percent 
increase in legacy technology orientation, the hazard rate of a legacy divestiture decreased by 24 
percent. I found material effects for this result as firms with a higher legacy technology orientation 
(≥ 25 percent) made only nine of the 28 legacy divestitures (32 percent). 
Hypothesis 2a proposed that in an evolving technology ecosystem, the negative effect of 
legacy technology orientation on its likelihood of scope expanding new technology acquisitions is 
weakened by new technology alliance experience. It was supported (table 10, model 3: β= 1.44, 
p< 0.05). For a 10 percent increase in alliance experience, the hazard rate of an acquisition 
increased by 15 percent. The moderation effect of alliance experience in panel 9a of figure 9 shows 
that the relative hazard rate of making an acquisition was higher for firms with higher levels of 
alliance experience (solid line) compared to firms with lower levels (dashed line). The hazard rate 
of acquisition for a firm with higher alliance experience was 16 percent higher relative to a firm 
with lower experience at a legacy technology orientation of 10 percent but this difference increased 
four times to 65 percent at a 100 percent orientation. This result was material as firms forming 43 
of the 63 alliances (69 percent) made 27 of the 41 acquisitions (65 percent). 
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Figure 8. Empirical context and material effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top panel 
Bottom panel 
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Table 9. Correlations and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1) Firm size 1              
2) Prod mkt size 0.00 1             
3) Prod mkt. population -0.25 -0.35 1            
4) Prod. mkt fixed effects 0.23 0.09 -0.31 1           
5) Time fixed effects 0.09 -0.11 0.03 0.02 1          
6) Organizational slack 0.57 -0.04 -0.14 0.17 -0.03 1         
7) Diversification level 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 1        
8) Prior performance  0.27 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.12 -0.03 -0.03 1       
9) Debt/equity ratio 0.42 0.03 -0.15 -0.01 0.03 0.35 -0.06 0.06 1      
10) Knowledge breadth -0.02 0.00 0.20 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 1     
11) Prior R&D expenditure 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.16 -0.09 0.06 1    
12) Alliance experience 0.26 0.02 -0.34 0.30 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.00 -0.10 -0.03 1   
13) Acquisition experience 0.16 0.09 -0.12 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.01 1  
14) Divestiture experience 0.39 0.00 -0.14 0.34 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.00 0.20 0.30 1 
15) Legacy tech. orientation 0.42 0.04 -0.18 0.23 0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.26 0.09 0.01 0.15 -0.48 -0.78 
16) New tech. alliancing  0.26 0.01 -0.21 0.27 -0.04 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.25 -0.03 -0.02 0.38 -0.02 
17) Likelihood of acquisition 0.14 0.04 -0.11 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.21 
18) Likelihood of divestiture 0.00 0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.21 -0.02 
19) Product market exit 0.02 0.09 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.10 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Mean  0.25 2.07 0.51 0.15 0.25 0.82 0.47 0.04 0.20 0.86 0.58 2.05 0.39 1.16 
S.D. 0.10 1.18 0.14 0.36 0.43 1.18 0.29 0.65 0.55 0.18 1.17 3.97 0.72 1.86 
Maximum  0.50 3.31 0.97 1 1 7.04 5 1.82 7.60 1 1.82 19 4 2 
Minimum value 0.06 0.24 0.10 0 0 -3.00 0 -1.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
N= 843 firm year observations. All values ≥ 0.05 and ≤ - 0.05 are significant at p<0.1.
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Table 9. (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N= 843 firm year observations. All values ≥ 0.05 and ≤ - 0.05 are significant at p<0.1. 
 
Hypothesis 2b proposed that in an evolving technology ecosystem, the negative effect of a 
firm’s legacy technology orientation on its likelihood of scope contracting legacy technology 
divestitures is weakened by new technology alliance experience. From model 6 of table 10, 
hypothesis 2b was supported (β= 0.60, p< 0.05). For a 10 percent increase in the alliance 
experience, the hazard rate of a legacy divestiture increased by 6 percent. The moderation effect 
of alliance experience in panel 9b of figure 9 shows that the relative hazard rate of legacy 
divestiture for a firm with higher levels of alliance experience was > two times that of a firm with 
lower levels of experience at a legacy technology orientation of 10 percent. This difference 
increased to > three times at a legacy technology orientation of 100 percent. I found material effects 
for this result as firms making 33 of the 63 alliances (52 percent) accounted for 22 of the 28 legacy 
divestitures (79 percent).  
Variable 15 16 17 18 19 
15) Legacy tech. orientation 1     
16) New tech. alliancing  0.11 1    
17) Likelihood of acquisition 0.27 -0.01 1   
18) Likelihood of divestiture 0.02 0.04 0.16 1  
19) Product market exit -0.26 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 1 
Mean  0.41 0.73 0.09 0.04 0.03 
S.D. 0.24 2.36 0.29 0.20 0.18 
Maximum  0.84 19 1 1 1 
Minimum value 0.10 0 0 0 0 
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Table  10. Event history modeling results - legacy reinforcement/legacy attenuation effects (endogeneity adjusted estimates) 
 
 
 Likelihood of new technology acquisition  Likelihood of legacy technology divestiture 
Control variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Firm size 0.71**(0.28) 0.45+(0.27) 0.53+(0.30) -1.51(1.13) -0.62(1.61) -0.88(0.19) 
Product market size  0.28**(0.01) 0.26(0.08) 0.23(0.09) -0.39(0.44) -0.10(0.45) -0.33(0.23) 
Product market population  
density 
-0.58+(0.31) -0.80**(0.32) -0.61+(0.33) -0.25(0.19) -0.25(0.21) -0.77(0.56) 
Product market fixed effects -0.68(0.44) -1.12**(0.44) -0.25(0.53) 0.15(0.22) 0.24(0.22) 0.21(0.14) 
Time fixed effects 0.17(0.32) 0.42(0.34) 0.42(0.36) 0.22+(0.13) 0.34*(0.16) 0.53*(0.23) 
Organizational slack -0.12(0.77) -0.25(0.83) -0.16(0.10) -0.88(0.80) -1.22+(0.72) -0.26(0.25) 
Corporate diversification 
level 
0.30(0.53) 0.62(0.55) 0.60(0.62) 0.91**(0.37) 0.92*(0.39) 0.53*(0.24) 
Prior performance 0.56(0.57) 0.83(0.58) 0.35(0.56) 0.19(0.32) 0.32(0.41) 0.38(0.50) 
Debt to equity ratio -0.31(0.39) -0.56(0.41) -0.09(0.50) 0.54(0.23) 0.73**(0.28) -0.24+(0.14) 
New technology knowledge 
breadth 
-0.54 (0.49) 0.36(0.51) 0.10(0.54) -0.27(0.23) -0.66*(0.29) 0.19(0.14) 
Prior R&D expenditure -0.18(0.77) -0.14(0.89) 0.32(0.83) -0.38*(0.18) -0.24(0.21) 0.57(0.51) 
Prior alliance experience 0.04(0.05) 0.11*(0.05) 0.45(0.64) 0.56*(0.23) 0.52*(0.24) 0.33(0.60) 
Prior acquisition experience 0.33**(0.17) 0.79**(0.14) 0.80(0.15) 0.12+(0.07) 0.61(0.78) 0.88(1.03) 
Prior divestiture experience 0.18(0.19) 0.20(0.20) 0.03(0.21) 0.22(0.10) 0.24**(0.09) 0.29(0.21) 
H1a/b: Legacy technology 
orientation  
(legacy reinforcement effect) 
 -2.45**(0.53) -2.66**(0.57)  -2.82*(1.31) -2.39(1.80) 
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Notes for table 10: a) n= 62 firms with 843 firm year observations.  
b) The first value for each variable in each model is the regression coefficient. The value in brackets is the standard error calculated through the concept of 
shared frailty that accounts for dependence between observations and unobserved heterogeneity. 
c) ** p<0.01, * p< 0.05 and + p< 0.1. 
d) Bold values refer to the hypotheses results.  
e) When the LR test of theta is not significant, unobserved heterogeneity (frailty) is accounted for in the model.  
  
Table 10. (continued) 
New technology alliancing 
experience  
  -0.91+(0.55)   0.29*(0.13) 
H2a/b: Legacy technology 
orientation * New technology 
alliancing experience (legacy 
attenuation effect) 
  1.44*(0.64)   0.60*(0.31) 
Inverse Mills ratio 1 – Legacy 
technology orientation 
-0.12(0.11) 0.10(1.15) -0.47(1.22) 0.44(0.34) -0.66(0.56) 0.45(0.76) 
Inverse Mills ratio 2 – Corporate 
scope decisions 
0.05(0.21) -0.24(0.21) -0.17(0.24) -0.62(0.37) 0.32+(0.18) 0.14(0.16) 
Over-dispersion (frailty) (θ) 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 
LR test (χ2) of θ (p-value) 0.50(0.49) 0.86(0.49) 0.25(0.50) 0.38(0.50) 0.75(0.49) 0.40(0.49) 
Log likelihood -225.28 -214.25 -199.31 -22.19 -19.56 -15.27 
Wald χ2 (df) 31.32(16) 49.76(17) 50.83(19) 13.27(16)    14.05(17) 19.59(19) 
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4.4.2 Legacy reconciliation effect (product market survival) 
 
Table 11 contains the mixed effects proportional hazards Cox model results (acquisitions – models 
1-3; legacy divestitures – models 4-6). Assumptions for event history modeling were met and 
multicollinearity did not pose an issue for the full model (VIF = 1.62) or for individual variables 
(highest VIF = 3.62). A positive coefficient for a variable indicates a decreasing (increasing) 
likelihood of product market survival (exit) and vice versa (Allison, 1984). 
The controls in model 1 of table 11 reveal important insights. Product market size and time 
fixed effects increased the likelihood of product market survival indicating the benefits of 
contextual munificence. Organizational slack, level of diversification, past performance and new 
technology knowledge breadth also positively affected product market survival indicating the 
importance of having slack and fungible resources and broad technological knowledge. However, 
product market population had a negative effect on firm survival indicating the adverse impact of 
competitive dynamics in product markets affected by technological change. Legacy technology 
orientation had a negative and significant effect on product market survival (β= 1.05, p< 0.05) 
indicating that a 10 percent increase in legacy technological orientation decreased the likelihood 
of product market survival by ~ 11 percent. This result is in accordance with existing literature on 
technological change (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Sull et.al., 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
Hypothesis 3a proposed that in the event of a new technology acquisition, firms that use a 
hybrid structural arrangement for resource reconfiguration will have a greater likelihood of product 
market survival compared to firms that use a pure structural arrangement. It was supported. For 
firms that chose a hybrid structural arrangement, the hazard rate of product market exit was 36 
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Figure 9. Graphical representation of legacy attenuation effect hypotheses and legacy reconciliation effect hypotheses 
 
 
 
Panel 9b Panel 9a 
Panel 9c Panel 9d 
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percent (64 percent lower) relative to the baseline of no acquisition (table 11, model 2: β= - 1.01, 
p< 0.05). For firms that chose a pure structural arrangement, the corresponding hazard rate was 70 
percent (30 percent lower) relative to the baseline (table 11, model 2: β= - 0.36, p< 0.01). Panel 9c 
of figure 9 demonstrates that the relative hazard rate of exit was lowest for firms that chose a hybrid 
arrangement in the event of an acquisition. This was ~49 percent lower compared to the hazard 
rate of firms with a pure arrangement supporting the legacy reinforcement effect. I found material 
effects for this result as surviving firms accounted for nine of the 13 acquisitions (69 percent) with 
a hybrid arrangement but only nine of the 28 acquisitions (32 percent) with a pure arrangement 
(figure 8, bottom panel). 
 Hypothesis 3b proposing that in the event of a legacy technology divestiture, firms that 
use a hybrid structural arrangement for resource reconfiguration will have a greater likelihood of 
survival relative to firms that use a pure structural arrangement. It was supported. For firms that 
chose a hybrid arrangement, the hazard rate of product market exit was 49 percent (51 percent 
lower) relative to the baseline of no divestiture (table 11, model 3: β= - 0.72, p< 0.05). For firms 
that chose a pure structural arrangement, the corresponding hazard rate was 77 percent (23 percent 
lower) relative to the baseline (table 11, model 3: β= - 0.26, p< 0.05). Panel 9d of figure 9 
demonstrates that the relative hazard rate of product market exit was lower for firms that chose a 
hybrid arrangement compared to firms that chose a pure arrangement by ~36 percent thus 
supporting the legacy reconciliation effect. I found material effects for this result as firms that 
survived accounted for all eight legacy divestitures that chose a hybrid structural arrangement 
(figure 8, bottom panel). 
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4.4.3 Robustness Checks 
 
I used several robustness checks to ensure the validity and consistency of the results. First, since 
the alliance experience variable may include the effect of time on the likelihood of acquisition and 
legacy divestiture, I included a time trend variable (1 for 1991, 2 for 1990....15 for 2006) to control 
for alternative processes that may predict the relationship between these corporate scope variables 
(Hsu and Prescott, 2017). My results were robust to this variable.  
Extant research on digital cameras has found that in 1991, the first commercially available 
digital camera was introduced in the United States while in 1999, the established ‘dominant design’ 
of the digital camera was introduced (Benner and Tripsas, 2012). In 2003, the sales of digital 
camera models surpassed those of analog camera models for the first time. I controlled for time 
fixed effects through dummy variables for each of these three years and did not find significant 
changes in my results. My data indicates a temporal trend in corporate scope decisions wherein 
there was a sharp increase in acquisitions and legacy divestitures after 1996 (left panel, figure 2). 
To ensure that this trend did not bias the results, I tested the model between 1991-1996 and found 
results that were consistent with the main results. I tested the robustness of the structural 
arrangement choice variable by creating an alternative coding scheme for acquisitions and legacy 
divestitures where I coded hybrid arrangements for each as 0, full integration and full selloff as 1 
and full autonomy and asset restructuring as 2. I tested the model using this coding scheme and 
found support for the results. 
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Table 11. Event history modeling results - legacy reconciliation effect (endogeneity adjusted estimates) 
 
 
 
Control variables 
Model 1 Model 2: 
Structural 
arrangement 
choices - 
acquisitions 
Model 3: 
Structural 
arrangement 
choices – legacy 
divestitures 
Firm size -0.89(0.54) 0.45(0.51) -0.14(0.51 
Product market size  -0.43**(0.09) -0.44**(0.09) -0.37**(0.10) 
Product market population  
density 
0.36**(0.10) 0.25**(0.08) 0.38**(0.11) 
Product market fixed effects 0.16(0.18) 0.57*(0.25) 0.64*(0.27) 
Time fixed effects -1.59+(0.87) -2.32**(0.87) -2.73*(1.20) 
Organizational slack -0.37+ (0.20) -0.94(0.59) -0.01(0.20) 
Corporate diversification -0.21(0.13) -0.85(1.35) -0.25(0.16) 
Prior performance  0.83*(0.38) 0.15(0.33) 0.20(0.57) 
Debt to equity ratio 0.32(0.39) 0.10 (0.08) 0.18*(0.08) 
New technology knowledge  
breadth 
-0.89*(0.40) -0.44**(0.16) -0.39(0.44) 
Prior R&D expenditure 0.26(0.56) 0.65(0.74) 0.37(0.89) 
Prior alliance experience 0.60*(0.25) 0.35**(0.13) 0.64**(0.22) 
Prior acquisition experience 0.26(0.23) 0.20**(0.07) 0.21**(0.08) 
Prior divestiture experience 0.02(0.42) 0.97**(0.39) 0.12*(0.05) 
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Notes for table 11: a) n= 62 firms with 843 firm year observations.  
b) The first value for each variable in each model is the regression coefficient. The value in brackets is the standard error calculated through the concept of 
shared frailty that accounts for dependence between observations and unobserved heterogeneity. 
c) ** p<0.01, * p< 0.05 and + p< 0.1. 
d) Bold values refer to the hypotheses results.  
e) When the LR test of theta is not significant, unobserved heterogeneity (frailty) is accounted for in the model.  
f) The hazard rate of hybrid and pure structural arrangements are interpreted against the baseline case where firms did not make an acquisition/legacy 
divestiture. 
 
Table 11. (continued) 
Legacy technology orientation     1.05*(0.48)      0.83**(0.25)        0.99**(0.36) 
H3a/3b: Structural 
arrangement choice (Legacy 
reconciliation effect) 
 
i) Hybrid structural 
arrangement choice  
 -1.01*(0.41) -0.72*(0.35) 
ii) Pure structural 
arrangement choice 
 -0.36*(0.15) -0.26*(0.11) 
Inverse Mills ratio 1 – Legacy 
technology orientation 
0.44+(0.34) 0.19(0.22) 0.22(0.25) 
Inverse Mills ratio 2 – Corporate 
scope decisions 
1.40**(0.49) 0.45(0.43) -0.11**(0.04) 
Frailty model over dispersion 
parameter(θ) 
0.14 0.16 0.17 
LR test (χ2) of θ (p-value) 0.01(0.99) 0.01(0.99) 0.01(0.99) 
Log likelihood -49.75 -45.59 -48.24 
Wald χ2 (df) 70.25 (17) 86.04 (21) 80.81(21) 
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 Further, I bifurcated my sample to create two subsamples – one with the 32 survivor 
firms and the second with the 30 non-surviving firms. I ran a competing risks event history model 
to check if there was heterogeneity in structural arrangement choices for survivors and non-
survivors (Cleves et.al., 2016). I found that surviving firms were more likely to have chosen a 
hybrid structural arrangement compared to pure arrangements but non-survivors were more likely 
to have chosen a pure arrangement. These results conform to the main findings.  
Empirically, I tested my model using alternative distributional assumptions - proportional 
hazards Weibull and Gompertz specification (both allowing for monotonically 
increasing/decreasing hazard functions) and the results were supported (Cleves et.al., 2016). I also 
tested for the piecewise exponential distribution (a special case of the Weibull distribution when 
the scale parameter = 1) and found results in favor of the Weibull model. As suggested by Amezcua 
et.al. (2013), I plotted the Cox and Snell residuals for both distributions and the results showed the 
Weibull specification to have a superior fit. I also ran a fixed effects model with robust standard 
errors clustered on individual firms to which my results were robust.  
Finally, my sample is subject to a ‘rare event’ bias due to the infrequent nature of 
acquisitions and legacy divestitures relative to firm years (King and Zeng, 2001). A drawback of 
this issue is that the maximum likelihood estimation of the Cox model may be prone to small 
sample bias that underestimates the probability of acquisitions and divestitures. To address this, I 
ran my models using a rare event specification (relogit in STATA) to which my results were robust. 
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4.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Drawing on the resource reconfiguration perspective, I asked the following research question - For 
firms with a legacy technology orientation, how does resource reconfiguration through corporate 
scope decisions and their structural arrangement choices affect the likelihood of product market 
survival in evolving technology ecosystems?  I motivated my research question by emphasizing 
that the role of resource reconfiguration as an adaptive mechanism is critical for as firms in several 
legacy technology ecosystems are threatened by the emergence of new technologies. I found three 
inertia-related effects linked to product market survival in the evolving technology ecosystem 
related to mass market photography. A firm’s legacy technology orientation reinforces inertia, new 
technology alliances attenuate inertia and acquisitions and divestitures coupled with hybrid 
structural arrangements help reconcile the inertia of a legacy technology orientation with new 
technology adoption to improve the likelihood of product market survival. 
 
4.5.1 Contribution 
 
The growing body of research on resource reconfiguration has provided important insights into 
how the addition, subtraction, redeployment and recombination of firm resources facilitate the 
process of resource creation and renewal (e.g., Folta et.al., 2016; Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Karim 
and Capron, 2016). I contribute to this body of work by demonstrating the role of resource 
reconfiguration as an adaptive mechanism that reconciles the inertia of a firm’s legacy technology 
orientation with adaptation to a new technology to improve its likelihood of survival during 
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technological change. I do this by theoretically formulating and empirically testing the legacy 
reinforcement, attenuation and reconciliation effects.  
By introducing the legacy reinforcement effect, I show that the inertia of a firm’s legacy 
technology orientation is an instance of scope preservation. Scholarly research has conceptualized 
organizational inertia as a pathology that imperils firm survival. Several maladaptive mechanisms 
have been forwarded to explain the pathology including structural and cognitive inertia (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), competence and learning 
traps (Levinthal and March, 1993), over-commitment to inferior strategies (Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001; Christensen and Bower, 1996; Sull et.al., 1997) and competitive blind-spots (Zajac and 
Bazerman, 1991). I contribute to this body of work by providing a corporate strategy perspective 
wherein the inertia of a firm’s legacy technology orientation hinders the reconfiguration and 
adaptation of corporate scope through acquisitions and legacy divestitures during periods of 
change in technology ecosystems. By theorizing a firm’s legacy technology orientation in terms 
of its relative emphasis on technological knowledge, products and business units aligned to a 
legacy technology, I show that these organizational resources are a source of inertia associated 
with a legacy technology orientation (Karim, 2012). Thus, my work demonstrates how 
organizational inertia manifests as a pathology to precludes changes in a firm’s boundary decisions 
thereby attenuating its capacity to adapt to evolving technology ecosystems.  
Through the legacy attenuation effect, I contribute to research by emphasizing the 
importance of how corporate scope decisions mitigate the inertia of a legacy technology 
orientation. By demonstrating the role of new technology alliance experience in decreasing inertia 
associated with the legacy reinforcement effect, my work complements research emphasizing the 
role of alliancing as an adaptive mechanism when technology ecosystems face periods of change 
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(Anand et.al., 2010; Asgari et.al., 2017; Schilling, 2015). Since new technology alliance 
experience increases the likelihood of resource reconfiguration via acquisitions and legacy 
divestitures (scope modification), my work complements research emphasizing the importance of 
acquisitions and divestitures as agents of discontinuous or path breaking change that facilitate 
strategic renewal (Barkema and Schjiven, 2008; Karim and Mitchell, 2000). 
The legacy reconciliation effect shows that the choice of structural arrangements associated 
with corporate scope decisions (e.g., choosing hybrid over pure) was central to reconciling the 
tension between the inertia of a firm’s legacy technology orientation and adaptation to the new 
technology. Hybrid structural arrangements facilitated the joint deployment of high 
reconfiguration potential resources from both technologies while isolating low potential resources. 
Thus, they not only enabled new resource creation or legacy resource renewal but also helped 
develop a ‘common ground’ wherein resource combinations of both sets of technological resources 
harmonized the pre-existing legacy context with an emergent new technology context (Puranam 
et.al., 2009). These findings demonstrate that firm’s structural arrangement choices associated with 
acquisition and divestitures was an important determinant of the winners and losers within the 
evolving technology ecosystem. I contribute to the organization design literature by showing that 
structural arrangement choices are a source of firm heterogeneity in terms of addressing 
organizational inertia and impacting product market survival (Galbraith, 2014; Rumelt et.al., 
1994). For instance, the acquisition of Konica by Minolta was implemented through a pure 
integration arrangement (Konica Minolta website, 2003). While Minolta had advanced capabilities 
in digital photography, Konica’s core competence was in based on digital imaging products (e.g. 
scanners etc.)  suggesting that a hybrid arrangement may have been more suitable to accommodate 
the differences in the firms’ products (Griffith, 2014). Konica Minolta exited the digital camera 
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market in 2006 through a selloff to Sony Inc. (Konica Minolta website, 2006). It is notable that 
Sony integrated the acquired digital photography assets by giving autonomy to Konica Minolta’s 
design engineers (McNamara, 2006) – a hybrid structural arrangement. 
 
4.5.2 Managerial implications 
 
For corporate strategy practitioners, my findings emphasize the importance of corporate 
transactions - acquisitions and divestitures in overcoming inertia and the threat to survival 
associated with a legacy technology orientation. Scholarly work on corporate renewal has 
conceptualized the role of acquisitions and divestitures as drivers of corporate renewal through 
growth and retrenchment (Chakrabarti et.al., 2011), revitalization and rationalization (Ghoshal, 
1997) and investing in new growth opportunities and away from less promising avenues (Kaul, 
2012; Kuusela et.al., 2017; Vidal and Mitchell, 2015). I complement this body of work with a 
cautionary message for managers – a ‘legacy reinforcement effect’ associated with an entrenched 
commitment to a legacy technology that negatively affects corporate renewal programs by 
decreasing the likelihood of new technology acquisitions and legacy technology divestitures.  
Equally important is the management of a firm’s corporate development portfolio. My 
work expands on how the alliancing function contributes to corporate renewal by engaging with 
the new technology and developing insight into its technological knowledge and the rationale 
behind the threat posed by it to a legacy technology. A firm’s alliancing function is hence a critical 
resource during technological change as it increases managerial attention to legacy technology 
divestitures and new technology acquisitions (legacy attenuation effect) as part of a corporate 
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renewal program. An associated takeaway is the importance of managing the corporate portfolio 
through a holistic approach wherein decisions to ‘go it alone’, ally, acquire and divest should be 
designed as a coherent pattern aimed at resource and capability renewal rather than as siloed and 
stochastic (Capron and Mitchell, 2013; Dyer et.al., 2004). For instance, the legacy attenuation 
effect indicated that alliance experience leads to acquisitions and legacy divestitures. Hence, 
managers who consider the nuances of multiple corporate development activities will be 
strategically positioned to address inertia and enhance their firms’ chances of survival.  
Finally, managers may note the importance of being circumspect in their choices regarding 
how they integrate acquisitions and implement divestitures particularly as these choices have 
repercussions for product market survival through their capacity to reconcile conflicts arising from 
the co-existence of different technologies (legacy reconciliation effect). Scholarly work on 
implementation of corporate transactions has focused on issues such as determining the degree of 
acquisition integration and divestment (Moschieri and Mair, 2017; Puranam et.al., 2009; Zaheer 
et.al., 2013), implementation speed and agility (Graebner et.al., 2010), enablers and disrupters of 
implementation (Kapoor and Lim, 2008; Paruchuri et.al., 2006; Stahl and Voigt, 2008) and how 
implementation affects corporate renewal outcomes (Capron et.al., 1998, 2001; Graebner, 2004; 
Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). I complement this work by demonstrating that hybrid structural 
arrangements are a key determinant of whether firms can successfully adopt a new technology 
while retaining a selective focus on their legacy technology. These choices also affect the firm’s 
capacity to develop new technology assets or modify legacy technology assets through the 
recombination of fungible resources from both technologies while isolating less fungible resources 
to minimize the conflict between technologies.  
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4.5.3 Limitations and future research directions 
 
My work examined three corporate scope decisions (new technology alliances, acquisitions and 
legacy technology divestitures) as agents of resource reconfiguration. However, a firm’s decision 
to ‘go it alone’ (through internal development) is an alternative approach to resource 
reconfiguration through structural differentiation (Chesborough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Jansen 
et.al., 2009) or recombinant innovation (structural or resource related) (Galunic and Rodan, 1998; 
Karim and Kaul, 2015). I suggest that a prospective research program for scholars is to evaluate 
how internal development driven reconfiguration complements reconfiguration through alliances, 
acquisitions and divestitures. 
Although the number of acquisitions and legacy divestitures in my data sample may appear 
limited, the robustness checks indicated that this was not a significant issue.  I did not expect to 
find high numbers of acquisitions because attractive targets with digital photography capabilities 
may have preferred to retain autonomy thereby restricting the number of targets in the market for 
corporate control (Hitt et.al., 1996). My expectations were similar regarding legacy divestitures 
given the entrenched commitment to analog photography wherein firms identified with the 
technology and privileged a legacy technology orientation as a bet to compete with the substitutive 
threat of digital photography (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Moreover, as digital photography began 
to outperform analog photography, the market for corporate control would have been less attractive 
for firms trying to divest legacy technology resources. I suggest that to enhance the external 
validity of my study, scholars may contemplate studying alternative industries where inertia 
imposed by firms’ legacy technologies was addressed through corporate scope decisions.  
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The operationalization of structural arrangement choices focused on the degree to which 
firms integrated acquired resources or divested legacy technology resources. However, alternative 
aspects of organizational design such as degree of formalization and centralization, culture and 
control mechanisms also exercise influence on the implementation of corporate scope decisions 
(Galbraith, 2014). For example, in the legacy reconciliation effect, the mechanisms behind joint 
deployment of high reconfiguration potential resources are likely to be associated with informal 
as well as formal structures. Thus, how these aspects affect implementation of corporate scope 
decisions represents an avenue of future research. 
While the use of isolated regression models for acquisitions and legacy divestitures enabled 
me to observe the three hypothesized effects for the two dependent variables, this approach framed 
each as different system states wherein how one decision affected the other could not be evaluated 
(Dubin, 1978). I suggest that a prospective research stream of interest to scholars of corporate 
scope is the study of how different corporate scope decisions interact with each other and affect 
the overall composition, evolution and reconfiguration of the corporate development portfolio. For 
example, some scholarly research on resource reconfiguration has conceptualized acquisitions and 
divestitures as a duality (‘cooking sweet and sour’) by treating them as symbiotic and mutually 
reinforcing activities as part of a single system state promoting concurrent growth and 
retrenchment (Chakrabarti et.al., 2011; Ghoshal, 1997; Kuusela et.al., 2017). Acknowledging this 
duality reflects a dynamic approach to corporate scope with significant implications for growth 
and profitability. I incorporated the role of alliances as an important component of the corporate 
development portfolio for resource reconfiguration in addition to acquisitions and divestitures. 
Further, I theorized an interaction effect between firms’ alliancing experience and divestitures - a 
relationship that has received scant scholarly attention in corporate scope research.  
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While scholarly research on corporate scope has focused on interactions between alliances 
and acquisitions (Hsu and Prescott, 2017; Zollo and Reuer, 2010) and acquisitions and divestitures 
(Kaul, 2012; Kuusela et.al., 2017), the broader implications of how these interactions affect 
portfolio evolution and firm outcomes are yet to be uncovered. Thus, I suggest that evaluating how 
corporate scope decisions interact to shape corporate development portfolio and influence firm 
outcomes can lead to richer theory development and managerial insights into the contribution of 
corporate scope towards the firm’s corporate strategy. As managers develop insight into how these 
interactions affect portfolio composition and evolution, the process of portfolio reconfiguration 
can emerge as a dynamic capability that underpins firms’ corporate strategy to adapt as well as 
shape periods of technological change (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009). 
 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Given the increasing threat of substitution and obsolescence from emerging technologies, firms in 
legacy technology ecosystems cannot remain inertial and must adapt their corporate strategy to 
adapt to evolving technology ecosystems or face extinction. My study demonstrates that during 
technological change, resource reconfiguration through corporate scope decisions and their 
structural arrangement choices enable firms to overcome the inertia of a legacy technology 
orientation and improve the likelihood of product market survival. For corporate strategy and 
resource reconfiguration scholars, my work emphasizes the role of corporate scope and structural 
arrangement choices as options for resource reconfiguration through which firms can improve their 
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adaptability and likelihood of survival in dynamic, fast-paced environments. For managers, my 
paper demonstrates the need for awareness to acknowledge threats to legacy technologies and 
address these threats through appropriate corporate development decisions and their associated 
resource reconfiguration choices in evolving technology ecosystems. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF THE FEATURE IMPLEMENTATION GAP CALCULATION FOR A 
FIRM IN THE SAMPLE – CANON INC.  
 
In the table below, I show the yearly absent feature score δpt (where p = feature and t = year) 
between Canon Inc.’s digital camera design and the evolving digital camera dominant design for 
three sample years. I = Canon introduced feature (scored 0), A = feature absent from Canon’s 
design (scored 1) and NA = feature had not been introduced till that year in the digital camera 
product market (not considered in calculation). 
Year Optical 
zoom 
Removable 
Storage 
Higher 
(>) than 
VGA 
resolution 
LCD Video 
recording 
Digital 
zoom 
Feature 
implementation 
gap score 
1993 I A NA NA NA NA 0.5 
1995 I A A A A NA 0.8 
2001 I I I I A I 0.33 
 
Step 1: For the year 1993, two features of the evolving dominant design had been 
introduced (optical zoom and removable storage). Canon had introduced the optical zoom in its 
digital camera design coded as I (scored 0) but removable storage was absent hence was coded as 
A (scored 1) in the above table.  
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Step 2: Canon’s feature implementation gap for 1993 was δFD (gapt-overall) = (0+1)/2 = 0.5. 
The numerator is the sum of the scores for Canon’s features. I divide by two because the evolving 
dominant design had two features that had been introduced as of 1993 (but not institutionalized). 
In material terms, this meant that the threat to Canon’s survival in the digital camera product 
market increased by (1-exp (0.73*0.5)) or by 44 percent from the start of the era of ferment in 
1991 and 1993. (See main effect size of the feature implementation gap in table 4). 
Now, consider year 1995. Here, five features of the evolving dominant design had been 
introduced (all but digital zoom). Four of the five evolving dominant design features were absent 
from Canon’s design. Using the coding, the feature implementation gap was, δFD (gapt-overall) = 
(0+1+1+1+1)/5 = 0.8. Hence, Canon’s feature implementation gap increased to 0.8 because it had 
four evolving dominant design features absent from its design. In material terms, this meant that 
the threat to Canon’s survival increased to 79 percent (an increase of 35 percent from 1993). 
Now, consider the year 2001 (two years after the full dominant design was introduced in 
1999). Canon had introduced five of the six evolving dominant design features (i.e., absent feature 
score 0 for optical zoom, removable storage, higher than VGA resolution, LCD and digital zoom). 
Five of these features had been institutionalized as shown in table 1 above (removable storage and 
LCD – 1997; > VGA resolution – 1998; digital zoom and video recording – 1999). Canon’s feature 
implementation gap for 2001 was; δFD (gapt-overall) = (0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 1*2 + 0)/6 = 0.33. As two 
years had passed since the institutionalization of the video recording feature and Canon still had it 
absent in its design, I multiplied 1 by a risk factor of 2 (years since institutionalization) in 
accordance with my framing of added risk (given by φ –see operationalization in the empirical 
section on pages 38-40) (0.17 without the risk factor). In material terms, this meant that the threat 
to Canon’s survival decreased to 27 percent in 2001 (a decrease of 51 percent from 1995). 
APPENDIX B 
EXAMPLES OF HIGH AND LOW GROWTH ORIENTATION COMPANIES, 
GROWTH MODES CHOICES AND SURVIVAL OUTCOMES 
Examples can aid in delineating the trends observed in this paper to indicate their empirical 
importance. I evaluated the raw data sample and archival sources and discovered several instances 
where the hypothesized effects were supported for firms in both sets of product markets. I outline 
three cases here. 
Consider the popular and highly studied example of Cisco Inc. - a networking product 
market firm that survived my sample period and had an average growth orientation percentile rank 
of 83 for the overall sample period (Capron, 2013; Puranam et.al., 2003, 2006). However, in the 
decade between 1991-2001, it was consistently ranked in the top one percentile of the sample. 
Cisco          used      internal development growth mode to set up greenfield subsidiaries in the 
local area network (LAN),  wide area network (WAN), multiplexers, modems and fiber
optic network product markets. It formed alliances with Cabletron Systems Inc (1990, 1994), 
SynOptics Communications (1991), Chipcom (1994) to develop cutting edge networking products 
aligned to the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) technology, hubs and
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router modules. In the latter part of the sample period, as the product market focus shifted towards 
integrated voice, data and video capabilities, Cisco forged alliances with Olicom Inc. (1997) and 
Acer Inc. and CTC Communications (1999) to explore the possibility of developing integrated 
capabilities.  
Cisco used acquisitions primarily to exploit emerging growth niches. For instance, the 
acquisition of Kalpana Inc. (1994) was significant as it enabled Cisco to become the product 
market leader in ethernet switching that was a prominent growth market early in the sample period. 
It consolidated this position through multiple exploitative acquisitions, LightStream (1994), 
Internet Junction and Grand Junction Networks (1995). In 1996, Cisco’s acquisition of Stratacom 
enabled it to gain product market leadership in the fast-growing integrated voice, data and video 
segment due to the complementary capabilities across both firms. The firm exploited this position 
through subsequent acquisitions of Nashoba Networks (1996), SummaFour (1997) and Active 
Voice Corp. (2000). A broader acquisition program across the sample period facilitated Cisco to 
gain access to complementary technologies and capabilities and thus drive its growth orientation.  
During this period, Cisco’s revenue grew at a yearly average of 67% with an ROA of 22 
percent that was significantly greater than the product market average of 11 percent. It was ranked 
in the top one percentile of the sample firms in terms of growth orientation between 1991-2001. 
The firm’s stock traded at a yearly average of 31 (trailing twelve months earnings) reaching a high 
of 61.25 in 1999. 
A second example is that of 3Com Corp – another networking firm that survived my 
sample period and had an average growth orientation percentile rank of 81 for the overall sample 
period. However, in the decade between 1991-2001, it was also consistently ranked in the top one 
percentile of the sample. 
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3Com achieved organic growth through internal development by setting up autonomous 
operations in the fast-growing network transmission/devices, LAN and WAN product markets to 
explore these niches. It also formed alliances with IBM and Synernetics (1990) for product related 
R&D on token ring networks, hub and router technologies. It also collaborated with AT&T 
Microelectronics and Cascade Communications (1993) and formed a multi-partner alliance with 
Softbank Corp. and Toshiba (1994) to develop Ethernet switches and routers through joint 
exploration. In the latter part of the sample period, 3Com participated in alliances with Picturetel 
Corp. (1998), Intel Corp. and Bell Atlantic (1998) and Broadcom Corp (2000) to develop 
integrated video, voice and data offerings as the market for these products saw significant growth. 
3Com maintained an acquisition program early in the sample period to consolidate its position in 
the product market for hubs, routers and switches. The firm’s acquisitions of BICC (1992), StarTek 
(1993), alliance partner Synernetics (1994) and Chipcom (1996) provided it with exploitative focus 
around a broad range of networking related product markets. However, unlike Cisco, 3Com used 
acquisitions to exploit domains related pure data and packet switching technology solutions and 
did not initiate acquisitions into the integrated product market of voice, video and data alternatives. 
It also used the divestiture activity growth mode proactively by selling off its hardware and 
manufacturing operations located in Salt Lake City and Chicago to increase strategic focus around 
networking solutions.   
During this period, 3Com’s revenue grew at a yearly average of 42% with an ROA of 17 
percent that was significantly greater than the product market average of 11 percent. It was ranked 
in the top one percentile of the sample firms in terms of growth orientation between 1993-2002. 
The firm’s stock traded at a yearly average of 24 (trailing twelve months earnings) reaching a high 
of 42.55 in 1997. 
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A third instance of note refers to ADC Telecommunications Inc. – an equipment product 
market firm that began the sampler period with a low growth orientation that increased over time 
and contributed to the firm surviving the substitutive threat posed by computer networking and 
packet switching technologies. It primarily focused on exploration through internal development 
wherein it set up autonomous ventures in the LAN, WAN, multiplexers, modems and network 
components product market segments. However, the firm collaborated with Fulcrum 
Communications (1991) to develop fiber optic network capabilities, Hitachi Inc. (1995) to explore 
the possibility of bundling voice and data product lines and Netcomm Inc. (1995) for product R&D 
related to modems.  
Over the sample period, ADC maintained a high degree of exploitation in the acquisition 
and divestiture activity growth modes. In this, it strengthened its core competency in voice 
technologies for recombinant outcomes with computer networking capabilities leading to the 
development of integrated voice and data products. For instance, the acquisitions of Fibermux 
(1991) (fiber optic capabilities in data transmission), Photonics Applications Inc. and Codenoll 
Technologies (1996) (both targets providing equipment development capabilities) and Pairgain 
Technologies Inc. and Centigram Communications (2000) (both targets pertaining to data and 
voice integration) enabled ADC to integrate and develop a dual set of capabilities pertaining to 
telecommunication equipment (legacy) and networking (developed through exploration). Finally, 
ADC divested its telephonic cable manufacturing assets to C-Cor Inc. and its integrated business 
planning assets to Svi. IBP Ltd. in 2001 indicating a greater focus on computer networking and its 
integration with voice technologies. 
Between 1989-1995, ADC had an average growth orientation percentile rank of 23. 
However, between 1997-2003, this nearly tripled to 67 as the firm proactively adopted a growth 
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orientation based around product markets related to networking and subsequently, those involving 
integrated data, voice and video. Over the sample period, ADC’s revenue at a yearly average of 
27 percent with an ROA of 13 percent that was higher than the average of equipment product 
markets (8 percent). The firm’s stock traded at a yearly average of 16 (trailing twelve months 
earnings) reaching a high of 25.65 in 1997. 
Two critical insights emerge from this analysis. First, the way different growth modes 
affected the growth orientation and contributed to growth related outcomes is causally complex 
given the influence of multiple growth modes. Second, the choice of growth modes is a key 
underpinning of firm heterogeneity with the characteristic of equifinality. In the three examples 
above, the choice of growth modes varied significantly but each firm survived the sample period. 
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